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Abstract 
Transport and economic historians generally consider the change from moving goods 
principally on roads, inland waterways and coastal ships to moving them principally 
on railways as inevitable, unproblematic, and the result of technological 
improvements. While the benefits of rail travel were so clear that most other modes 
of passenger transport disappeared once rail service was introduced, railway goods 
transport did not offer as obvious an improvement over the existing goods transport 
network, known as the carrying trade. Initially most railways were open to the carrying 
trade, but by the 1840s railway companies began to provide goods carriage and 
exclude carriers from their lines. The resulting conflict over how, and by whom, goods 
would be transported on railways, known as the carrying question, lasted more than 
a decade, and railway companies did not come to dominate domestic goods carriage 
until the 1850s.  
 
In this study I develop a fuller picture of the carrying trade than currently exists, 
highlighting its multimodal collaborative structure and setting it within the ‘sociable 
economy’ of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England. I contrast this 
economy with the business model of joint-stock companies, including railway 
companies, and investigate responses to the business practices of these companies. 
I analyse the debate over railway company goods carriage, and identify changes in 
goods transport resulting from its introduction. 
 
Finally, I describe the development and outcome of the carrying question, showing 
that railway companies faced resistance to their attempts to control goods carriage on 
rail lines not only from the carrying trade but also from customers of goods transport, 
the government and the general public. I suggest some reasons why the railway 
companies were able to establish a monopoly over rail goods transport despite this 
resistance, and briefly describe the ramifications of the change in control of goods 
transport.  
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Introduction  
Purpose and scope of this study 
This study is a history of the carrying trade, the collective term for the multimodal 
network of hundreds of small businesses - carriers on roads, inland waterways and 
via coastal shipping, and the trades that supported them - that transported goods 
throughout England between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. It considers the 
change in the carrying trade between about 1750, by which time this domestic goods 
transport network was well established, and about 1850, by which time the national 
railway network had been largely constructed and railway companies had taken over 
much of the carrying trade’s role in the domestic economy.  
 
In this introduction I identify how this study contributes to and modifies existing 
transport history and the history of the Industrial Revolution. I review existing historical 
writing to highlight gaps in understanding the transition from the carrying trade to 
railway company carrying. I identify the work of historians of transport and other areas 
that I build on in this study. I then explain the parameters of this study and sources 
from which I draw evidence, and conclude with an outline of my arguments and the 
structure of this study.  
 
This study contributes in two ways to the conversation in transport and economic 
history about the change in domestic goods transport in England during the first half 
of the nineteenth century, from primarily on roads, inland waterways and coastal 
shipping to primarily on railways. First, it offers a wider view of the carrying trade 
during a period when both it and its economic context were changing rapidly. Second, 
it investigates, in more detail than has been previously considered, the relationship 
between the carrying trade and the first mainline railway companies.  
 
In 1825, after the repeal of the Bubble Act of 1720, Parliament began to authorise 
joint-stock companies to raise capital and obtain land to construct the first mainline, 
or trunk line, railways (railways connecting city pairs rather than the industrial railways 
that connected mines and water transport). These railways were conceived as 
transport infrastructure improvements similar to the turnpike roads, navigations and 
canals, and port and harbour improvements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, and were intended to facilitate users of transport, including the carrying 
trade. Until the 1850s the carrying trade incorporated railways into its multimodal 
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network in the same way that it had incorporated these earlier transport infrastructure 
improvements.  
 
The first mainline railway company prospectuses and enabling acts assumed that 
these companies would generate revenue from tolls charged to third parties using the 
line to transport goods; they did not suggest that significant revenue would be 
generated from providing passenger travel. But when the lines began to open in the 
early 1830s the high demand for passenger travel took everyone, including company 
directors and investors, by surprise. The Liverpool & Manchester Railway, for 
example, was so busy transporting passengers that it did not start regularly carrying 
goods for six months.1 When railway company directors realised how large and 
profitable passenger travel was, they focused on capturing the passenger and small 
parcels transport sector served by the coaching trade. The story of how the railways 
quickly came to dominate passenger transport is well described in transport and 
economic histories.2  
 
It does seem as if the change from coaching and other forms of passenger transport 
to rail passenger transport was generally as straightforward as it is typically 
represented. Rail travel was so much faster and, after legislation passed in 1844 
required companies to provide low-cost passenger services, less expensive than 
coaching that the coaching trade quickly disappeared, as many historians have 
noted.3 Aside from being faster, and eventually cheaper, railway passenger service 
offered orders of magnitude more capacity; between June and December 1831, for 
example, the Liverpool & Manchester Railway carried more than 250,000 passengers, 
while the total seating capacity of the coach routes between the two cities during the 
same period would have been 688 people.4  
 
                                                 
1 Robert Eugene Carlson, The Liverpool & Manchester Railway Project, 1821-1831 (Newton 
Abbot: David & Charles, 1969), 237. 
2 Michael Robbins, The Railway Age (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 35; 
James Joyce, The Story of Passenger Transport in Britain (London: Ian Allan, 1967), 67-69; 
Simon Bradley, The Railways ([not identified]: Profile Books, 2017), 57; Frank Ferneyhough, 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway 1830-1980 (London: Hale, 1980), 82, 119-121. 
3 B. R. Mitchell, ‘The Coming of the Railway and United Kingdom Economic Growth’, Journal 
of Economic History 24, no. 3 (September 1964): 317; T. R. Gourvish, Mark Huish and the 
London & North Western Railway: A Study of Management (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1972), 34. 
4 Mr. Glyn’s Report on Loco-Motive Engines, &c., Butterley, 11 May 1832, Thomas Telford 
Papers T/MT2, Institution of Civil Engineers, London. 
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By the 1840s, however, as the cost of constructing, operating and maintaining rail 
lines became better understood and as profit margins began to shrink, railway 
companies began to expand into less profitable goods transport, the work of the 
carrying rather than the coaching trade. Throughout the 1840s goods revenue made 
up an increasingly higher proportion of railway company revenues, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of total company revenue. During this period the question 
of whether railway companies should be permitted not only to provide their own goods 
carriage services but also to exclude carriers from their lines and thus effectively 
monopolise the carriage of goods, known at the time as the carrying question, was 
hotly debated in Parliament, in the courts, in public meetings, and in print. In this study 
I will show that by 1850 the question had been resolved formally, through legal 
precedent, in favour of the carrying trade, but informally and effectively in favour of 
the railway companies. By that time almost all railway companies operated their own 
goods carrying services and excluded carriers from their lines. Railway companies 
soon gained almost complete control over long-distance and regional carrying, both 
by railway and by canal, putting national and regional carriers out of business and 
exercising economic dominance over local carriers, which by this time largely served 
the railway companies, directly or indirectly. This study is the first to investigate in 
detail the origins, development and outcome of the carrying question, and to present 
the argument that, unlike passenger services, the change from the carrying trade to 
railway company goods carriage was both contentious and historically contingent.  
 
Historians of transport, economics and policy generally represent this change in 
domestic goods carriage in England, from the carrying trade to railway companies, as 
unproblematic and inevitable - the substitution of a superior technology for an inferior 
one - and take for granted that railway companies quickly achieved market dominance 
in both passenger and goods transport by offering cheaper and faster services.5 If rail 
goods transport was so clearly superior, however, some explanation is needed for 
why this change took nearly two decades, compared to the adoption of the rail network 
for passenger travel, which happened almost instantaneously. Harold Pollins 
acknowledges that this fact ‘needs explaining’, but covers the transition with a single 
sentence, ‘[t]he trend of opinion was soon in favour of the railway companies 
                                                 
5 Philip Bagwell and Peter Lyth, Transport in Britain: from Canal Lock to Gridlock (London: 
Hambledon and London, 2002), 58; T. C. Barker and Christopher I. Savage, An Economic 
History of Transport in Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1974), 67; Laurence Albert Williams, Road 
Transport in Cumbria in the Nineteenth Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975), 104, 142-155. 
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becoming carriers’.6 Harold Dyos and Derek Aldcroft also find the delay surprising, 
and write, conflating the carrying trade and canal transport, ‘it is not easy to see at 
first why the railways did not bite deep and hard into canal profits.’7 Gary Hawke, also 
conflating the carrying trade and canal transport, concludes that the delay was due to 
the fact that canal transport remained less expensive for some time after the railways 
began to transport goods.8 Philip S. Bagwell draws a similar conclusion; ‘[t]he failure 
of rail goods traffic to develop as rapidly as passenger travel was partly due to the 
relative cheapness of inland navigation’.9 Michael J. Freeman and Derek Aldcroft 
explain the slow growth of railway goods traffic by suggesting, contrary to evidence of 
the text of railway company prospectuses, that ‘[t]raffic managers were slow to 
perceive the potential scale of railway usage beyond the realm of passenger 
carriage.’10 Michael Robbins suggests that the slow development of rail goods traffic 
was due to lack of innovation in the private sector; '[o]nly after 1850 did the slower-
moving processes of industrial and commercial change in Britain catch up with the 
personal decisions of individuals'.11  
 
Although railways offered the individual passenger overwhelming improvements over 
coaching, in both lower cost and higher speed, these advantages were not necessarily 
clear to the business customers of goods transport services. W. T. Jackman first 
suggested that railway companies typically charged one half to one third of what the 
carrying trade charged to transport goods; later historians have generally agreed with 
this figure, although more recent work suggests that the difference was not always 
that great, and that ‘the railways’ cost advantages are not clear-cut’.12 Even if 
transporting goods by rail cost significantly less than by the carrying trade, however, 
goods transport costs in the early nineteenth century appear to have accounted for 
only about three per cent of the total cost of goods, so this reduction would only have 
                                                 
6 Harold Pollins, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 
1971), 55, 58. 
7 Harold James Dyos and Derek Howard Aldcroft, British Transport: An Economic Survey from 
the Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), 215. 
8 Gary Richard Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 55. 
9 Philip S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution 1770-1985 (London: Routledge, 2014), 98. 
10 Michael J. Freeman and Derek H. Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991), 18. 
11 Robbins, The Railway Age, 9. 
12 William T. Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1916), 607-608; Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in 
England and Wales, 1840-1870, 84-86; Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 45-48; quote from 
Maw, Transport and the Industrial City, 86-88. 
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decreased this cost by about two per cent.13 As I will suggest in chapter 2, this 
relatively small reduction in the total cost of goods, less than half the typically hotly 
debated 5 to 10 per cent discounts sellers often offered for reduced credit periods, is 
unlikely to have had a significant effect on buyers’ and sellers’ transport decisions.  
 
Buyers and sellers of goods were also generally less interested in the speed with 
which they were transported. Goods sent by carrier were typically left at inns and 
warehouses for receivers to collect at their convenience; with few exceptions, goods 
carriage was not particularly time-sensitive, and higher speed was generally not 
sought or valued. As one merchant pointed out in his testimony to Parliament in 1840, 
for example, ‘if there is a delay in the delivery of the goods it is of no importance 
having them quickly conveyed.’14 Lower cost and higher speed were the most salient 
advantages that railway company carrying had to offer passengers; however, goods 
transport customers typically sought adaptability, consistency, reliability, and value for 
money. The carrying trade, which had spent centuries adapting its business practices 
to its customers’ needs and requirements, met these needs and requirements more 
effectively and consistently than railway companies, whose business practices were 
designed to serve the passenger and small parcels trade. 
 
If railway companies did not provide a service that customers of goods transport 
wanted or valued, how did they come to dominate the goods transport market? In this 
study I suggest three reasons. First, railway companies acted collectively to achieve 
their political and economic goals, while the carrying trade was unable to organise on 
a national or even a regional or local scale. Second, profits from passenger services 
provided railway companies with financial resources that dwarfed those of the 
carrying trade, resources which they were able to use against less well capitalised 
carriers. Finally, as each railway company had to develop a relationship with 
Parliament to obtain its enabling act, company directors had influence within 
government that the carrying trade had no reason or opportunity to acquire. 
 
In addition to challenging some of the current thinking among transport and economic 
historians about the transition from the carrying trade to railway company carrying, 
                                                 
13 Dorian Gerhold, Carriers & Coachmasters: Trade and Travel before the Turnpikes 
(Chichester: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 2005), 38; Gerard L. Turnbull, ‘Provincial road carrying in 
the 18th century’, Journal of Transport History new series 4 (1977): 34. 
14 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, 10 July 1840, 57. 
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this study also highlights the significance of this change in goods distribution to the 
history of the Industrial Revolution. Since the nineteenth century economic historians 
have investigated the causes and consequences of the Industrial Revolution by 
focusing on changes in manufacture and production. More recently such social and 
cultural historians as Maxine Berg, Lorna Weatherill and John Brewer have 
highlighted the role of consumption in driving the Industrial Revolution through the 
development of national and global economies, the formation of a national market for 
fashion and the creation and dissemination of taste.15 Less has been written extending 
this work on consumption in the Industrial Revolution into the nineteenth century.16 
Although, as I will discuss in more detail below, historians such as John Chartres, Jon 
Stobart and David Hancock address the significance of the development of 
distribution networks, the role of distribution is still little understood in this context.17  
 
I argue that before the development of the railway network in England the carrying 
trade, by providing an efficient, affordable and comprehensive goods transport service 
that facilitated multistage manufacture and wholesale and retail distribution, played a 
significant role in the development of many industries important in the Industrial 
Revolution. This aspect of the goods transport network is not addressed by transport 
historians, and historians writing about the Industrial Revolution have yet to integrate 
fully the work of transport historians on the change in England’s goods distribution 
network into their own understanding of economic development in eighteenth and 
early nineteenth-century England. In this study I attempt to bridge the gap between 
transport history and social and economic history by adding to both the economic 
history of production and the social history of consumption a fuller understanding of 
the operation of the goods distribution network, and its development and change 
during the Industrial Revolution. 
 
                                                 
15 Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Lorna Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-
1760 (London: Routledge, 1996); John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., Consumption and the 
World of Goods (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
16 Maxine Berg, ‘Consumption in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain’, in The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain vol 1, eds. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 357-386. 
17 John Chartres, ‘Road Transport and Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century’, in New 
Directions in Economic and Social History, eds. A. Digby, C. Feinstein, D. Jenkins 
(London: Palgrave, 1992); Jon Stobart, Sugar and Spice: Grocers and Groceries in Provincial 
England, 1650-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); David Hancock, Citizens of the 
World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Historians have typically not considered the change in the structure of goods 
distribution in England, from a network of small businesses operating on infrastructure 
assets provided by others to railway companies providing both infrastructure and 
exclusive transport services, as something that requires a great deal of explanation. 
W. T. Jackman’s interpretation of this change, mentioned in a footnote, is typical:  
when railways began to be worked on a large scale with locomotive power, it 
was found that the necessities of the case demanded the non-recognition of 
this Parliamentary safeguard [against railway companies monopolising goods 
carriage on their lines].18 
 
Jackman attributes the change in government policy, allowing railways to control 
regional and national goods carriage, to some unidentified outside influence (‘it was 
found’, ‘necessities…demanded’) rather than the outcome of a political and economic 
conflict between two groups with different interests or, as I will argue, between two 
groups relying on, and engaging with each other using, different business models. 
Frank Dobbin uses similar wording: ‘[b]y 1840, Parliament recognized that railway 
technology made free public access to the rails impracticable.’19 Philip S. Bagwell 
describes the elimination of the long-distance carrying trade as one of several 
‘decisive improvements in organisation’ resulting in a 'more business-like organisation 
of railway freight traffic’.20 Many historians, like Stephen Hughes, suggest that railway 
companies were required to act as monopoly transport service providers due to safety 
concerns: ‘[i]n these new fully-developed modern public railways a company had to 
run all its own timetabled trains simply to avoid the risks of the collisions.’21 As I will 
show in this study, however, the change in the way goods were transported in England 
during this period was less the result of a change in technology than of a change in 
the economic structure of the goods transport sector - the replacement of hundreds 
of small businesses informally collaborating within a loose social and regulatory 
framework with a small number of joint-stock firms working collectively through formal 
organisations. The carrying question pitted the business model of the ‘sociable 
economy’, which I will discuss in chapter 2, against the transactional and managerial 
model of the joint-stock railway companies, which I will discuss in chapter 3, and the 
latter emerged victorious, with consequences for the way business in general, not just 
goods transport, was done. 
                                                 
18 Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England, 574 footnote 5. 
19 Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway 
Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 200. 
20 Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 101. 
21 Stephen Hughes, ‘The emergence of the public railway in Wales,’ in Early Railways 4: 
Papers from the Fourth International Early Railways Conference, ed. Grahame Boyes 
(Sudbury, Suffolk: Six Martlets Press, 2010), 124. 
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In order to demonstrate that the transition from the carrying trade to railway company 
carrying was not a simple technological change between modes of transport but rather 
a conflict between two types of business practice, I will present the following 
arguments. First, I will argue that, rather than a set of isolated and competing transport 
modes, as pre-railway goods transport is usually described, the carrying trade was a 
complex and sophisticated multimodal network of small businesses that collaborated 
with each other, with such related businesses as carrying inns and infrastructure 
managers, and with buyers and sellers of goods, in the context of a ‘sociable 
economy’ built on trust, credit and personal relationships. Second, I will contrast this 
business model with the managerial and transactional business model of joint-stock 
companies, in which policy and decision-making are based on short-term and 
narrowly defined business interests, such as revenue and profit, rather than on 
developing and maintaining long-term business relationships. I will identify ways in 
which those who dealt with joint-stock companies attempted to control or mitigate the 
harm caused by their business practices. Finally, I will show that the carrying question, 
the conflict over control of goods carriage on rail lines, was part of this larger conflict 
between these two business models, and that the fact that joint-stock companies 
emerged victorious, despite strong opposition and lack of support from other social 
structures and institutions, had consequences for the economy as a whole. 
 
In order to provide this history and make these arguments, in addition to using 
evidence from sources used by other historians researching the development of 
transport in England during this period (newspaper articles, railway and canal 
company records, government records, and quantitative information extracted from 
business directories) I also provide evidence from sources less often used in transport 
history: business correspondence describing the logistics of goods transport and the 
relations among the parties involved, evidence and rulings presented in lawsuits 
between carriers and railways, the Parliamentary Select Committee testimony of 
those involved in the carrying question, and, thanks to the availability of digitised 
documents, wills, ephemera, pamphlets, newspaper articles and books written by 
parties supporting both the carrying trade and the railway companies.  
 
Historical background and literature review 
In this section I first briefly mention the principal works in transport history, railway 
history, and the history of economic development that either do not acknowledge the 
18 
 
 
existence of the carrying trade or conflate it with passenger transport, to demonstrate 
that this study fills a gap in existing transport history. I then identify and review 
historical research that addresses the carrying trade, both directly and indirectly, and 
explain how my work builds on and expands this research. Finally, I mention the work 
of historians on other subjects - sociability, trust, credit, and management – that I have 
drawn on to help contextualise and understand the carrying question. 
 
Before I review the existing historical literature I must first clarify the distinction 
between the coaching (passenger) and carrying (goods) trades, as historians often 
conflate the two. Alan Everitt, for example, writes that ‘[w]ithin a few years of the 
establishment of rail connections…the old long-distance coach and carrying trade… 
was extinct.’22 Jon Stobart refers indiscriminately to ‘coaches and carriers’ in his 
description of the pre-railway transport network.23 J. S. Jeans claims that ‘[t]he vested 
interest of stage-coach proprietors and carriers offered a strenuous objection to the 
new system’ when in fact, as I will describe in chapter 4, carriers were eager to 
collaborate with railway companies.24 Laurence Albert Williams’ work on the 
development of rail lines in Cumbria, and the subsequent decline in turnpike tolls, is 
mostly about passenger service, with a single mention that railway goods rates for 
general merchandise were less by rail than by other modes, but the only goods rates 
Williams quotes are for coal; by not distinguishing between the coaching trade, the 
carrying trade, and the use of railways in mining, Williams fails to explain fully the 
events he describes.25 Harold Pollins, in Britain’s Railways, confusingly refers to 
carrying as ‘road coaching’.26 Roy Church’s phrase ‘the replacement of packhorse 
[used for goods carrying] with stage coach [used for passenger travel]’ indicates a 
basic misunderstanding of the pre-railway transport system.27 
 
                                                 
22 Alan Milner Everitt, ‘Town and Country in Victorian Leicestershire: The Role of the Village 
Carrier’, in Perspectives in English Urban History, ed. Alan Milner Everitt (London: Macmillan, 
1973), 217. 
23 Jon Stobart, The First Industrial Region: North-West England, c.1700-60 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013), 47-50, 190. 
24 James S. Jeans, Railway Problems (London: Routledge, 1998), 7. 
25 Williams, Road Transport in Cumbria in the Nineteenth Century, 142-155.  
26 Pollins, Britain’s Railways, 67. 
27 Roy Church, ‘Ossified or Dynamic? Structure, Markets and the Competitive Process in the 
British Business System of the Nineteenth Century’, Business History 42, no. 1 (January 
2000): 8. 
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The carrying trade, as I have mentioned, was a network of small businesses which 
transported goods, as well as occasionally carrying passengers for low fares.28 The 
coaching trade, made up of private coach companies and, after 1784, the Post Office, 
transported passengers, letters and small parcels. The coaching trade and carrying 
trade served different types of customers; the coaching trade served individuals as 
passengers or senders of letters and small parcels while, although carriers 
transported personal goods and occasionally people, the carrying trade primarily 
served businesses that bought and sold raw materials and manufactured products.  
 
In addition to conflating coaching and carrying, transport and economic historians 
tend to describe developments in transport in ways that obscure the role of the 
carrying trade. Many, like Charles Hadfield and Jack Simmons, write about specific 
‘transport sectors’ or modes of transport.29 My review of these historians’ work, and 
of transport history in general, suggests that these historians, like most historians of 
transport, are interested in the origins and development of specific modes (mostly 
canals and railways, but also roads, shipping, and later aviation and cycling), 
describing the political, economic and technical issues relating to the conception, 
design, and construction of infrastructure as well as the growth of each mode into a 
national network. This focus on single competing modes is sensible when describing 
the passenger transport network; when planning journeys people do typically 
consider, for example, whether to drive or take a bus, or to fly or take a train, weighing 
various factors to make the decision. This model does not, however, accurately 
describe the goods transport network which, as I explain in chapter 1, often employed, 
and typically still employs, more than one mode to accomplish a single journey. 
 
Historians who focus on economic development, like Jon Stobart, Neil Raven, Derek 
Aldcroft, Michael J. Freeman and Rick Szostak, and John F. Wilson and John 
Singleton, consider transport as a facilitator of production and consumption, and use 
the availability and capacity of infrastructure links between destinations as a factor to 
help explain economic change and to compare the development of regions and 
economic sectors. These scholars primarily focus on the construction or improvement 
of road, inland waterway, port or rail infrastructure, rather than the actual movement 
                                                 
28 I do not address this aspect of the carrying trade in this study, as it was quickly replaced by 
third-class passenger transport on railways after the 1844 Railway Regulation Act required 
companies to provide ‘penny a mile’ service. 
29 Charles Hadfield, British Canals, An Illustrated History (London: Phoenix, 1950); Jack 
Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830–1914 (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1978). 
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of goods, and seem to assume that once infrastructure connecting two destinations 
is provided or improved that trade between them automatically occurs or increases.30 
This assumption that transport infrastructure leads to trade and development 
continues to drive government decision-making, as Luke Patey points out, leading 
governments and global development organisations to fund the construction of 
transport infrastructure in the expectation that the inevitable economic growth that 
follows will retroactively pay for it.31 
 
Transport historians typically write about three subjects - the financing, design and 
construction of transport infrastructure (during this period, roads, canals, railways, and 
the vehicles that travel on them), the management of infrastructure companies, and 
the role of government as facilitator or regulator of infrastructure development.32 
William Albert identifies this pattern, suggesting that transport historians focus on 
these issues to provide examples and instruction for developing countries and to 
demonstrate that unregulated private enterprise - the way the railway network in 
Britain is generally portrayed as having developed - leads to superior results, and, 
therefore, to argue implicitly that public support for infrastructure development, in 
either the developing or the developed world, is unnecessary and potentially 
counterproductive.33 This portrayal of the development of Britain’s canal and railway 
infrastructure as entirely the work of private capital is at best incomplete, as it leaves 
out the role, both direct (through the Exchequer Bill Loan Commission) and indirect 
(through money disbursed via the Slave Compensation Act of 1837), of public finance 
in constructing the network; this history of transport infrastructure development in 
nineteenth-century Britain has not yet been written.34 
 
                                                 
30 Neil Raven and Jon Stobart, eds., Towns, Regions and Industries: Urban and Industrial 
Change in the Midlands, c.1700-1840 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, c2005), 80; 
Derek Aldcroft and Michael J. Freeman, Transport in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983), 106-107, 122-123, 128-129, 200-202; Rick Szostak, The 
Role of Transportation in the Industrial Revolution (Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, c1991), 58; John F. Wilson and John Singleton, ‘The Manchester industrial district, 
1750-1939: clustering, networking and performance’, in Industrial Clusters and Regional 
Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, eds. John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp (London: 
Routledge, 2017), 46. 
31 Luke Patey, ‘The Chinese Model is Failing Africa’, Financial Times, 26 August 2018. 
32 Any book on canal or railway history will address these issues. Charles Hadfield’s body of 
work on the English canal system is an example of the genre. 
33 William Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England: 1663-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 1.  
34 L. T. C. Rolt, Thomas Telford (London: Longmans, 1958), 158; ‘Legacies of British Slave-
ownership’, accessed 14 September 2018, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/. 
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Transport historians who write about the rail sector, like other transport historians, 
typically consider railway company goods carrying a natural outgrowth of the logistical 
and technical requirements of rail technology; the role of the carrying trade in the 
history of English railways is generally not recognised. Some acknowledge that 
carriers initially used rail lines, and that the question of whether carriers or railway 
companies should manage rail goods transport services was not immediately settled. 
Many others, however, who consider railway companies’ monopoly of both passenger 
and goods carriage on their lines as a defining characteristic of the ‘true’ or ‘modern’ 
railway, find it necessary to assert, for example, that the Liverpool & Manchester 
Railway Company, generally considered the first ‘modern’ railway, chose ‘not [to] 
employ contractors for the conveyance of traffic on their railway, but to handle all the 
business directly’ in order to ensure that it fits this definition.35 Bagwell and others 
claim incorrectly that ‘[f]rom the date of [the Liverpool & Manchester Railway’s] 
opening…it was managed and run solely by the company which made all the 
arrangements for carriage of both goods and passengers.’36 The history of pre-
mainline railways has attracted enough specialist interest to support an International 
Early Railways Conference every three to four years since 1998.37 Despite its 
significance to rail transport during this period, papers published from these 
conferences do not mention the carrying trade; its sole appearance is in a quotation 
by Francis Wright, chairman of the Cromford and High Peak Rail Road, explaining the 
line’s financial failure.38 The carrying question is occasionally mentioned indirectly and 
in passing, as a transition period, deviation or dead end in the development of the 
modern railway.39  
 
                                                 
35 T. R. Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1980), 
27; Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy, 200; Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England 
and Wales, 1840-1870, 317; Robbins, The Railway Age, 77; Simmons, The Railway in 
England and Wales, 19; Sydney Charles Williams, Economics of Railway Transport (London: 
Macmillan, 1910); Robbins, The Railway Age, 13. 
36 Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 76, 80; Dyos and Aldcroft, British Transport, 24.  
37 Andy Guy and Jim Rees, eds., Early Railways: A Selection of Papers from the First 
International Early Railways Conference (London: Newcomen Society 2001); M. J. T. Lewis, 
ed., Early Railways 2: Papers from the Second International Early Railways Conference 
(London: Newcomen Society, 2003); Michael R. Bailey, ed., Early Railways 3: Papers from 
the Third International Early Railways Conference (Sudbury: Six Martlets Publishing, 2006); 
Boyes, Early Railways 4. 
38 David Hodgkins, ‘Success and failure in making the transition to a modern railway: the 
Liverpool & Manchester and Cromford & High Peak,’ in Early Railways 2, 61; Maurice W. Kirby, 
The Origins of Railway Enterprise: the Stockton and Darlington Railway, 1821-1863 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 37, 90, 95, 110, 139; Carlson, The Liverpool 
& Manchester Railway Project, 179, 184, 201, 204, 207, 245.  
39 Winifred Stokes, ‘Who ran the early railways? The case of the Clarence,’ Early Railways 2, 
81; Stephen Hughes, ‘The emergence of the public railway in Wales,’ Early Railways 4,121. 
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Although most transport historians, with their focus on physical infrastructure, internal 
company management, and relations with government, do not mention the carrying 
trade, a few do recognise its existence. W. T. Jackman’s comprehensive 
Development of Transportation in Modern England, published in 1916, includes a 
great deal of material about the carrying trade in the seventeenth century and after 
1750, identifying its multimodal nature and addressing its attempts to operate on rail 
lines.40 However, like later historians, he states categorically that ‘experience had 
clearly shown that this right [of carrier access to rail lines] could not be exercised 
without great danger to the public.’41 Some histories of the Stockton & Darlington and 
Liverpool & Manchester Railways mention these companies’ relationships with the 
carrying trade, though without a clear understanding of how the latter operated; they 
do not mention carriers’ organisational structures, requirements, objectives and 
operations, or the business arrangements between carrying firms and railway 
companies. Robert Carlson’s history of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway mentions 
in passing that the line ‘was a public highway like any turnpike road and was open to 
all users’, and R. H. G. Thomas describes negotiations between the directors of the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company and carrier John Hargreaves.42 
 
My description in chapter 1 of the structure and operation of the carrying trade builds 
on the work of two historians, Dorian Gerhold and Gerald Turnbull, who have written 
about two regional carrying firms, Russells Flying Waggons (which served London 
and the southwest) and Pickfords (which served London and Manchester). Gerhold 
uses the extensive business records of Russell’s Flying Waggons, preserved in the 
National Archives’ Court of Exchequer documents as evidence in a lawsuit between 
the firm’s partners, to examine the structure and operations of the firm, how they 
determined their rates, what goods they carried and for whom. Gerhold briefly 
mentions the evolution of the relationship between Russells and the Great Western 
Railway, which started providing services in the region in 1841; ‘[a]t first, carriers 
regarded railways as a new variety of turnpike on which to conduct their own 
businesses,’ but due to the nature of rail operations ‘[i]t was inevitable…that where 
railways existed, carriers would have a drastically reduced role’.43 Gerhold, like the 
                                                 
40 Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England, 306, 309-310. 
41 Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England, 747. 
42 Carlson, The Liverpool & Manchester Railway Project, 179; Ronald H. G. Thomas, The 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway (London: B.T. Batsford, 1980), 95-98, 207. 
43 Dorian Gerhold, Road Transport before the Railways: Russell’s London Flying Waggons 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 206. 
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historians I mention above, seems to consider the carrying trade as a technology 
clearly inferior to rail transport and inevitably to be supplanted by it. 
 
Turnbull’s study is a similarly detailed description of the development of Pickfords, 
drawn from company and government records. Turnbull describes the relationship 
between Pickfords and two railway companies, the London & Birmingham and the 
Grand Junction. Pickfords had an agreement with the London & Birmingham Railway 
Company until 1846, when the company merged with two others to form the London 
& North Western Railway Company. In the 1840s Pickfords was forced to cease 
carrying on the Grand Junction Railway, even after it won a series of high-profile 
lawsuits against the company; the Grand Junction also became part of the London & 
North Western Railway Company in 1846, and the Grand Junction’s officials were the 
driving force behind the new company’s exclusive carrying policy.44 Turnbull explains 
how Pickfords managed the restriction of its business in the 1840s and 1850s, and 
continued to survive into the present day, by becoming an agent of the railway 
companies. 
 
Neither Russells nor Pickfords were typical carrying firms; they were both unusually 
large, and it is unusual that a substantial number of business records of both firms 
have been preserved (Russells due to the lawsuit among the partners and Pickfords 
due to their continuing to exist). These company histories, as well as other work by 
Gerhold, Turnbull and other historians who have researched other aspects of the 
carrying trade, which I will describe in more detail in chapter 1, were a useful starting 
point for my analysis of the carrying trade as a whole. The focus of my analysis, 
however, is different from that of these historians. In this study I highlight the 
intermodal and collaborative nature of the carrying trade - how carriers worked with 
each other to move goods, and adapted their business practices to their customers’ 
needs and requirements. I contrast this collaborative way of doing business, both 
between carriers and between carriers and customers, with the contractual and 
transactional way railway companies interacted with their customers and competitors. 
 
Aside from the work of the transport and economic historians I have mentioned, in 
this study I also build on the work of several scholars in different areas whose 
                                                 
44 Gerald L. Turnbull, Traffic and Transport (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 106-122. 
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research is relevant to understanding the carrying trade and the carrying question.45 
My understanding of the ‘sociable economy’ within which the carrying trade operated 
is based largely on the work of Craig Muldrew, who analyses the economic structure 
of early eighteenth-century England.46 My own research, as well as that of other 
historians, suggests that the business model Muldrew describes, based on long-term 
credit exchanged in the context of carefully-cultivated personal connections, 
continued into the early nineteenth century and beyond. Gillian Cookson, Max Weber 
and E. P. Thompson also describe and analyse this type of economic interaction 
within specific groups and business sectors, and Margot Finn and Deborah Valenze 
have investigated other aspects of this business model.47 In this study I demonstrate 
that the carrying trade both conformed to this business model in its own economic 
behaviour and facilitated it by providing ways for participants to maintain social 
connections by exchanging gifts, information and favours. Although railway 
companies ostensibly provided a similar goods transport service, they did not 
explicitly facilitate the ‘sociable economy’ and in fact their own business model 
undermined it. 
 
The first mainline railway companies were joint-stock companies. My assessment of 
the business model and economic behaviour of railway companies is based on Sidney 
Pollard’s The Genesis of Modern Management and James Taylor’s Creating 
Capitalism.48 Pollard, an economic historian, was specifically interested in the 
relationship between labour and management in industrial settings, and how non-
economic factors affected economic behaviour; his book addresses the history and 
structure of this relationship and investigates how people behave within joint-stock 
companies. At the time James Taylor wrote Creating Capitalism his research focused 
on corporate governance and commercial fraud; his book describes the social and 
                                                 
45 I will provide more detailed consideration of their work, and the work of other scholars I have 
identified here, in the chapters where it appears. 
46 Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in 
Early Modern England (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). 
47 Gillian Cookson, 'Family firms and business networks: Textile engineering in Yorkshire, 
1780-1830', Business History 39, no. 1 (1997); Max Weber and Colin Loader, ‘“Churches” and 
“Sects” in North America: An Ecclesiastical Socio-Political Sketch’, Sociological Theory 3, no. 
1 (1985): 7-13; E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture 
(London: Merlin Press, 2010); Margot C. Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in 
English Culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Deborah M. 
Valenze, The Social Life of Money in the English Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
48 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University 
Press, 1965); James Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and 
Culture, 1800–1870 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2006). 
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political reactions to the introduction of the joint-stock business model into the early 
nineteenth-century English economy, with particular reference to public concern 
about fraud and other unethical corporate behaviour. As my own research 
demonstrates that railway companies’ business practices and styles of interaction 
resemble those of other contemporary joint-stock firms, their analysis of the behaviour 
of joint-stock companies helps to put the actions of railway companies with regard to 
the carrying question into context. I have also drawn on Mark S. R. Jenner's research 
on customers' and government's responses to the business practices of the joint-stock 
companies supplying water to London in the 1820s to show that the business 
behaviours and others’ responses to them over the carrying question were not unique 
to railway companies.49 My exploration of responses to railway company goods 
carrying policy also builds on the work of R. W. Kostal, who analyses the 'small 
package wars' in his book on the legal issues related to railway companies, and to 
Frank Dobbin, whose research highlights government responses to the growth of 
joint-stock firms in England during this period.50 Kostal’s and Dobbin’s work help to 
put the carrying question into a larger context of the government’s unsuccessful 
attempts to control the behaviour of joint-stock companies in the early nineteenth 
century, in the courts and through legislation. 
 
Parameters of this study 
To make my arguments about the carrying question clearer, limit the amount of 
evidence reviewed, and present a consistent picture of the changing economy which 
is not affected by national variations, I have limited the geographical scope of this 
study to England. Because the political, financial, commercial, legislative and 
economic issues surrounding international trade render the subject complex, and 
because other scholars, particularly David Hancock, have already addressed 
international trade in this context, this study focuses exclusively on goods transport 
within England; I have not included evidence relating to goods transport outside 
England except as it relates to internal transport links (for example, between inland 
waterways and international ports).51 Although where relevant to my arguments I 
                                                 
49 Mark S. R. Jenner, 'Monopoly, Markets and Public Health: Pollution and Commerce in the 
History of London Water 1780-1830’, In Medicine and the Market in Pre-Modern England and 
its Colonies 1450-1850, eds. Mark S. R. Jenner and Patrick Wallis (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007). 
50 R. W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Dobbin, 
Forging Industrial Policy. 
51 Hancock, Citizens of the World; David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the 
Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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discuss how carriers used transport infrastructure - roads and turnpikes; rivers, 
navigations and canals; and coastal port facilities, as well as rail lines - I do not 
address the financing, construction and management of this infrastructure as this 
topic has already been exhaustively covered in both general transport histories and 
books and articles about each transport mode.52 This study does not address 
passenger transport for the same reason. Because the carriage of bulk goods has its 
own requirements and constraints, because other scholars have already written about 
the carriage of bulk goods, particularly coal, and because before the middle of the 
nineteenth century mainline railway companies were not interested in the carriage of 
bulk goods, this study focuses on the carrying of general merchandise, and does not 
discuss the carriage of bulk goods except where relevant to the development and 
characteristics of the goods transport network.53 Some of these parameters serve to 
limit the amount of material to review in a consistent way, and others to avoid 
duplicating or recreating the work of other historians; none seem likely to affect the 
nature of the evidence I use in my arguments. I will discuss the limitations of evidence 
as I provide it; in my conclusion I will summarise this discussion and identify the 
potential effects on my arguments of including new or different evidence. 
 
Structure of this study 
This study describes and analyses the carrying question and its outcome in four 
sections: 
 The structure and operation of the carrying trade  
 The carrying trade and the ‘sociable economy’  
 The business model of joint-stock companies  
 The carrying question and its outcome  
 
                                                 
52 For general economic and transport history please refer to the footnotes earlier in this 
chapter. For roads and turnpikes: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The Story of the King's Highway 
(London: Cass, 1963); Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England, 1663-1840; John R. 
Copeland, Roads and their Traffic (London: David & Charles, 1968). For inland waterways: 
the work of Charles Hadfield; Thomas Stuart Willan, River Navigation in England 1600-1750 
(London: Cass, 1964); Peter Maw, Transport and the Industrial City: Manchester and the 
Canal Age, 1750-1850 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); John Douglas 
Porteous, Canal Ports: The Urban Achievement of the Canal Age (London: Academic Press, 
1977). For coastal shipping: the work of John Armstrong; Thomas Stuart Willan, The English 
Coasting Trade, 1600-1750 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967); John 
Armstrong, ed., Coastal and Short Sea Shipping (London: Ashgate, 1996). 
53 John Ulric Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry (London: Cass, 1966); Fifth Report, 
531. 
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In chapter 1 I review the research of Dorian Gerhold, Gerald Turnbull and others to 
synthesise what is currently understood about the carrying trade, then expand this 
understanding of the carrying trade from individual carrying firms to the multimodal 
goods carriage network, including carriers and the other businesses - carrying inns, 
transport infrastructure companies, and the Post Office - that supported them. I 
describe the structure and operation of the carrying trade and interaction among 
carriers and between carriers and their support networks. I identify the legal and 
regulatory frameworks affecting carrying, and conclude with some thoughts on the 
role of the carrier in the society and culture of Georgian England. Transport and 
economic historians generally describe goods carriage before the railways as 
unsophisticated and poorly-organised, on bad roads and slow canals, a technological 
constraint on economic development which was removed by the railways. I argue 
instead that, although not centrally managed or controlled, the carrying trade was well 
organised and adaptable, and that it facilitated economic interaction, specialisation of 
production and the development of national markets. I draw evidence for the 
arguments in this chapter from transport, economic, social and local histories and 
from a variety of sources including newspaper articles, pamphlets, legal records, wills, 
literature and trade cards. 
 
In chapter 2 I focus in more detail on the business structures of both carrying firms 
and their customers, and the way businesses interacted with and through carriers. I 
begin the chapter by developing the idea of the ‘sociable economy’ described by Craig 
Muldrew and others. I then use evidence primarily from the correspondence of twenty 
businesses that employed carriers, held in ten archives around the country, to show 
how the carrying trade facilitated and was integrated into the kind of economy 
described by Muldrew, in which economic interaction took place in the context of a 
social structure based on credit and personal relationships. Carriers both worked 
within this business structure and facilitated its operation, providing a way for people 
doing business with each other to establish, maintain and strengthen personal 
relationships. These relationships allowed long-term credit to be given and accepted, 
and disagreements or conflicts to be resolved informally, without the necessity of legal 
or government intervention. 
 
In chapter 3 I contrast the business model of the ‘sociable economy’ I developed in 
chapter 2 with the business model of the joint-stock company, based on different 
principles and operating outside of and differently from this economy. I begin by 
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arguing that the first mainline railway companies, though not always considered part 
of the 'modern management' revolution, exhibited the characteristics of organisations 
described by historians of corporations. I then analyse the business practices of the 
joint-stock company, applying them to the behaviour of the first mainline railway 
companies. I then consider how businesses and individuals responded to the 
business practices of joint-stock companies, building on James Taylor’s analysis of 
these responses in the early nineteenth century. In this chapter I argue that, when 
faced with the perceived disruptive actions of joint-stock companies, people and 
businesses accustomed to the operations and interactions of the ‘sociable economy’ 
tended to exhibit a specific set of responses, beginning with attempts at negotiation, 
then escalating to legal action, publicity and calls for government intervention, and 
finally, if possible, to boycott or disengagement. To demonstrate and delineate this 
set of responses I use as a case study customers’ responses to the policies and 
actions of the joint-stock companies providing London’s water supply in the 1820s. I 
draw evidence for the arguments in this chapter from newspaper articles and 
government records, particularly the testimony of witnesses at Parliamentary Select 
Committee hearings investigating complaints about London’s water supply. 
 
The final three chapters of this study address the carrying question and its outcome. 
In chapter 4 I introduce the carrying question of the 1840s and 1850s: whether railway 
companies should be permitted to exclude carriers from their lines and operate their 
own goods carriage service as a monopoly. I begin by investigating the precedents 
for railway company carrying in the practice of ‘self-carrying’ (operating their own 
carrying services) by inland waterway companies. I then consider the debate over 
railway company carrying among railway company officials and shareholders in the 
1840s, to understand how and why companies decided to exclude carriers from their 
lines. I then describe how this policy, controversial even within railway company 
management, spread to the entire railway network through collective organisations, 
and the quantifiable effects of the exclusion of carriers from railways on the carriers 
themselves, the businesses that employed them, and the wider economy. The 
evidence for arguments in this chapter comes from company and organisation records 
held at the National Archives, a series of published pamphlets and open letters 
outlining the arguments for and against railway company carrying, and several 
sources of quantitative evidence including business directories and demographic 
information. 
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In chapter 5 I use the model I developed in chapter 3 to identify and categorise the 
responses of carriers, businesses, the public and government to railway company 
policy excluding carriers from their lines. The historians I cited earlier in this chapter 
typically claim that, with the exception of a few classes of goods that continued to be 
transported by canal, customers of the carrying trade moved their goods carriage 
business to railway companies due to their clear superiority in cost, speed, and 
service; the range of responses to railway company goods carrying that I document 
in this chapter, however, suggests that many customers did not support or welcome 
railway company carrying, preferred working with carriers on railway lines, and 
attempted to influence railway company policy and practice via direct negotiation, 
lawsuits, publicity, calls for government action, and boycotts. For this chapter I draw 
on evidence from the testimony recorded in Parliamentary Select Committee hearings 
investigating the carrying question, legal records, and books, pamphlets and articles 
published by and about the participants in the conflict. 
 
In chapter 6 I describe the ramifications of the outcome of the carrying question in 
favour of the railway companies. I begin by speculating about why the railway 
companies succeeded in monopolising goods carriage despite the concerted and 
principled opposition I identified in chapter 5. Once their monopoly position was 
secured, railway companies vertically integrated the carrying trade by purchasing and 
either managing or removing competitors, including carriers and canal companies. As 
railway companies became, in effect, the only carriers, the legal definition of the word 
‘carrier’, originally describing the small businesses that comprised the carrying trade, 
changed to include railway companies. As the carrying functions of railway 
companies, formerly separate from the companies’ original purpose of building and 
maintaining transport infrastructure, became integral to their business, railway 
companies became subject to taxes on their revenue as carriers and to laws making 
carriers responsible for goods in their care. The responses I identified in chapter 5 
proved unsuccessful in the short term in changing railway company policy or 
behaviour, but it could be argued that they contributed in the longer term to more 
government regulation of railway companies, culminating in the nationalisation of the 
railway network. Evidence from this chapter is drawn largely from testimony before 
Parliamentary Select Committees, transcripts and analyses of legal cases, and 
newspaper articles and reports of lawsuits involving railway companies. 
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I conclude this study by summarising the arguments of the previous chapters. I 
describe the effects of the outcome of the carrying question on the wider economy 
and on how business was done, and suggest how my arguments contribute to our 
understanding of the Industrial Revolution. I conclude this chapter with some 
suggestions about areas where research about the carrying trade affects and is 
affected by other areas of historical interest, including the transport infrastructure; 
industrialisation and regionalisation; consumer culture, consumption and fashion; 
distribution and retailing; literacy, letter writing and the postal service; and women's 
work and family firms. 
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Chapter 1: Development of the carrying trade 1750-1850 
Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse the work of Gerald Turnbull, Dorian Gerhold and others who 
have written about the carrying trade, and draw on the work of scholars in several 
fields - transport history, economic history, local history, and the history of inns, 
literacy and the Post Office - and my own analysis of sources previously 
uninvestigated or underused for transport history to create a more complete view of 
the multimodal carrying trade between about 1750 and about 1850. I begin the 
chapter by describing the structure and operation of the carrying trade, in order to 
understand the business, but my primary focus in this chapter is on the relationships 
between carriers, between carriers and the businesses and organisations that 
supported the carrying trade, between carriers and their customers, and between 
carriers and their communities.  
 
The businesses that comprised the carrying trade in England in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries ranged in size from a single person with a horse and 
waggon or canal boat to a partnership managing a fleet of waggons or seafaring 
vessels covering hundreds of miles of route. Carriers operated on road, inland 
waterway and coastal shipping routes, co-ordinating with each other via a 'hub and 
spoke' network (in which goods were transported to central ‘hubs’ to be transferred 
between local and longer-distance routes) to transport goods between any two points 
in the country. Carrying firms relied on and collaborated with other businesses: 
carrying inns, transport infrastructure built and managed by trusts or joint-stock 
companies, and the government-supported postal service. Carrying had a significant 
role in the economic and social life of the country - both businesses and individuals 
relied on their services. As the owners and operators of businesses essential to 
communication and trade, carriers were integrated into and recognised and respected 
by the communities they served. These statements appear to have been true since at 
least the second half of the eighteenth century, and remained true until, as I describe 
in chapter 4, railway companies largely took over the business of carrying, managing 
regional goods transport directly and local transport indirectly. 
 
This chapter has eight sections. In the first section I review what is known about the 
scope and scale of the carrying trade in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
In the second section I explore the structure and operation of carriers and the carrying 
trade. In the third and fourth sections I consider how carriers’ customers interacted 
32 
 
 
with them - how customers chose a carrier and planned a journey, and how they 
engaged with the carrying trade to accomplish the journey. In the fifth section I discuss 
how carriers collaborated with each other to move goods around the country, and in 
the sixth I show how carriers interacted with and relied on other businesses and 
organisations - carrying inns, transport infrastructure owners and the Post Office. In 
the seventh section I review the legal, regulatory and customary framework within 
which the carrying trade operated, showing that carrying was an established and well-
regulated part of the economy by the mid-eighteenth century. In the final section I 
explore what we can determine about carriers themselves - their self-image, social 
status, economic role, and place in society – from available evidence, and provide 
some examples of portrayals of carriers in contemporary media, showing that carrying 
and carriers were an established part of the economy and culture of eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century England.  
 
Scope and scale of the carrying trade 
Although the carrying trade has been 'especially resistant to statistical enquiry', 
historians have attempted to extract statistical information from a variety of sources 
to provide some sense of its nature and scale, and how it changed over time.1 John 
Taylor's Carriers Cosmographie of 1637, listing 270 waggons leaving London every 
week, attests to a comprehensive national goods transport network centred on 
London by that time.2 The number of waggons had doubled by 1700 and doubled 
again by 1800. By 1838 about 1,000 waggons, each carrying up to six tons, entered 
and left London each week.3 Gerald Turnbull and John Chartres, collaborating on a 
study of the economic history of British inland transport and communications between 
1600 and 1850, investigated the volumes and types of goods carried and the horses 
and waggons used by the carrying trade; Dorian Gerhold's review of their research 
concludes that road carriers moved about 74,700 ton-miles of goods into and out of 
London per week in 1690, a figure that had increased to 369,800 ton-miles per week 
by 1826.4 W. T. Jackman states that in 1818 about 1.5 million tons of goods entered 
London via coastal shipping; Bagwell provides a higher number, about 2.2 million 
                                                 
1 Dorian Gerhold, 'The growth of the London carrying trade, 1681-1838’, Economic History 
Review, second series (1988): 392. 
2 John Taylor, The Carrier's Cosmographie. Innes, Hostelries, and Other Lodgings in and neere 
London (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1974); Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 4; 
Dorian Gerhold, Road Transport before the Railways, 11. 
3 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 4-5; Gerhold, Road Transport Before the Railways, 1. 
4 Turnbull, 'Provincial road carrying', 17-39; Dorian Gerhold, 'Packhorses and wheeled 
vehicles in England, 1550-1800', Journal of Transport History 14 (1993): 13-18; Gerhold, 'The 
growth of the London carrying trade’, 403. 
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tons, for the year 1824. Bagwell states that 84% of the tonnage brought into London 
by coastal shipping was coal and 14% grain, leaving only 2% of this figure as general 
merchandise.5  
 
Goods transported by general merchandise carriers (as opposed to transporters of 
bulk goods) can be separated into three broad categories: agricultural products, 
manufactured goods and their components, and personal goods. A significant portion 
of the carrying trade's business was agricultural products and foodstuffs, both locally 
grown and imported.6 Several food routes, such as the Droitwich-Worcester salt route, 
have been identified.7 As dairies near cities specialised in providing fresh milk, butter 
and cheese were often brought in from farther away; in his Tour through the Whole 
Island of Great Britain, first published between 1724 and 1727, Daniel Defoe 
described the cheese routes from Cheshire down the Trent to Hull then by sea to 
London, and from Gloucestershire to Lechlade and Cricklade by road then down the 
Thames.8 By 1730 producers in York, Hull, Scarborough, Stockton, Newcastle and 
Suffolk were sending butter and cheese to London via coastal shipping.9 By the late 
eighteenth century Manchester residents were buying Irish butter shipped to Liverpool 
and then transported by canal to the city; by the early nineteenth century London was 
also being supplied with Irish butter.10 Higglers purchased eggs from farms in 
southeast Scotland and shipped them from Berwick-on-Tweed down the east coast 
and up the Thames to London, and grain was sent via the ‘corn road’ from Hexham 
to Alnmouth then shipped down the coast to Leith and London.11 Hops were grown in 
the Vale of Farnham, Kent, Worcester and Hereford and sent all over the country 
during the brewing season.12 Although historians have documented several of these 
traditional agricultural carrying routes, due to the lack of correspondence related to 
this sector of the carrying trade this study does not consider the transport of 
agricultural products.  
                                                 
5 Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England, 154; Bagwell, From Canal 
Lock to Gridlock, 30.  
6 Brewer and Porter, Consumption and the World of Goods, 179-183.  
7 Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England, 44. 
8 Daniel Defoe, A Tour thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain, vol. 2 (London: G. Strahan et 
al., 1724), 47, 108-109, 198-199. 
9 G. E. Fussell and Constance Goodman, 'Eighteenth century traffic in milk products', 
Economic History 3 (1934-7): 380. 
10 Roger and Pauline Scola, Feeding the Victorian City (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992), 80-81; Fussell and Goodman, 'Eighteenth century traffic in milk products', 381. 
11 Tony Barrow, 'Corn, carriers and coastal shipping', Journal of Transport History 21 no. 1 
(2000): 19. 
12 Gerhold, Road Transport before the Railways, 102-104. 
34 
 
 
 
Carriers also transported raw materials and manufactured products in various stages 
of completion, for wholesale or retail sale and for export. The putting-out system, in 
which products were manufactured over several stages in several different locations, 
relied on the carrying trade to transport raw materials, components and partially-made 
products between production locations as well as to London for wholesale purchase 
and subsequent redistribution for further production, sale or export.13 Some products 
such as nails or containers were both sold directly to wholesale and retail buyers and 
fed back into the manufacture of more complex products. Clay from Cornwall, for 
example, was carried to Staffordshire to be made into pots, which were sent to London 
for wholesale purchase and then to farms and factories to be used as containers for 
products eventually sold to wholesale and then retail customers.14 Merchants met 
weekly in London, Colchester and Hull to buy raw wool, then send it to Yorkshire and 
other parts of the country for manufacture into cloth; they then sent the finished cloth 
back to these ports and ultimately to the London wholesale market for purchase and 
export or redistribution to wholesalers and retailers.15 Correspondence containing 
information about these kinds of transactions has been preserved in several archives 
around the country; in the next chapter I will analyse some of this correspondence in 
detail to develop a fuller understanding of the operation of the carrying trade and the 
relationships among buyers, sellers, carriers and agents. 
 
Finally, carriers transported the personal goods of people in all classes of society - 
wealthy people moving between seasonal homes as well as poorer people relocating 
for economic reasons. Because any surviving records for these kinds of transactions 
are likely to be widely scattered among personal documents, this study does not 
address this sector of the carrying trade. 
 
Organisation and operation of the carrying network 
In this section I describe how carrying firms were organised and how they operated, 
to provide a comparison to the joint-stock companies I describe in chapter 3. Although 
in 1974 Aldcroft and Dyos stated that ‘how the carrying business was organized…is 
                                                 
13 Gerhold, Carriers & Coachmasters, 36-37. 
14 Francis Edwin Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1971), 
28; Lorna Weatherill, 'The Business of Middleman in the English Pottery Trade Before 1780', 
Business History 28, no. 3 (1986): 59. 
15 Eric Kerridge, Textile Manufacture in Early Modern England (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, c1985), 215; Willan, The English Coasting Trade, 88-93.  
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not known in detail’, more recent research by Gerhold, Turnbull, Freeman and others 
have provided some insight into how carrying firms operated.16 
 
By the early nineteenth century carriers were operating on three transport modes: 
road, inland waterway, and coastal shipping. Carriers were also using the industrial 
railways that had been constructed before the 1830s; when mainline railways began 
to be added to the transport network after 1830 both the representatives of railway 
companies and the members of Parliament that approved their enabling acts 
assumed that carriers would use these railways in the same way they used turnpikes, 
navigations, canals and existing rail lines. 
 
Road carriers 
Historians generally divide road carriers into three groups which comprised a ‘hub and 
spoke’ network - long distance or national carriers between London and regional hubs, 
regional carriers between these hubs, and between these hubs and smaller 
settlements, and local carriers typically not travelling more than a day's trip of 25 to 
30 miles each way.17 The latter made up the majority of carrying firms; in 1767 the 
routes of 65 per cent of Birmingham-based carriers were no longer than 40 miles, and 
in 1772 the routes of 77 per cent of Manchester-based carriers were no longer than 
40 miles. In these cities only 12.5 per cent and ten per cent of carriers respectively 
served London.18 
 
Neil Raven and Jon Stobart used business directories from 1835 to determine the 
density of road carrying services in the Midlands at that time, showing that the urban 
centres of this region had widely varying levels and types of service.19 Carriers based 
in Leicester, for example, offered connections to about 160 destinations, more than 
100 within ten miles of Leicester, while only eight destinations were served directly 
from Newcastle under Lyme. The number of waggons entering and leaving each 
centre also varied widely; while the average was about 50 per week, Birmingham’s 
carriers collectively operated 579.20 The results of Raven and Stobart’s study clearly 
show the ‘hub and spoke’ pattern; places like Birmingham had frequent high-capacity 
connections to relatively few locations, typically other regional centres, while carriers 
                                                 
16 Dyos and Aldcroft, British Transport, 110. 
17 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 5. 
18 H. P. R. Finberg and Joan Thirsk, Agrarian History of England and Wales, vol. 6 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967- 2000), 218. 
19 Raven and Stobart, Towns, Regions and Industries, 83-86. 
20 Raven and Stobart, Towns, Regions and Industries, 85-86. 
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in smaller towns provided fewer services per week to a higher number of closer 
destinations.21 
 
Road carriers were typically small family firms, often lasting several generations. 
Although lack of records makes it difficult to determine, some evidence supports the 
continuity of carrying businesses and routes, though some firms may have changed 
hands either by purchase or by transfer to relatives with different surnames.22 Gerhold 
suggests that starting a carrying business required a great deal of capital, so the 
number and size of carrying firms was relatively stable; however, many firms started 
with an investment in a multipurpose waggon and a few horses.23  
 
Road carriers generally served regular routes on a fixed schedule, departing and 
arriving weekly, twice-weekly, or sometimes daily, generally at the same time, to and 
from carrying inns in two destinations, and often stopping on scheduled days and 
times at inns in places along the route between them. Carrying, particularly local 
carrying, was not always a full-time job; local carriers often served a weekly or twice-
weekly route over the course of two or four days. Many farmers used their own 
vehicles to carry their produce into towns to sell at markets, and carry others’ goods 
back, or they or their employees carried during less agriculturally busy times of year. 
Families whose primary occupation was carrying also worked land for farming and 
feeding their horses, and carriers also practiced craft occupations such as 
blacksmithing or weaving, or occupations related to goods distribution such as 
shopkeeping and innkeeping.24 Carriers sometimes employed assistants to help with 
loading and delivery, and larger firms employed casual or full-time porters, watchmen, 
ostlers, clerks, smiths, waggon repairers, and guards.25 Gerhold estimates that in 
1816 Russells Flying Waggons, one of the country’s largest carrying firms at that time, 
employed up to 60 or 70 full time staff to operate a 316 mile long route.26 Carriers also 
sometimes outsourced ‘back office’ functions; a letter from a Kendal grocer, for 
example, mentions that ‘Mr Worrall is Bookkeeper for the Kendall waggoners’.27 
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Most road carrying firms typically operated on low overheads, with a small staff of 
waggon drivers and overseers. Road carriers typically made a 6-7% profit; a figure 
that may have been considered ‘fair’ by government and the business community.28 
It was reported in 1752, in a pamphlet written by a farmer concerned that carriers' 
rates would increase with the passage of a new roads act, that  
an Inquiry [was] made into the Circumstances of our common Carriers, upon 
which it is found, there are not Twenty, amongst the great Number who follow 
that Business, that are reputed to be worth 1000 l. each, and that, in general, 
they scarce get a reasonable Subsistance.29  
 
Although carriage rates, usually per hundredweight per mile, or per hundredweight 
between destinations, were typically fixed by the carrier and capped by local 
government, as I will explain below, they were subject to variation and could be 
negotiated based on an object’s size and weight, value, perishability or fragility, and 
the attitude of the customer. Long journeys were more profitable than short ones; thus 
some sources suggest that goods sent short distances along long-distance routes 
were occasionally not picked up.30 Up to 80 per cent of the operating cost of a road 
carrying firm went toward feeding and caring for the horses that provided motive 
power.31  
 
Because carrying firms, like most contemporary businesses, were family owned, 
women often participated as partners to their husbands, as widows, and as single 
women. Women are occasionally listed as carriers in newspaper announcements and 
business directories. Of the 73 York carriers listed in Pigot & Co.'s 1828-1829 
business directory, for example, three were women: Sarah Carr, who carried to 
Riccall, Ann Wilson, who carried to Hull and Lincolnshire, and the Widow Giles, who 
carried to Pocklington.32 Five of the 67 carriers' wills I analyse later in this chapter 
were written for women. 
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Inland waterway carriers 
Inland waterway carriers operated on rivers, navigations and canals, and each type 
and size of waterway had its own type of business organisation and vessels designed 
for it.33 By the late eighteenth century navigations and canals connected Britain’s 
extensive river network; canals connecting the rivers Severn, Thames, Great Ouse, 
Trent, Humber and Mersey were all in place by 1790.34 A 1795 survey of canal boats 
in five counties indicates that fewer than four per cent were operated by owners or 
part owners; most were owned by manufacturers of bulk commodities (coal, iron, salt), 
and 20 per cent were owned by canal companies.35 Although most boats on these 
waterways were owned and operated by businesses transporting their own bulk 
materials, particularly coal, some canal traffic, like most traffic on rivers and 
navigations, was general merchandise transported by carriers.36  
 
The business practices of inland waterway carriers were generally similar to those of 
road carriers; small family firms owned their own boats and horses to pull them, 
served fixed routes on regular schedules, and where applicable paid tolls to the 
owners and maintainers of the infrastructure they used. Inland waterway carriers, 
however, had a wider range of business models than road carriers. Some navigation 
and canal companies rented boats, often too expensive for a small business to afford 
and, unlike waggons, not useful for anything but waterway carrying, to carriers who 
provided labour and horsepower.37 Some carriers worked directly for infrastructure 
companies which paid them a salary; others worked in collaboration with 
infrastructure companies.38 The Thames & Medway Canal Company, for example, 
hired Henry Drury, based in Maidstone, to operate their six barges as a carrying 
business. Two months later they hired another carrier, Henry Simmonds, and 
eventually provided boats and facilities to six carriers on the canal.39 The Aire & Calder 
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Navigation made several types of arrangements with carriers, including those who 
owned their own boats and horses, those who contracted with the company for horse 
towing, and those who rented boats and horses from the company.40 Other inland 
waterway carriers worked full time for large multimodal carrying firms. Pickfords, for 
example, put ten fly boats, mostly to send goods to ports, into service in 1795, 
employing 40 boatmen; this number had increased to nearly 100 boats and 500 
boatmen by 1832.41 Like road carriers, many inland waterway carriers also farmed or 
practiced a craft, although this practice had largely died out by the 1820s.42 Canal 
carriers were more likely than river carriers to work as a family, and to live on their 
boats.43 
 
Coastal shipping 
Coastal shipping is the least-studied of the three modes used by the carrying trade. 
In 1996 John Armstrong wrote that the last important work on coastal shipping had 
been written in 1938, and no significant work on the subject appears to have been 
published since then.44 Coastal ships served not only major cities but also the 
hundreds of small ports along Britain's 10,000 miles of coastline. From Hull, for 
example, coasters called at Newcastle, Sunderland, Stockton & Seaton, Whitby & 
Bridlington, Boston, Lynn, Yarmouth, and Burnham & Clay, among other places; by 
1772 coasters from Hull called at 31 ports including Bristol.45 Coastal ships varied 
widely in size and capacity, from the 400 ton colliers, large enough to be used for 
overseas trade, that travelled between London and Newcastle, to ships carrying about 
40 tons, small enough to sail several miles up navigable rivers.46 Most coastal ships 
transported bulk commodities such as coal, timber and clay, but often took general 
merchandise to top up their holds or to fill empty holds on the return journey after 
delivering bulk cargo. Coastal ships travelled up rivers to such transhipment ports as 
York and Bawtry, their penetration inland depending on the extent of river 
improvements as well as the tide and the season.47 Some ships travelled on both 
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inland waterways and coastal routes; a 1796 advertisement, for example, offered 
carriage from the Aire & Calder Navigation via the Humber River and down the coast 
to Kings Lynn and Wisbech.48  
 
The business model for coastal shipping, like that of other carriers, tended to be small-
scale. Local merchants, manufacturers and landowners bought 1/64 shares in ships, 
hired captains and crew, and shared in the profit or loss.49 Most captains owned a 
share of their ships; some owned their ships outright or in partnership with friends and 
relatives.50 The capital cost per ton of coastal shipping was about half that of road 
carriage, or about £7 per ton to construct and equip a ship; although ships required 
more labour than the other carrying modes, their operation and maintenance cost was 
less as they had fewer moving parts and no horses to feed, care for and replace.51  
 
Comparative cost and mode choice 
Sir Robert Southall told the Royal Society in 1673 that coastal ships could transport 
goods for 1/20 the cost of road carriers, and inland waterway carriers could transport 
goods at one-twelfth the cost of road carriers; coal could be transported 300 miles by 
water at the same cost as 15 miles by road.52 Due to the efficiency of horse power 
resulting from the lack of friction on water, and the greater weight a barge could carry 
compared to a waggon, the per-mile cost of transport by inland waterway could be far 
less than by road. Historians have thus often assumed that the cheaper the goods to 
be sent the more likely they would be sent by water, and goods that could be sent 
more slowly would be sent by water.53 William Court, for example, suggests that ‘the 
economic advantages of water over road transport were so considerable that it might 
almost be said that the chief function of roads was to bring traffic to the point…at 
which it could leave them for less expensive modes of travel.’54  
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These conclusions, however, do not take into account the other factors that influenced 
senders’ mode choices. Road carriage had the advantage of being ‘quick if dear’.55 
However, while the per-mile cost of water carriage might be less, road carriage was 
often more direct and thus loads travelled fewer miles. Additionally, inland waterway 
carrying could incur additional costs. Although most natural waterways were free to 
use, the owners of artificial waterways charged tolls, and transferring from one 
waterway to another often incurred expense as well as delay. Water transport also 
incurred wharf charges and, usually, the cost of road carriage at each end. Taking 
these factors into account, it could be less expensive to employ road than waterway 
carriage for a journey. The choice between road and waterway carriage, even on a 
cost basis, was often not obvious; even such goods as bulk flour could often be 
transported as cheaply by road as by water, and a shipment of marble was once sent 
from London to Sidmouth overland.56 As late as the late eighteenth century most coal 
arriving in Manchester came by road, as the addition of transfer and road carriage 
costs to the cost of water transport made it less cost effective.57 
 
In addition, customers of goods carriage often considered other factors besides cost. 
For example, depending on the type of goods being sent, they might prefer to spend 
more money on road carriage to ensure that goods arrived on time and undamaged. 
Shipments were subject to delay, damage or loss due to bad weather, shipwreck or 
attack, and could be damaged by water or eaten by rats.58 Gerald Turnbull notes that 
Scottish agents of John Wilson & Son, linen merchants of Leeds, were instructed to 
select nearly full ships to send their goods by, as they were more likely to leave soon 
after loading, and if the linen was loaded last it would be on top and highest out of the 
water, and thus less subject to water damage.59 Customers had varying opinions 
about the safety of road compared with waterway carriage; goods were more likely to 
be damaged by water on canals, rivers and navigations, but less likely to be shaken 
by waggons or roughly handled. Canal boats were easier to pilfer from than waggons, 
which were guarded during travel and kept secure during stops. Additionally, 
customers might not be specifically concerned with the speed of goods travel, but 
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could be concerned that goods arrive on the expected day; in these situations road 
carriage was preferable because waterway carriage was typically not only slower and 
less frequent but also less reliable.  
 
Carriers’ customers chose routes and modes considering their own requirements and 
priorities, including but not exclusively the cost of carriage. The same goods sent over 
the same routes could be carried on either road or waterway, depending on time of 
year, weather conditions, or the time the shipment was required. Michael Freeman's 
study of the mode choices of cotton manufacturers in Lancashire and the Midlands 
shows that these firms used all three modes to transport the same types of goods at 
different times and under different circumstances, and that decisions about mode 
choice were complex. Road carriage was used more often than would be predicted if 
choices were based primarily on per-mile cost, or even on total cost.60 The biggest 
advantage of road carriage, speed, was generally not considered significant, as most 
goods were sent from and to inns and warehouses to be held until receivers collected 
them; speed was not typically factored into a decision unless goods were being sent 
to a vessel leaving for an overseas port on a certain date, and even in these situations 
reliability was more significant than speed per se. Speed was a significant factor in 
mode choice when producers sent perishable, fashionable or seasonable goods by 
road, the decision to do so typically based on the price differential between goods 
arriving sooner and later.61 
 
Road carriers’ descriptions of their services, and the correspondence I analyse in 
chapter 2, suggest that road carrying was generally considered a reliable method of 
goods transport. Most newspaper announcements and carriers’ trade cards roughly 
identified the time of day a weekly, twice-weekly or daily waggon could be expected, 
and some provided specific arrival and departure times. A 1796 carrier’s 
advertisement in the Gloucester Journal, for example, stated that their waggon 
departed at 12:00 precisely.62 A carrier’s trade card from 1800 stated that he delivered 
goods to St. Ives every Monday night 'at 10 o'Clock Precisely'.63 Several letters from 
Thomas Nowill specified fixed arrival dates for silver goods probably intended for 
shipment overseas - ‘Wanted here 14 Novemr...Certain I trust you will not fail being 
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in time as we expect no other vessel this year’ - indicating that he felt he could rely on 
carriers to meet these deadlines.64 Dorian Gerhold found waggoners using clocks to 
time their runs, and notes that while delays did occur due to accidents, inclement 
weather or other unforeseen circumstances, ‘[d]elays were never blamed on bad 
roads’.65  
 
Coastal shipping, by contrast, was generally not expected to achieve any sort of 
schedule. Because the low cost of coastal shipping depended on economy of scale 
and free motive power, captains were typically reluctant to keep fixed schedules, 
preferring to wait until they had a full hold and favourable wind before setting sail. 
Some coastal ships promised regular departures, but weather always affected 
departure and arrival dates.66 One merchant wrote in 1732 of what must have been a 
common situation: the ship containing his goods ‘cannot Sail on the tuesday last 
having no wind to Send him away’.67  
 
The logistics of carrying 
Much of my evidence for the logistics of carrying described in this section comes from 
records of trials at the London central criminal court, found in the ‘Proceedings of the 
Old Bailey, 1674-1913’ online database. This database includes transcripts of 53 
hearings between 1760 and 1831 in which carriers were defendants, plaintiffs or 
witnesses. While it would be impossible to determine how close to verbatim these 
transcripts are, historians generally consider them to be reliable records of what was 
said in court.68 Technical information about carriers and carrying (such as logistics 
and legal issues) from this source is likely to be reliable, as the participants in these 
trials were specifically concerned with resolving conflicts over ownership and liability 
and identifying the potential for fraud or theft; these transcripts contain clear and 
complete descriptions of logistical issues so that judges and juries, who may have 
little or no understanding of or involvement in the carrying trade, could understand 
them. On the other hand, information about carriers themselves drawn from this 
source may not be representative of carriers in general, as the carriers that appear in 
these records were atypical in that they were victims of crimes (or, less often, 
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witnesses or defendants). In addition, the editors of these transcripts may have left 
out information that might have been considered obvious or well-known, thus 
providing an incomplete depiction of the situation being discussed in court.  
 
The descriptions of carrying in business correspondence, newspaper reports and 
legal records suggest that most goods delivered to carriers for transport were packed 
in standardised ways: flats for butter and eggs, bales for fabric, barrels for potatoes 
and books, trusses, boxes, hampers, or firkins for other goods. These packages were 
not marked with the receiver’s address, as goods were typically left at inns or 
warehouses for the receiver to pick up; instead, senders typically marked them either 
with the receiver's name and delivery location or with a symbol representing the 
receiver which the sender provided to the receiver via separate correspondence, as 
shown in the examples below.69 These symbols protected the receivers, by making it 
difficult for others to identify and collect a receiver’s package without the associated 
symbol. 
 
Figure 1: Carriers’ marks 
Source: Letters from William Lupton and Company Limited, 8 November 1811 and 16 
July 1816, BUS/Lupton/6, Brotherton Library, Leeds. 
 
Senders selected a carrier and mode for the first segment of a journey, and brought 
their goods to the inn or wharf from which the selected carrier departed for the 
appropriate destination, determining the carrier and departure point from a newspaper 
notice, business directory, or word of mouth. At the inn or wharf a bookkeeper logged 
the package, including its value, in a delivery book which the sender countersigned. 
These delivery books were considered evidence in court; a bookkeeper could use 
them to prove that a package had been received and sent on.70 Goods were weighed 
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and numbered, then stored until the arrival of the appropriate waggon or vessel.71 For 
each journey the bookkeeper prepared a waybill or manifest of the carrier’s load, 
stating where each package was to be left, the contents of the package, the name of 
the receiver, and the fee owed by the receiver. Waybills were sent ahead to waggon 
stops. Some court transcripts suggest that waggons were locked, and that 
bookkeepers at the inns where the carriers stopped had the only keys.72 Waggons’ 
log books recorded not only what was loaded and unloaded at each stop (and thus 
how much space a carrier had to pick up goods en route) but also waggon 
maintenance, money spent on the journey, and other useful notes.73 Goods were 
generally left at inns or warehouses for receivers to arrange to pick up; parties agreed 
beforehand where and when goods would arrive, so receivers knew when to arrange 
to pick up their goods and pay for delivery. These records and descriptions of the 
logistics of carrying suggest that the carrying trade was well organised, that carriers 
operated within a structure generally understood by all parties involved in or paying 
for their work, and that carriers’ customers had reliable expectations of the service 
they were paying for. 
 
Intermodal and intercarrier cooperation 
Although goods could be taken from sender to receiver by a single carrier, it was 
typical for them to be transferred between carriers, and often between transport 
modes, to accomplish a journey or to reduce the cost of a journey. Although transfers 
cost both time and money, and created a risk of goods being lost, stolen or damaged, 
they were so common that the benefit must have outweighed the cost and risk. 
Hadfield mentions several formal transfer arrangements between inland waterway 
carriers and road carriers. By the late eighteenth century, for example, carriers on the 
Calder & Hebble Canal were offering a regular twice-weekly service connecting with 
carriers to Manchester and via Huddersfield to Wakefield and then by boat to Hull.74 
In 1819 the company advertised its ‘very active operation of several new 
establishments for the expeditious conveyance of Goods from Manchester and Leeds 
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to Hull by means of Waggons and Steam Packets.’75 The Chester Canal Company 
operated two boats on the Trent & Mersey Canal which carried goods to Wheelock, 
where they were put on waggons to the Nantwich Canal; goods could continue by 
water from there to Chester where they could be sent on to Liverpool.76 Gerhold notes 
that by the early nineteenth century some intermodal routes had become so 
standardised that carriers were advertising direct delivery to destinations they 
themselves did not carry to. For example, around 1800 the Carlisle carrier Holmes 
advertised service to London, York, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and the northeast 
through Penrith.77 An 1816 advertisement in a Sheffield newspaper for Deacon, 
Harrison and Co. offered daily shipments ‘By Waggon and Canal’, and Crowley, 
Hicklin, Batty & Co. operated waggons from Shifnal to Wolverhampton connecting to 
fly boats from Wolverhampton to London.78  
 
Other historians describe carrier coordination and goods transfer on standard routes. 
Before Liverpool became the dominant cotton port, cotton was typically shipped from 
London to textile producers in the northwest via either coastal ship to Liverpool and 
inland waterway to Manchester, or coastal ship to Hull and inland waterway to 
Wakefield, Doncaster or Rotherham and then across the Pennines by road.79 Woollen 
manufacturers determined that it was cheaper and quicker to send yarn to be 
bleached at Tean from London than from Manchester, a third of the distance away; 
the yarn was sent from London to Gainsborough by inland waterway, then transferred 
to boats travelling up the River Trent to Willington Ferry near Repton, then sent the 
last 18 miles by road. Sending bleached yarn from Tean to Manchester to be made 
into cloth could be more challenging, as the carriers that served Manchester were 
often fully loaded by the time they reached Tean and unable to pick up additional 
goods; a shipment could be delayed in Tean for weeks before accomplishing the 
journey.80 Finished textiles and other goods were sent from Manchester and Stockport 
by road over the Pennines to Doncaster, then by inland waterway to Hull and coastal 
ship to London.81  
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Goods could often be sent between the same two places by several different routes 
and modes; senders assessed their choices and selected the routes that best met 
their requirements. In 1836 B. Redfern, a general merchant in Birmingham, sent 
goods by waggon and canal to London, then by coastal ship to Edinburgh, as he found 
it cheaper than sending goods directly by waggon, or by waggon and inland waterway 
to Hull and then by coastal ship to Edinburgh.82 Other merchants sent goods from 
Birmingham to Scotland via canal to the Mersey, then coastal ship from Liverpool to 
Glasgow and then by canal to Edinburgh.83 Gerald Turnbull’s analysis of the mode 
choices of John Wilson & Son, importers of Scottish linen, during the second half of 
the eighteenth century shows that the firm continuously assessed and altered 
transport arrangements between Scotland and Leeds. They employed road carriage 
from rural Scotland to Edinburgh, to Newcastle, and occasionally all the way to Leeds, 
depending on the relative cost and risk of road, inland waterway and coastal ship. 
They also selected different combinations of modes for different types and qualities 
of cloth.84  
 
A few large carrying firms constructed and managed their own mode transfer 
infrastructure and logistics. In 1780 Pickfords began operating canal boats as well as 
waggons, employing ten boats in 1795 and 28 boats by 1803.85 In 1801 they opened 
their own wharfs on the Grand Junction Canal, in which Pickfords owned shares, and 
developed extensive canalside infrastructure in Castleford and Manchester.86 In 1825 
Pickfords advertised that ‘they have established Waggons for the Conveyance of 
Goods to and from Kidderminster and Birmingham, from which their Fly Boats Sail to 
various parts of the Kingdom’.87 Some evidence suggests that Pickfords and other 
carriers developed and used vehicles designed to facilitate intermodal carrying, such 
as waggons that could be transferred directly to barges. Such equipment was 
proposed to carry coal on the Monkland Canal in 1775; it appears it was never 
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constructed although coal waggons were carried on boats on the River Don by the 
1830s.88 
 
Like the evidence for carrier logistics, this evidence of standardised goods transfer 
arrangements also shows that the carrying trade was a well-organised and 
sophisticated network of small businesses that routinely worked together to 
coordinate goods delivery.  
 
The carrying trade and other businesses 
In addition to coordinating with other carriers, carriers also worked with the owners of 
carrying inns and other storage facilities, often through written communication 
delivered by the Post Office, and with the owners of such private transport assets as 
turnpikes and canals. 
 
Carrying inns and other storage facilities 
The role of inns in the distribution of goods in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
is still little understood. Alan Milner Everitt’s 1973 overview of the 'very considerable 
literature' on English inns and taverns finds it largely 'a mass of popular sentiment and 
Pickwickian nonsense'; Everitt states that aside from some architectural and local 
history there has been 'no serious, systematic study of the functions of the inns'.89 
Although since 1973 there has been some historical work on inns and taverns in 
continental Europe, to date most historical research on English inns has been in 
relation to the consumption and regulation of alcohol.90 It appears that no research 
has yet been done on role of inns in goods distribution, or the relationships and 
interactions between carriers and inns. 
 
Carriers typically made arrangements with inns along their routes to collect, store and 
distribute goods and to accommodate drivers, horses and waggons overnight. 
Carriers relied on inn staff to receive and store goods for pickup by waggon or by 
receiver, supervise loading and unloading, accept supplies for waggons and drivers 
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and deal with carriers’ customers.91 These support services for carriers and their 
customers were part of the general function of inns as hubs of commercial activity.92 
Aside from offering food, drink and accommodation to travellers, inns provided various 
types of services to the public and to other businesses. Innkeepers acted as 
postmasters, hired out horses and vehicles, and operated coaching services.93 Inns 
also provided space for such institutional, commercial and public functions as law 
courts, sales and auctions, company board meetings, club meetings, and 
entertainments, as well as for the practitioners of many trades including doctors and 
dentists, tailors and staymakers, fencing and dancing masters, and other educational 
and retail businesses. Many of these activities were later moved to purpose-built 
public and private buildings, though such events as wedding receptions and trade 
shows are often still held in the modern equivalents of inns.94 Commercial travellers 
and businesspeople met at inns to make deals, particularly for seeds, grain, cloth and 
horses; innkeepers often constructed storage facilities to support these transactions.95 
Everitt also notes that highwaymen were based out of inns, which served as the sites 
of various criminal activities.96 
 
Carrying inns were distinct from, and lower in social status than, the coaching inns 
that catered to travellers in private carriages, post coaches or stagecoaches. While 
carrying and coaching routes often overlapped, the two types of inns provided 
different facilities for their customers. Coaching inns offered accommodation for well-
off travellers and their servants, stablemen and spare horses to change coach horses 
rapidly, and facilities to serve meals at any time. Carrying inns provided basic 
accommodation for carriers and horses, a secure area for waggons, and storage for 
goods, as well as such administrative support and customer-facing services as 
collecting and recording items for transport, issuing receipts and collecting fees, and 
offering information about the carrying service. 
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Although Gerhold suggests, based on the records of Russells Flying Waggons, that 
carriers contracted with innkeepers to provide food and accommodation for drivers 
and horses at fixed prices, in order to keep operating costs consistent, the exact 
financial and administrative arrangements between carriers and innkeepers remain 
unclear.97 As the existing literature on inns has not investigated the agreements, 
formal and informal, between innkeepers and carriers, which defined how carrying 
inns supported the carrying trade, and as I have not yet found any sources that 
provide evidence of these arrangements, many questions remain. For example, what 
duties did inn staff perform on behalf of carriers? Were they done by specific staff 
members with skills relevant to carrying (such as bookkeeping, loading and 
unloading), or by any inn staff available? An 1817 newspaper advertisement for a 
barmaid required a potential candidate to 'write a good hand, and ha[ve] a competent 
knowledge of accounts'; not necessarily skills required to perform the duties of a 
barmaid.98 Were carriers responsible for hiring or supervising inn staff that supported 
their work? How were mistakes or suspected dishonesty handled?  
 
Hans Medick argues that families in the eighteenth century often made matrimonial 
and reproductive choices to optimise the household ‘unit of labour’.99 Some evidence 
suggests that carriers and innkeepers often had personal relationships instead of, or 
in addition to, business relationships; some carriers owned inns, and wills, newspaper 
articles and wedding announcements provide evidence of family connections 
between carriers and innkeepers. An 1828 announcement in the Bath Chronicle and 
Weekly Gazette, for example, mentions a wedding between an innkeeper and a 
carrier’s daughter.100 Such connections may indicate deliberate diversification 
strategies of both family businesses.101 Further evidence of the nature of relationships 
between carriers and inns might appear in court records, which would record 
situations where such customary relationships broke down; however, in the legal 
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sources I reviewed for this study I did not find any records of cases identified as 
involving a carrier and an innkeeper.102  
 
Although some inland waterway carriers established similar arrangements with 
waterside inns, they more typically relied on storage and transhipment facilities built 
by canal and navigation companies which provided space to anyone paying to use 
the canal, often free for two weeks to two months with a nominal charge thereafter.103 
Storage and business facilities were also often constructed on private land adjacent 
to inland waterways and used by the landowner or leased to carriers. Peter Maw 
describes this situation in Castlefield, where the warehouse constructed in 1776 by 
the Bridgewater Canal Trustees was occupied by carriers Henshall and Co. as well 
as local merchants. Other canal companies and carriers, including Pickfords, built and 
extended warehouses at the same site in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.104 Larger carrying firms also often invested in storage and transhipment 
facilities adjacent to canals.105 Customer-facing support for inland waterway carriers 
was usually provided by paid agents, who also arranged waterside warehousing and 
support and maintenance for boats and horses.106  
 
This evidence of a national network of inns and storage facilities providing support to 
carriers shows that the carrying trade was well-organised and that carriers and 
supporting industries made full use of existing technologies, demonstrated continuous 
improvement (such as in the design of boats, waggons and storage facilities and the 
development of administrative procedures), and put in place standardised practices 
to move, store, and keep track of large volumes of a variety of goods. 
 
Literacy and the Post Office 
The business of carrying relied on written communication. During this period carriers 
kept meticulous records of pickups, transports and deliveries, including countersigned 
receipt books, receipts to senders and invoices to receivers, waybills recording the 
contents of each waggon, and log books recording every transaction and significant 
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piece of information on a journey. Many of these carriers’ account books (though far 
fewer than might be expected, given their ubiquity at the time) can be found in 
archives around the country.107 Carriers and their customers communicated by letter 
to agree on routes, modes, charges, and delivery dates and times, and to resolve 
problems or conflicts. Thus the operation of the carrying trade depended on a high 
level of general literacy for both staff and customers. 
 
Until recently scholars had extrapolated general literacy rates from the proportion of 
people able to sign their names to legal documents; by the middle of the eighteenth 
century this figure was about 60 per cent for men and 40 per cent for women. This 
extrapolation is now considered inaccurate for several reasons, including the common 
teaching of reading as a skill distinct from writing, the availability of free or charity 
schools, the frequency of teaching within families outside formal schooling, and the 
popularity and dissemination of printed material.108 Understanding these factors has 
led scholars to believe now that literacy, promoted for both men and women for 
religious reasons and to maintain family and social ties through correspondence, as 
well as for business reasons, was in fact widespread among farmers, artisans and 
merchants in the eighteenth century.109 Although in at least some cases carriers were 
known to assist illiterate customers - it was stated in Parliament in 1840 that in the pig 
trade ‘[c]arriers write the notes as [m]any of the men who send them [pigs] cannot 
write at all’ - in general the operation of the carrying trade depended on widespread 
literacy, as written instructions, records, waybills, invoices and receipts were 
necessary to manage the complex intermodal network.110 
 
The carrying trade relied on the Post Office to facilitate rapid communication among 
senders, receivers, agents and carriers. By the late eighteenth century the postal 
system had expanded and improved both technologically and administratively in the 
nearly two centuries since it had been established.111 Royal Mail coaches left the 
General Post Office in London every evening, travelling along 42 designated routes, 
stopping at inns in strategic towns, and delivering and receiving mail bags on the 
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move.112 John Palmer, who developed the mail coach route system in the 1780s, 
explicitly referred to the postal service as ‘merely a branch of the carrying trade’ 
operated by government in the public interest, using the same routes and sometimes 
the same inns as carriers, although it would have been more accurate to describe the 
Post Office as a branch of the coaching trade, transporting passengers and small 
parcels as well as letters.113 The postal system adopted the intermodal structure of 
the carrying trade; in addition to post coaches, the mail was carried by coastal ship 
and packet boat.114  
 
Carriers and transport assets 
In addition to carrying inns and the postal service, carriers relied on the support of 
owners and managers of private transport assets. The most significant change in the 
carrying trade between 1750 and 1850 was the development of transport 
infrastructure - the construction of turnpike roads, ports and harbours, the canal 
system both linking existing internal waterways and opening up new routes, and finally 
the railway network. Carriers adapted to the availability of these transport assets by 
extending and improving their services and by reducing their rates as their own costs 
dropped. 
 
Turnpiking began in 1663 as a temporary measure to finance the maintenance of 
major roads to and from London; by 1750, 71 per cent of major London routes had 
been turnpiked, and by 1835 about 20 per cent of all roads in the country were 
turnpiked or managed by turnpike trusts.115 The first turnpike acts authorised Justices 
of the Peace to supplement existing road maintenance arrangements by collecting 
tolls and supervising repairs, but after 1714 these tasks were more typically performed 
by commissions or trustees, responsible for erecting toll gates, collecting tolls, and 
borrowing money to finance maintenance and repairs.116  
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Although contemporary sources suggested that the principal benefit of turnpiking was 
to render travelling 'safer, easier and pleasanter to Gentlemen and others', improved 
roads also reduced the cost of road carriage by as much as 30 per cent.117 Although 
tolls increased the nominal cost of transport, and carriers were required to comply 
with the rules of the turnpike trusts, which typically limited waggon weight and number 
of horses and prescribed wheel width and configuration, these costs were outweighed 
by the fact that on turnpike roads 'our Carriers are enabled to draw greater Weights, 
with the same Number of Horses in one Carriage, than they formerly could do.' Speed 
is not mentioned as a benefit of turnpiking.118 Albert states that ‘the returns show that 
it was generally cheaper to carry goods along the main routes', and Bogart states that 
the improvements resulting from turnpiking accounted for half the 40 per cent 
reduction in goods carriage rates between 1750 and 1800, a downward trend that 
continued as better roads, improved waggon design, cheaper fodder and horses bred 
to pull more while eating less led to lower road carriage rates in the 1820s and 
1830s.119  
 
Although access to rivers was generally free, river carriers faced several obstacles 
including weirs, traditional fishing rights and collectors of corporate tolls, and in any 
conflict between river transport and the use of river water for power the latter had 
priority.120 Responding to requests to improve waterway transport, Parliament 
authorised several river improvements, referred to as navigations, which were 
constructed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.121 In the mid-
eighteenth century, in addition to improvements to existing rivers, Parliament began 
to authorise corporations to construct canals. Between the mid-eighteenth century 
and the early nineteenth century the length of navigable inland waterway in Britain 
grew from about 1,400 miles to nearly 4,000 miles.122  
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Coastal shipping carriers did not pay to use the seas, but relied on those who built, 
maintained and operated the ports and harbours at which they called. Ships needed 
varying types and levels of onshore support to operate and to transfer cargo, from the 
extensive dock system constructed in Liverpool in the 1830s to none at all, transferring 
goods ‘overside’ directly between ships and inland waterway vessels that rowed out 
to meet them.123 Due to the substantial financial resources required to construct 
maritime infrastructure, the connection between national and international trade and 
communication, and the customs revenue and national security interest involved, 
coastal shipping attracted more public investment than the other carrying modes. 
Local and national government provided naval protection for merchant shipping and 
invested in docks, ports, breakwaters and lighthouses, raising funds from duties on 
international goods and penalties for evasion of customs fees.124  
 
This brief review of carriers’ connections with other businesses and organisations 
suggests that carriers were part of a larger network of small and large businesses, 
and government organisations and that improvements in transport infrastructure 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries resulted in both 
improvements in carrying service and reductions in the cost of carrying. 
 
Legal, regulatory and customary framework of the carrying trade 
In this section I briefly describe the legal and regulatory framework within which the 
carrying trade operated, to show that the carrying trade was well-established legally 
and politically as well as physically and operationally. The body of law concerning 
carrying had evolved along with the carrying trade, and was generally sufficient to 
protect both carriers and their customers and to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of each. By contrast, in later chapters I will show that existing law was inadequate to 
regulate the actions of railway companies and their relationships with their customers. 
 
By the early nineteenth century the carrying trade was securely embedded in English 
statute law, common law and custom, regulated and monitored by rules reinforced by 
centuries of legal precedent. All of the precedents cited in a lengthy treatise on carrier 
law written in 1827 predated the nineteenth century; some from the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were still considered pertinent, and carrier law relating to 
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shipping cited the Rhodian law of Byzantium.125 Since the medieval period legal 
precedent identified carriers, like innkeepers, farriers, brewers, merchants, 
schoolmasters and surgeons, as common traders, who worked directly for the public 
rather than for an individual employer and who were ’obliged to accept the custom of 
all who claimed their service’; common traders could be sued if they discriminated 
against any member of the public by refusing service or charging different rates for 
the same service.126  
 
Although most common traders faced direct competition, carriers often effectively 
monopolised their routes due to lack of demand for more than one carrier between 
two destinations, and thus local and national governments considered it necessary to 
oversee and if necessary limit carriers’ rates.127 A 1692 law empowered Justices of 
the Peace to 'assess and rate the Prices of all Land Carriage of Goods whatsoever' 
every year at the Quarter or General Sessions following Easter; maximum rates were 
posted in public places and recorded in business directories, and any carrier charging 
more could be fined. This law was amended and reinforced in 1748, as part of a more 
general set of laws regulating road carriage, and updated in 1766 to give the power 
of yearly rate assessment to grand juries at the Summer Assizes.128  
 
The law regulating carriers’ rates appears to have been haphazardly followed, 
however; by 1766 eighteen counties had no record of assessed maximum carriage 
rates.129 T. S. Willan suggests that carriers and their customers used these maximum 
rates, when available, as a ‘very general guide to the market rate of land carriage’.130 
Carriers influenced rate assessments by informing magistrates of their costs and 
requirements; letters between Yorkshire carriers and their agent in early 1800 suggest 
that carriers operated fewer services if they could not make a profit at the assessed 
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maximum rate and customers refused to pay more.131 Carriers charged customers 
according to their own costs, offering lower rates for regular customers and large 
shipments and higher rates for bulky goods or personal goods; '[g]entlemen cannot 
expect Carriage quite so cheap as a Trader, who perhaps half loads a Waggon every 
Journey.’132  
 
As I will describe in more detail in chapter 2, carriers were paid by, and responsible 
to, the receivers of goods rather than the senders. When goods were transferred 
between carriers, the carrier receiving the goods, acting on behalf of the receiver, paid 
the previous carrier, and the last carrier in the chain collected payment for the entire 
journey from the receiver of the goods. Goods transfers were arranged and paid for 
directly between carriers, without requiring any involvement of the sender or receiver, 
and without any overall direction or management. The way the chain of carriers was 
organised and compensated was described in an 1855 newspaper article reporting a 
lawsuit between carriers. Carrier Kenworthy & Co. successfully sued another carrying 
firm for payment for carrying goods from Manchester to Liverpool that were 
subsequently lost at sea en route to Penzance. Kenworthy's Manchester agent 
explained to the judge:  
It was the universal custom that when goods were received by a first carrier, 
and handed…to a second carrier…the second carrier paid the first carrier’s 
charges…the third carrier paid to the second carrier his charges…and also 
refunded the charges paid by the second to the first carrier, and so on; the last 
carrier paying to the one from whom he received the goods the accumulated 
charges upon them, in the expectation of being repaid by the person to whom 
the goods were to be delivered. If the consignee would not repay him, he had 
a lien [the right to seize the customer’s property to pay the debt] upon the 
goods.133  
 
Kenworthy & Co. had carried the goods in question on the segment of the journey for 
which they were responsible, and thus reasonably expected compensation for that 
segment whether or not the goods arrived at their final destination; any loss incurred 
was solely that of the carrier responsible for the goods at the time they were lost. 
  
Responsibility for compensating a receiver for loss or damage of goods in transit was 
determined by extensive legal precedent. Goods were the responsibility of the sender 
                                                 
131 Turnbull, ‘State regulation in the eighteenth-century economy’, 18-20. 
132 Turnbull, ‘State regulation in the eighteenth-century economy’, 25; The Farmers and 
Traders Apprehensions of a Rise upon Carriage &c., 23. 
133 Liverpool Mercury etc., 27 April 1855; The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, 5 May 
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until received by the carrier’s bookkeeper, then the responsibility of the inn where the 
goods were held until signed for by the carrier. Once a sender handed goods to the 
bookkeeper, they were legally the property of the receiver; if goods were lost or 
damaged in transit, the receiver could sue the carrier for compensation, but the sender 
could not. The description of an 1804 lawsuit demonstrates how liability for goods was 
transferred from carrier to carrier. The plaintiff sued the Aire & Calder Navigation, 
acting as a carrier, for the loss of a bale of leather destined for London. He claimed 
that the carrier was responsible for the goods until they reached their destination, but 
the defendant successfully argued that they were liable only for the portion of the trip 
between Leeds and Selby, as they had only been paid to carry the bale between 
Leeds and Selby.134 Similarly, in an 1835 case the court agreed with the carrier 
defendant who argued that he was not responsible for the loss of a package once he 
proved that it had been transferred to another carrier.135  
 
A substantial body of statute law and legal precedents documented the expectations 
customers had when hiring carriers. Carriers were legally responsible for the goods 
they carried, with the exception of ‘acts of God or the King’s enemies’, and were 
expected to make good any loss or damage. As Richard Burn stated in Justice of the 
Peace and Parish Officer, first published in 1755 but in use well into the nineteenth 
century: 
[w]here goods are delivered to a carrier, and he is robbed of them, he shall be 
charged…although it might be thought a hard case, that a poor carrier who is 
robbed on the road...should be answerable for all the goods he takes; yet the 
inconvenience would be far more intolerable, if he were not so, for it would be 
in his power to combine with robbers, or to pretend a robbery...and the law will 
not expose him to so great a temptation....136  
 
In his justification of what appears to be a harsh law Burn expressed sympathy for the 
situation of an honest carrier who might be penalised due to circumstances beyond 
his control, but his explanation illustrates the significant responsibility carriers 
undertook to safeguard the goods in their care.  
 
A 1748 comprehensive carrying law permitted carriers to request that senders insure 
goods worth more than £5, and to not be held liable for loss or damage to certain 
types of goods worth £10 or more unless the sender declared their value and paid a 
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surcharge.137 Despite this law, however, courts were ambivalent about the extent to 
which carriers could shirk their liability. One court ruled that a sign on the wall of a 
carrier’s booking office claiming no liability for uninsured articles worth more than £5 
was insufficient to exempt them; notification also needed to appear on senders’ 
receipts.138 Another ruled that a carrier was liable for broken glass; the sender had 
identified the package as fragile but not insured it, as the carrier had not informed the 
sender that he would not be liable for any damage to it if it was not insured.139 On the 
other hand, courts generally ruled that carriers were not liable for the full value of 
costly goods not disclosed to them by senders. One plaintiff had entrusted a box of 
goods worth £4,000 to a carrier without informing him of its value, and it was 
subsequently lost; the opinion accompanying a verdict for the carrier defendant stated 
that if the plaintiff had wanted to save himself the cost of paying a premium for 
shipping the box, and it was lost, it was a risk he had chosen to take.140 Another court 
ruled in favour of a carrier who had lost two boxes of fabrics worth more than £200; 
although the carrier had apparently been aware that the boxes were worth more than 
£5, the sender had not indicated this or paid the required surcharge.141 
 
As I will show in chapter 2, carriers and their customers understood their roles and 
responsibilities, and often informally agreed to appropriate compensation when one 
party was found deficient. By contrast, as I will discuss in chapter 5, customers of 
railway companies often found them unwilling to take responsibility for goods in their 
care, unresponsive to negotiation, and content to continue to lose expensive and time-
consuming lawsuits rather than accept liability or adapt their business practices to 
assist their customers. 
 
The place of carriers in the economy, society and culture 
In this section I consider what we can learn from contemporary evidence about 
carriers as people - their place in society, social and economic status, personal 
connections and role in contemporary culture. I have included this section to 
demonstrate another way in which carriers were integrated into the social and cultural 
life of their communities. Carriers were ubiquitous in the eighteenth- and early 
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nineteenth-century English landscape; they worked alongside and were well known 
to the communities they served, and were connected through family to those 
practicing the trades that employed and supported them.142 Aside from moving goods, 
carriers often took on personal errands for their customers, including passing on 
letters or news, delivering gifts, collecting bills, selling goods and shopping.143 A 
witness's description of a carrier at a trial at the Old Bailey in 1813 suggests the 
multiplicity of a carrier's business: '[h]e held in his hand a pocket-book; it appeared to 
contain letters, as carriers commonly have directions and orders and patterns of 
goods that he had got to match.'144 By contrast, as I will discuss in chapter 3, as is the 
case with all joint-stock companies most of the owners of railway companies were 
anonymous, and their directors and officers removed from the communities their 
railways served and thus not directly accountable to these communities for their 
decisions and actions.  
 
In this section I present evidence that shows details of carriers’ personal lives and 
offers insight into how carriers were and wished to be perceived by customers, 
potential customers and the general public. Mentions in newspapers allow us to 
compare the social status of carriers to that of those in other occupations, and identify 
the connections among carriers and their families. Obituaries, as well as the 
representations of carriers in literature, help us understand how carriers were viewed 
by their communities. Carriers' trade cards provide both explicit and implicit evidence 
of the operations of these carriers (such as the type, frequency and quality of the 
services they offered) as well as the expectations carriers believed their customers to 
have of their services (such as care, punctuality, respectability) and the ways in which 
they wanted to be seen by their customers and communities. Finally, the wills of 67 
carriers, dated between 1750 and 1850, preserved in the National Archives, provide 
evidence of carriers’ wealth, social status, family relationships and personal 
connections. 
 
This evidence suggests that carrying belonged to the lower to middling ranks of 
traditional occupations. Some contemporary sources suggested that carrying was 
considered somewhat disreputable and that carriers ‘[a]s a class…lacked the dignity 
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and skill that was usually associated with the stage and mail coach drivers’.145 
Contrary to this image of carriers as disreputable, however, my analysis of articles in 
south-western newspapers between 1750 and 1850 that mention carriers shows that 
the most common adjective used to describe a carrier was ‘respectable’, and the 
second most common was ‘eminent’.146 Even the defendant in a trial for theft was 
described in a local newspaper in 1839 as a 'respectable carrier'.147 
 
This image of carriers as ‘respectable’ members of society is reinforced by the 
absence of contrary evidence in the ‘Proceedings of the Old Bailey, 1674-1913’ online 
database and in newspaper reports of crimes or lawsuits. In these sources carriers 
occasionally appear as victims of robberies, and carriers appear to be neither more 
nor less often mentioned in accounts of such personal criminal behaviour as assault 
as those of any other occupation. Carriers were also sometimes cited for 'traffic 
violations' like speeding, drunk driving, or blocking the road, including incidents where 
a carrier’s negligence resulted in injury or death. However, although an occasional 
newspaper report or record of a lawsuit described carriers’ employees stealing from 
a carrier, or a dispute between carriers or between carriers and customers over 
payment, reports involving fraud or theft by carriers (as distinct from criminals 
impersonating carriers, a relatively common occurrence) seem to be virtually 
nonexistent.148 I found no reports of a carrier being accused of defrauding someone, 
or even (as railway companies often did) making it difficult for someone to obtain 
compensation for loss or damage to their goods. I suggest two reasons for this 
apparent rectitude among the carrying community. First, unlike railway companies 
during this period, the carrying trade was heavily regulated, and it would have been 
difficult for carriers to exploit ambiguities, loopholes or misunderstandings with 
respect to business practice, relationships or responsibilities. Second, as I will 
suggest below, carriers traded on their integrity, honesty and 'respectability' (which 
makes it unsurprising that criminals impersonating carriers could so easily fool 
unsuspecting customers). Carriers worked autonomously, without supervision, and 
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took on the responsibility of holding valuable goods in their custody for long periods 
of time; they perhaps needed, even more than other businesspeople, to maintain a 
reputation for reliability and trustworthiness. 
 
Marriage announcements suggest that carriers associated with the ‘middling sort’, 
and often had family connections to those practicing the trades that employed them - 
farmers, millers, maltsters, coachmakers, wine merchants, innkeepers, coal 
merchants, carpenters, and occasionally minor gentry.149 Although most carriers were 
not wealthy, or well-known except to the communities they served, it was possible for 
a carrier to achieve some distinction, and a few did, accumulating enough wealth to 
purchase or construct stately homes and associating with high-ranking members of 
society. Walter Wiltshire, for example, was born in 1718/1719 into a family involved 
in carrying and entertainment, operating both Wiltshire's Flying Waggons between 
London and Bath and the Wiltshire Assembly Rooms in Bath; in the mid-eighteenth 
century Walter took on the carrying business. Wiltshire was a local councillor, turnpike 
trustee, member of the Bath improvement commission, and Justice of the Peace for 
Somerset. He enjoyed a friendly relationship with Thomas Gainsborough, whose 
paintings he transported to London, reportedly for no fee; this friendship was 
strengthened through gifts of horses on Wiltshire's part and paintings on 
Gainsborough's. Wiltshire earned enough from the carrying trade to purchase land 
and construct a country house on the outskirts of Bath.150 William Jackson, the 
landlord of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Robert Southey during their residence in the 
Lake District, earned enough in the carrying trade to acquire a substantial estate.151 
Perhaps the only carrier to become a household name was the seventeenth-century 
Cambridge carrier Thomas Hobson, who is remembered in the expression ‘Hobson’s 
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choice’, and who was the subject of a eulogy by John Milton; one of Hobson's 
daughters married a baronet.152 
 
Obituaries in local newspapers portrayed carriers as valued and respected members 
of their communities. The Bath Chronicle, for example, reported in 1777 on the death 
of carrier Mary Penn, known as Mary Marshfield as she had carried between Bristol 
and Marshfield for 50 years. The reporter noted that over the course of her career she 
had walked nearly 400,000 miles, and that her considerable fortune, saved over the 
years due to her ‘somewhat parsimonious disposition’, had been left to her only 
daughter.153 These statements suggest that, like members of the clergy, medical 
practitioners, innkeepers and other prominent citizens, carriers were at least 
occasionally similarly recognised for their contribution to the community.154  
 
Some evidence of how carriers affected and were affected by their communities’ view 
of them can be found in carriers’ trade cards held in ephemera collections. Historians 
have used trade cards to help understand the development of branding, marketing 
and advertising, the development and dissemination of trends in taste and fashion, 
and the transactions involved in making and selling specific products or trades, and 
to provide biographical insights into the collectors of the cards and those in their social 
networks.155 Trade cards preserved in collections tend to be more visually complex 
and interesting than usual, so cards for producers and sellers of fashionable clothing 
and homewares tend to be overrepresented; presumably, cards for less visually-
appealing occupations like carrying are underrepresented. Maxine Berg and Helen 
Clifford suggest that trade cards were expensive, and thus used by relatively large 
and prosperous businesses, which carriers tended not to be; on the other hand, they 
also suggest that the target market for trade cards was returning rather than new 
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customers, and that they served as reminders of the locations where goods and 
services could be obtained, both of which uses would have made them particularly 
valuable to carriers.156  
 
The British Museum holds 18 trade cards for carriers, dated between 1759 and 1811. 
Most of these cards simply indicate the destinations the carriers served and the days 
of the week they arrived and departed. Some state the time of day (morning, 
afternoon, evening or night) that goods could be expected to be collected and to 
arrive, though a few state specific hours for both pickups and deliveries. Several cards 
state their terms of business with respect to insurance - which types of goods cannot 
be insured, and that the carrier can only insure goods up to a certain value.157 A few 
cards indicate that the carrier will assure 'the greatest Care shall be taken of the 
Goods sent by him.'158  
 
The images on the few carriers’ cards that include them show the equipment of a 
large and prosperous firm - a waggon with six or eight horses and an outrider, usually 
mounted (only the most prosperous waggon drivers rode; most walked beside their 
waggons), occasionally set in an industrial or bucolic landscape.159 In these images 
the waggon is clean, fully loaded and in good repair, the horses are well fed and 
carefully matched, and the driver is well dressed and alert. Overall, both the text and 
images in the carriers' cards in these collections, like the ones shown in figure 2 below, 
convey an air of prosperity, businesslike efficiency and careful, attentive service. 
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Figure 2: Carriers’ trade cards 
Source: Trade card of William Dancer, c. 1800, Banks,31.7, British Museum, London; 
trade card of Byrch, 1806, D,2.2917, British Museum, London. 
 
Newspaper announcements contained similar images and information to trade cards, 
but allowed carriers more space to describe their businesses to prospective 
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customers. The text of these announcements tended to be standardised, using the 
polite and sociable language of business relationships that I will discuss in more detail 
in the following chapters. John Millard, for example, taking on the carrying business 
of his brother Edward, who had died in March 1800, requested the 'favours of his 
Friends and the Public', and pledged to undertake his business with 'unremitting Care, 
Diligence and Dispatch'.160 Carriers also used newspaper announcements to thank 
their customers for their support. In 1804 Charles Pugh  
with the greatest deference, humbly begs leave to return his most unfeigned 
Thanks to the MERCHANTS, TRADESMEN, &c. of this city…for their very 
liberal Support and Patronage...and solicits a continuance of the same; 
assuring them that no expence, or exertion, shall be wanting on his part for 
the accommodation of the Trade, by keeping a tight Vessel, good Tarpauling-
Coverings, careful and skilful Hands, together with every other necessary 
requisite on board.161  
 
These announcements sometimes included endorsements from customers and other 
businesses that supported them. Leonard Darke, for example, a river carrier in 
Swansea, included in his 1801 announcement the names of 21 local merchants who,  
being desirous of giving Mr. Leonard Darke...every Recommendation and 
Support in our Power...give this public Notice of our Wish, that all Goods, 
Wares, or Merchandize intended for us by our respective Friends, should be 
directed to go by the said Mr. Leonard Darke.162  
 
And, finally, carriers mentioned their connections to carriers who would forward goods 
to additional destinations.163 
 
In addition to evidence from trade cards and newspaper announcements, we can 
learn about carriers from their wills. Although by the late-eighteenth century wills were 
no longer accompanied by the detailed inventories of personal property that historians 
like Lorna Weatherill used to assess levels of and changes in wealth, consumption 
and economic status, we can still learn something from them about the relative wealth 
and status of carriers and gain some idea of the nature and extent of their belongings, 
investments and real estate holdings, as well as their social networks through those 
identified as executors and beneficiaries. Gregory Clark suggests that by the late 
eighteenth century wills were less common among all sectors of the population than 
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they had been, instead becoming the ‘preserve of the propertied’, though Nigel Goose 
and Nesta Evans suggest that the decision to incur the cost of preparing a will was 
not determined by wealth but by whether the inheritance was complex or 
counterintuitive.164 Scholars have pointed out that many wills only mention property 
whose ownership needed to be confirmed; real estate and other goods already given 
away, or the ownership of which was agreed, might not be mentioned.165 
Nevertheless, even with these caveats it is possible to gain some understanding of 
the physical situation, economic status, family structure and social and business 
connections of carriers from their wills, although the proportion of carriers who 
prepared wills is likely to have been wealthier and higher in economic status than the 
average, and therefore not necessarily representative. 
 
I reviewed 67 wills and probate materials preserved in the National Archives of people 
identified in the catalogue descriptions as carriers, filed between 1751 and 1855 in 12 
counties. These counties - Cornwall, Cumberland, Derbyshire, Devon, Dorset, 
Lancashire, London, Middlesex, Northumberland, Somerset, Wiltshire and Yorkshire 
- represent a variety of regions, and also correspond to the regions for which I have 
archival material; unfortunately, however, none of the names in these wills matched 
any of the names of carriers that I encountered in other sources. Of these 67 
documents, 33 were handwritten wills, which often included descriptions of property 
to be inherited and complex and contingent instructions about how it should be 
divided. The remaining 34 documents were Abstracts of Wills or Abstracts of 
Administration, which provided less information - typically the names, relationships 
and occupations of the executors and beneficiaries and the total value of the testator’s 
legacy, rounded to increments of £100 (typically written as ‘under £100’, ‘under £200’, 
‘under £300’, ‘under £600’, ‘under £1000’, and ‘under £2000’). The 29 wills and 
abstracts in this sample that mentioned specific sums of money can be summarised 
as follows: 
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Table 1: Value of monetary legacies in carriers’ wills 
Approximate total amount of money mentioned in will Percentage of wills 
(number of wills) 
Under £200 25 (7) 
£201-£599 44 (13) 
£600-£1,999 5 (1) 
£2,000 or more 26 (8) 
Source: IR 26, PROB 11, The National Archives, London. 
Although these counts cannot be used to calculate the average wealth of the carriers 
in this sample of wills, the proportions generally confirm what is suggested in other 
contemporary and later sources, that carriers tended to be in the lower to middle ranks 
of the ‘middling sort’, though some seemed substantially better off. The mode figure 
of £201-£599 is about the average of personal wealth, derived from late-eighteenth 
century fire insurance records, of £287; it is broadly similar to the personal wealth 
calculated for workers in manufacturing (£478.0), agriculture (£446.5), skilled services 
(£431.6), and shopkeeping and trade (£392.3), and substantially higher than the 
figures calculated for those working in low-wage services and service (£87.5) and 
labourers (£17.6).166 The remaining wills in the sample did not mention specific sums, 
but bequeathed such property as silver, ‘tea equipage’, furniture, real estate, and 
investments and interests in other businesses.  
 
Many wills indicated that the testator and his or her family operated other businesses. 
For example, John Bush of Dorset, who died in 1753, left his business to his sons, 
with the instruction that they 'give to my said Wife the Carriage of such Goods as she 
shall choose to sell in her house or Shop'.167 George Mitchell of Morley, who died in 
1811, left his property to his wife, with whom he ran an inn. At her death he instructed 
that their daughter inherit the household (and presumably the innkeeping business) 
and their son inherit the carrying business.168 Most wills left the equipment of the 
carrying business to wives or children, though sometimes it was to be passed to 
people whose relationship to the testator is unclear. It was common for a husband to 
make his wife his executor and to leave the entire estate, including the business, to 
her, with the exception of some bequests to children and other family members, which 
reflects mentions in newspaper advertisements and articles and in business 
directories of widows managing carrying businesses. 
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The designation of executors and beneficiaries in carriers’ wills provides some 
information about their social networks and connections. Executors and beneficiaries 
included labourers, farmers, dyers, tanners, chandlers, bargemasters, maltsters, 
grocers, butchers, apothecaries, clerks, yeomen, and gentlemen, which again seems 
to put carriers into the broad middle class, their precise situation depending on their 
wealth and family connections.169 In his will of 1766, for example, Thomas Phillips of 
Devizes named three friends - James Powell, a gentleman, William Waylon, an 
apothecary, and William Stead, a yeoman - as executors. He requested that they sell 
his house, a nursery ground, and his carrying equipment and use the proceeds to pay 
his debts, arrange an annuity for his mother, provide funds for his brother and a 
woman named Anne Still, and use the remainder to raise his niece.170 Carrier families 
were sometimes connected to each other; in her will of 1806 Mary Pixton, carrier of 
Lancashire, left her estate to her daughter, who was married to John Kenworthy of 
Kenworthy & Co., or Kenworthy & Holt, an inland waterway carrier operating services 
in the northwest.171  
 
In addition to this information we can determine a few other things from carriers’ wills. 
This sample does not suggest any trends over the course of a century; both rich and 
poor carriers are represented in both earlier and later wills. Of the sample of wills, five 
are for women, the earliest from 1797 and the latest from 1850; while this does not 
tell us anything about the proportion of women involved in carrying, it does indicate 
that women did participate in the business and were successful enough to accumulate 
enough property to bequeath. The wills of two of these women, Hannah Thornton and 
Susannah Roff, identified them as widows; the records include the will of Thomas 
Roff, who died six years before Susannah.172 In her will Mary Baseden left ‘my late 
husband’s silver watch’ to a beneficiary; none of her beneficiaries was identified by a 
                                                 
169 Will of Thomas Phillips (1766), PROB 11/920/403, The National Archives, London; Will of 
Jeremiah Brewer (1771), PROB 11/966/162, The National Archives, London; Abstract of Will 
of Susanna Hutchings (1797), IR 26/333/4, The National Archives, London; Abstract of 
Administration of George Atkinson (1802), IR 26/425/116, The National Archives, London; 
Abstract of Administration of Thomas Hall (1802), IR 26/425/263, The National Archives, 
London; Abstract of Will of James Heys (1811), IR 26/311/116, The National Archives, London; 
Will of Ambrose Phillips (1816), PROB 11/1577/209, The National Archives, London. 
170 Will of Thomas Phillips (1766), PROB 11/920/403, The National Archives, London. 
171 Abstract of Administration of Mary Pixton (1806), IR 26/305/700, The National Archives, 
London. I could have obtained more evidence on the nature of carriers’ social networks by 
performing a similar analysis of witnesses to marriages or baptisms. 
172 Will of Hannah Thornton (1850), PROB 11/2115/221, The National Archives, London; Will 
of Susannah Roff (1842), PROB 11/1968/275, The National Archives, London; Will of Thomas 
Roff (1836), PROB 11/1866/87, The National Archives, London. 
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relationship to her, and none has the same surname, so it is difficult to determine if 
and how they were related to her.173 Mary Pixton was not identified as a widow in her 
will, but as her daughter was her executor it seems likely.174 Susannah Hutchings left 
all her property to nieces and nephews, which suggests that she may not have been 
married.175 Of this sample of wills, only two testators did not sign their names. This 
figure seems to confirm the high literacy rate of carriers; although there is no easy 
way to explain why two carriers did not sign their wills, it is possible that these testators 
were too sick or old to physically accomplish the task.176 
 
The contemporary evidence related to specific carriers - from newspapers, trade 
cards, wills and records of lawsuits - consistently portrays carriers as 'respectable' 
and well-connected within their communities. The image of the carrier in 
contemporary literature, however, is more varied. Some poems, novels and stories 
similarly portray the respectable but not very bright carrier, diligently serving his 
community.177 Others portrayed carriers, who travelled from place to place and worked 
alone, as transgressive characters; in these works, the carrier in his wide brimmed 
hat and heavy coat, accompanied by his vicious dog, was a distinctive figure both on 
the road and in town.178  
 
Summary and conclusions 
Although several historians have written about the carrying trade, and others mention 
aspects of it in their work on other topics, to date no history of transport, economic 
development, or Georgian society has developed a comprehensive picture of the 
carrying trade before the railways. In order to describe the conflict between the 
carrying trade and the railway companies in the 1840s, I began this study by providing 
such a picture, pieced together from secondary sources (business and economic 
histories, local histories, histories of transport assets, and studies of individual 
                                                 
173 Will of Mary Baseden (1842), PROB 11/1956/50, The National Archives, London. 
174 Abstract of Administration of Mary Pixton (1806), IR 26/305/700, The National Archives, 
London. 
175 Abstract of Will of Susanna Hutchings (1797), IR 26/333/4, The National Archives, London. 
176 Will of Ambrose Phillips (1816), PROB 11/1577/209, The National Archives, London; Will 
of Charles Hinder (1843), PROB 11/1984/77, The National Archives, London. 
177 Some favourable characterisations of carriers in literature include those in James 
Templeman, Gilbert; or the Young Carrier (London: H. D. Symonds, 1808); Blackmore, Cripps, 
the Carrier: A Woodland Tale, and Charles Dickens, A Cricket on the Hearth, accessed 5 
August 2015, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/678/678-h/678-h.htm. 
178 Carriers are portrayed in a less favourable light in The History of Tom Long the Carrier, 
eighteenth edition (London: L. How, 1750[?]); William Wordsworth, ‘The waggoner’, accessed 
14 September 2018, https://www.bartleby.com/145/ww284.html; and a gruesome ‘urban 
legend’: ‘Extraordinary Event.’ The Friend 18 (1845): 167. 
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carrying firms) and original research using such contemporary documents as 
business directories, court records, wills, newspaper articles and announcements, 
literature and ephemera. This picture suggests that, although the carrying trade had 
no central management structure or overseeing authority, it provided an effective 
national goods distribution network embedded in the law and custom of the country. 
The carrying trade was part of the social and economic structures of contemporary 
business, and carriers and carrying were integral to the work and lives of ordinary 
people.  
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Chapter 2: The carrying trade and the 'sociable economy' of eighteenth-
century England 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that the carrying trade I described in the previous chapter was 
part of the ‘sociable economy’ of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England, 
an economy based on personal relationships, and that the carrying trade facilitated 
these relationships by enabling participants to exchange goods, services and 
information. I begin the chapter by reviewing the scholarship on social networks and 
the ‘sociable economy’, also referred to as the ‘moral economy’ and ‘high-trust 
culture’, specifically that of Craig Muldrew, Margot Finn, Deborah Valenze, and other 
historians who have recognised the role of personal relationships in economic 
activity.1 I then apply this work to the carrying trade and the businesses it served, 
analysing business correspondence to demonstrate this ‘sociability’ with respect to 
carrying and carriers.  
 
In the following chapter I will compare the ‘sociable economy’ and its business model 
with the contractual, managerial and adversarial model developed and employed by 
joint-stock companies, including the first mainline railway companies. In chapters 4 
and 5 I will explore the outcome when the two models came into conflict in the 1840s, 
and the effect of this conflict on the carrying trade and on the economy as a whole. 
 
Contemporary and recent historiography of the 'sociable economy' 
The first scholars to describe the ‘sociable economy’ of eighteenth-century England 
were its contemporaries. Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith, 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, worked to develop a secular 'science of 
man' with laws of human behaviour as powerful and predictive as those Isaac Newton 
had developed to describe the behaviour of matter nearly a century earlier.2 In contrast 
to such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes and Samuel von Pufendorf, they believed 
that humanity must be considered collectively rather than individually; '[b]orn into 
society he must be studied in society'.3 They argued that human society was based 
                                                 
1 Mark Casson, ‘An economic approach to regional business networks’, in Industrial Clusters 
and Regional Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, eds. John F. Wilson and Andrew 
Popp (London: Routledge, 2017), 28. 
2 Eric Schliesser, 'Hume's Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism', in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2008), accessed 13 September 
2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/ entries/hume-newton/. 
3 Alan Swingewood, 'Origins of sociology: The case of the Scottish Enlightenment', The British 
Journal of Sociology 21, no. 2 (1970): 168. 
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on personal relationships which grew out of people's innate ‘kind Instincts; of natural 
Affections to associate…of Compassion, of Love of Company…and of a natural 
Delight Men take in being esteem’d and honour’d by others for good Actions’.4 Smith's 
first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, explored the individual 
and collective mechanisms by which humans created and maintained mutually 
beneficial social groups; in this work he 'showed subtly and convincingly that social 
institutions could channel self-love into decent and sometimes virtuous behavior’.5  
 
Smith and Hutcheson based their theories of human behaviour primarily on 
observations of their own society, in which 'sociable' values and behaviours were not 
only highly esteemed but crucial to the functioning of an increasingly complex 
economy. Later historians concurred with and built on their insights, arguing against 
a view of economic behaviour based solely on a narrow interpretation of individual 
self-interest. Although E. P. Thompson, in his book Customs in Common, published 
in 1991, does not directly name the ‘sociable economy’ described by Smith and 
Hutcheson, he observes that ‘many “economic” relations are regulated according to 
non-monetary norms.’6 He presents evidence from several areas of study that reveal 
a culture in which non-economic motivations and concerns influenced what other 
historians had considered ‘purely’ economic activity, people collectively regulated 
economic activity, and ‘custom’ and social norms rather than individual economic 
rationality governed economic behaviour.7 During the long eighteenth century, which 
Thompson describes as a transition between feudal dependence and industrial 
discipline, he suggests that the ‘subordination’ of feudal relationships was 
transforming into ‘negotiation’ - not necessarily among equals, but among people who 
were developing some power to determine their own ‘rules of engagement’.8 
 
In his 1998 book The Economy of Obligation Craig Muldrew explains how the complex 
trading economy of early modern England functioned without the sophisticated 
economic institutions and fiscal liquidity seemingly required to underpin it.9 He argues 
that most business was transacted in the context of a previously underappreciated 
                                                 
4 Francis Hucheson, quoted in Nicholas T. Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 46. 
5 Jerry Z. Muller, Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 53-54. 
6 Thompson, Customs in Common, 340. 
7 Thompson, Customs in Common, 71-72, 256-257, 336-339. 
8 Thompson, Customs in Common, 38. 
9 Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation. 
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reliance on extensive personal credit that facilitated the long production and 
distribution chains that developed during this period. Credit was essential for 
economic activity, as so little money was in circulation and as most income was 
variable, from piecework or odd jobs, or tied to the seasonal pace of agriculture; it was 
typical, for example, for landowners to collect rents once a year, after tenants had 
received their income from the harvest.10 
 
Muldrew argues that for an economy so extensively based on credit to function 
effectively people doing business with each other needed to trust each other enough 
to extend credit, often for very long periods. In order to obtain credit terms that allowed 
them to participate in economic interaction, people needed to exhibit behaviours that 
inspired trust, such as frugality and moderation, to establish a reputation for 
creditworthiness. Muldrew suggests that the deliberate display of these virtues led to 
a culture of 'competitive piety' amongst merchants, traders, and manufacturers.11 In 
addition to facilitating transactions without currency, long-term credit relationships 
were also 'a means of forming social bonds to secure repeated custom'.12 Long-term 
social and economic relationships discouraged cheating; as rumour of unfair dealings 
discouraged others from interacting with their subject it was in everyone's self-interest 
to act honestly.  
 
Although Muldrew draws his evidence from early eighteenth-century sources, other 
historians demonstrate that the beliefs, relationships, and behaviours he describes 
persisted throughout the century and into the next.13 Margot Finn, for example, in The 
Character of Credit, provides evidence from legal records relating to debt and the 
portrayal of debt and credit in contemporary fiction and nonfiction to extend the types 
of social relationships on which Muldrew argues the early modern English economy 
depended well into the twentieth century.14 Deborah Valenze points out that ‘[t]he web 
of joint indebtedness that Muldrew traced in seventeenth-century King’s Lynn was not 
unlike business in eighteenth-century London.’15 She suggests two reasons for the 
continuation of this type of economic interaction. First, although more silver coins were 
                                                 
10 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class, 116-117. 
11 Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, 148. 
12 Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, 124. 
13 Robin Pearson and David Richardson, 'Business Networking in the Industrial Revolution', 
Economic History Review, new series 54, no. 4 (2001): 674; Valenze, 
The Social Life of Money, 117, 266. 
14 Finn, The Character of Credit.  
15 Valenze, The Social Life of Money, 32. 
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minted in the late seventeenth century, the government remained reluctant to mint 
small change in large quantities until the nineteenth century.16 Second, although 
money was used both for contributions to the church and 'penitential' fines, the direct 
exchange of goods and services for money continued to be considered socially and 
morally suspect, and ‘[t]he detoxification of money was never complete…[s]uch coin-
starved conditions contributed to the persistence of an aura of gifting…well into the 
nineteenth century.’17  
 
Our understanding of the use of credit in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
also comes from recent research on trust and credit, part of more general economic 
and sociological study of collective action, social networks and social capital. Several 
historians have noted a connection between business transactions and personal 
relationships in specific economic sectors. R. G. Wilson, for example, identifies this 
pattern in the interactions of textile merchants in Leeds during this period: 
Relationships with customers were most cordial, disputes detested. Mirrors, 
barrels of oysters and silver cutlery…were exchanged with old 
correspondents. Constant advice was given on market trends…. Calculations 
of returns were based not simply on securing an adequate percentage on 
capital employed but also on retaining the goodwill of customers.18  
 
and Geoffrey Jones and Mary B. Rose identify it in business elites: 
Held together by common experience and regular contact, the bonds within 
nineteenth-century business elites went far deeper than mere economic ties. 
There existed...a community of trust cemented by ties of religion and 
intermarriage, which facilitated common action.19  
 
These and other scholars have suggested that social networks provided economic 
value by reducing financial risk, lowering transaction costs and disseminating 
information.20  
 
Max Weber's essay ‘“Churches” and “Sects” in North America: An Ecclesiastical 
Socio-Political Sketch’ specifically focuses on the economic value of participation in a 
                                                 
16 This information seems to be contradicted here: Tony Clayton, ‘Coins of England and Great 
Britain’, accessed 31 July 2015, http://www.coins-of-the-uk.co.uk/penny.html. 
17 Valenze, The Social Life of Money, 117, 266. 
18 Richard George Wilson, Gentlemen Merchants: The Merchant Community in Leeds, 1700-
1830 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 81. 
19 Geoffrey Jones and Mary B. Rose, Family Capitalism (London: Cass 1993), 9, footnote 32.  
20Jon Stobart, 'Personal and commercial networks in an English port: Chester in the early 
eighteenth century', Journal of Historical Geography 30 (2004): 277–293; Andrew Popp, 
Entrepreneurial Families: Marriage, Business and Life in the Early Nineteenth Century 
(London: Routledge, 2016), 107; John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 25, 52, 56. 
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religious community, arguing that 'religious sects formed the foundation of a robust 
informal social control system that would make trust, norms of reciprocity, and cheap 
information about individuals' creditworthiness abundant public goods.'21 Gillian 
Cookson makes the same points about English Quaker networks in the early 
nineteenth century.22 Although at least one of the business owners whose 
correspondence I analyse in this chapter was a Quaker, in this study I have not 
investigated the role of religion in the formation and maintenance of the social 
networks underlying credit and economic interaction as I have too little information 
about the religious affiliations of the people whose writings I analyse, both in the 
carrying trade and in the railway companies, to make any meaningful comparisons or 
draw any conclusions.  
 
The principal focus of most of the research on social networks in business has been 
concerned with how these networks facilitated capital formation and business 
management, rather than how they affected day-to-day interactions and the 
relationships between businesses and between businesses and their customers. 
Some historians initially considered the salience of social networks in the economic 
sphere 'a sign of market failure in young economies', but others have come to 
appreciate the role they played in the development of an industrial economy.23 Social 
networks have been of particular interest to economists seeking to understand how 
enough capital could have been accumulated to finance the Industrial Revolution in 
an economy with rudimentary financial tools and institutions.24 Gillian Cookson argues 
that the ‘sociable economy’ facilitated the development of industry in England:  
To accept that some kind of collaboration operated…requires an imaginative 
leap out of the competitive and confrontational framework upon which much 
late-twentieth-century management thinking rests…. This apparently 
anachronistic pre-industrial milieu provided a highly suitable setting for the 
new industry.25  
 
Mary Rose makes a similar observation in her work on the development of the cotton 
trade in Lancashire and the United States.26  
 
                                                 
21 Weber and Loader, ‘“Churches” and “Sects” in North America’, 9. 
22 Gillian Cookson, ‘Quaker networks and the industrial development of Darlington, 1780-
1870’, in Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks, 155-173. 
23 Pearson and Richardson, 'Business Networking in the Industrial Revolution,' 657.  
24 Peter Mathias, The Transformation of England (London: Methuen, 1979), 88-115; Wilson, 
British Business History, 52, 56. 
25 Cookson, 'Family firms and business networks’, 8-9. 
26 Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values, 3-4. 
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In the remainder of this chapter I will provide evidence from the correspondence of 20 
businesses, written between 1741 and 1866, which describes how customers 
selected carriers, transport modes and routes, how carriers were instructed and paid, 
and how problems were addressed and conflicts resolved. This correspondence 
illustrates the nature of the relationships among the parties involved in business 
transactions and the expectations each had of the others, and demonstrates that the 
carrying trade both facilitated and was part of an economy of obligation, reciprocity, 
and credit based on personal relationships and social networks.  
 
Evidence of the ‘sociable economy’ in contemporary business 
correspondence 
As surviving records of the carriers themselves do not provide much direct information 
about the operation of the carrying trade and its interactions with customers, I have 
found the evidence I use in this chapter in the correspondence of customers of the 
carrying trade. I identified the correspondence I used in this analysis by searching 
regional archives for correspondence for the appropriate time period of companies 
which bought and sold physical objects, rather than providing services, and thus 
employed the carrying trade as part of their business. The most valuable 
correspondence of this type was that of companies selling goods directly to a variety 
of individual customers, rather than to well-established partners, as these letters often 
laid out the details of carrying arrangements; in the latter case correspondents had 
no need to specify the details of carrying transactions. All of the firms whose 
correspondence I analysed had national markets, and many (particularly those 
providing luxury goods - furniture, wine and silverware) bought raw materials and sold 
products globally. As I am focusing in this study on domestic transport, I have not 
analysed specific correspondence dealing with international trade and transport. 
 
I reviewed letters and letter books held in archives in Bradford, Leeds, London, 
Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield. I also later reviewed some of the extensive 
correspondence of Boulton & Watt held in the Birmingham Public Library, though not 
as thoroughly (the archive was unavailable during the period in which I was doing 
archive research); my review of these documents did not identify any ways in which 
their relevant content differed from that of the firms I have analysed in this chapter. 
As the processes and relationships described in these letters are remarkably 
consistent among the wide range of types, sizes and locations of businesses whose 
correspondence I reviewed, it seems unlikely that analysis of additional collections 
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will reveal anything substantially different than what I describe in this chapter. I have 
no reason to think these processes were substantially different for other firms and 
other carriers; in fact, several descriptions of processes (particularly those pertaining 
to how problems were resolved) explicitly stated that the writer was describing what 
he perceived to be standard business practice.27  
 
Although the correspondence represents a range of goods, a range of regions and a 
period of more than 100 years, there does not appear to be any significant variation 
in business methods, processes, and interaction styles across industry sector, region 
or time period. The single exception to this consistency is the decline over time in the 
importance of 'recycling' empty containers, which I discuss later in this chapter. 
Despite the fact that the evidence I analyse in this chapter is remarkably consistent, 
as preserved business correspondence from before 1850 is rare it can be considered 
neither comprehensive nor representative, and conclusions drawn from these 
documents may not apply to the carrying trade as a whole, or across regions or time 
periods. The fact that these particular sets of letters were preserved, while the 
correspondence of thousands of similar businesses was not, may be due to chance, 
but might be due to these businesses being unusual in some way, such as more prone 
to lawsuits (some of this correspondence was found in the preserved records of law 
firms), more problematic with respect to transition of ownership or authority, or longer-
lived. It seems unlikely, however, that the ways in which these companies may be 
distinctive would relate to the way they managed goods transport.  
 
Although the sample of correspondence I refer to in this chapter suggests a uniformity 
of business models and practices, it represents only a small fraction of the range of 
goods I mention in chapter 1 and cannot be considered a representative sample of 
the economic activity of the time. As I have only reviewed business correspondence, 
I have not considered the transport of personal goods, and the firms whose 
correspondence I have analysed includes none which bought or sold agricultural 
products. The correspondence does include firms that bought and sold both raw 
materials and finished products shipped to and from manufacturing locations as well 
as to wholesale and retail distributors and individual customers. The raw materials 
covered in this correspondence include lead, tanned leather, cotton, iron, and various 
components of finished goods (wood, metal, furniture fittings, horsehair and fabric). 
                                                 
27 Letter from Harrisons, 27 December 1819, B/HRS/013, London Metropolitan Archives, 
London. 
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Manufactured or finished goods include machine parts, cloth, furniture, silver goods 
and cutlery, wine, spirits and vinegar, plants, bulbs and seeds, and wallpaper. A list 
of the names and locations of the companies, documents consulted, years reviewed, 
and archive in which documents are held, as well as a short description of each 
company, can be found in the appendix.  
 
Arranging the sending of goods 
Aside from requests for payment and negotiations of bills, goods transport was the 
most frequent subject of the correspondence I analysed for this chapter; letters to and 
from sellers, buyers, carriers and agents arranged deliveries, organised logistics, and 
investigated delays or damage.28 As I will describe in more detail below, the process 
of arranging goods carriage was iterative and cooperative, and relied on the 
relationships among the parties involved. Buyers, sellers and carriers chose among a 
number of available options, allowing them to prioritise speed, cost, risk, or (in the 
case of selecting a carrier) an existing personal relationship. The method of arranging 
for carrying allowed for a great deal of flexibility; the parties involved were continually 
consulted and provided with regularly updated information in order both to make initial 
decisions and to change them during the process if new circumstances arose. 
 
Although, as I mentioned in chapter 1, the buyer typically paid for carriage on receipt 
of the goods, the seller, who had business connections to the carrying trade and was 
typically more familiar with the logistics of carrying, generally arranged carriage with 
the buyer's agreement. Sellers negotiated transport arrangements based on the 
buyer’s instruction, then reported to the buyer, after consultation with the carrier, how 
their goods would be sent. For example, in 1800 the furniture manufacturer Gillows 
wrote to a buyer in Cockermouth, ‘The Carpets…were sent on Saturday to Scotts 
Warehouse he forwarded them on Monday to Kendal from whence they wou'd be sent 
on Tuesday by the Cockermouth Carrier’, and to a buyer in Leeds, 'The Laidies 
Wardrobe and other articles…are this Day forwarded by Geo Hitchinsons Waggon to 
Gargrave where they will be put on the Canal'.29 Sellers typically trusted carriers to 
determine the most appropriate route, and either obtained advice from the carrier 
before sending or allowed the carrier to use his judgment on the way:  
                                                 
28 'The terms of credit laid down between the merchant and his customers always appears to 
have been the most controversial between the two parties.' Wilson, Gentlemen Merchants, 78. 
29 Letter from Gillows to Sir Winfred Lansons, 17 December 1800, 344/174, Westminster City 
Archives, London; Letter from Gillows to Thos Fisher, Leeds, 14 May 1800, 344/174, 
Westminster City Archives, London. 
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The Two Board Table…was forwarded 17th inst by Geo Atkinson's Waggon 
to Skipton with directions to forward it by the best conveyance…to Pontefract, 
as the Canal has been dry some time we were fearful if we had given positive 
directions to send them by the Canal it might have caus'd delay30 
 
Buyers and sellers generally seemed to be informed purchasers of transport services, 
and were sufficiently aware of logistical issues to be notified of any problems that 
arose in transit; a 1795 letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, for example, pointed 
out to a buyer of their silverware presumably enquiring about a delay, ‘[we] can assure 
the last goods were sent immediately after the breaking up of the Ice; we could have 
sent them sooner, but they would have been detained…and perhaps put in a damp 
place, which would have caused them to be much tarnished’.31 Sellers often explained 
to buyers that weather affected their decisions about how and when to send goods; 
Gillows wrote to a buyer in January 1800 that their furniture order would be sent ‘most 
likely by land as a Conveyance by Sea from London at this Season of the Year is 
precarious and the difference in the expence from thence is not much.’32 
 
An 1812 letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons to a buyer of silverware stated that they 
‘cannot ascertain here which of the Plymouth Coasters the Box will come by’; this is 
unusual, as sellers generally informed buyers by which carrier or captain they were 
sending their goods so that the buyer could enquire whether the waggon or ship had 
arrived.33 In 1826 one buyer chided wine and vinegar merchant H. Singers & Co. for 
omitting this information in a letter: ‘as you do not give the carrier's name am quite at 
a loss of whom to enquire why [a shipment of whiskey and vinegar] has not been 
delivered…there is foul play at work with my favourite beveredge’.34 As early as 1813 
at least one manufacturer provided his customers with such printed notices as the 
following: 
Sir, We have forwarded for you under, per ____ which wish safe and soon to 
hand. We have the pleasure to inform you the ___ Captn ____ has arrived 
from ____ having on board for you ____ which we have forwarded by ____ to 
____ and hope will soon be received.35 
 
                                                 
30 Letter from Gillows, 23 September 1800, 344/174, Westminster City Archives, London. 
31 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 14 May 1795, BR240, Sheffield City Council Archives, 
Sheffield. 
32 Letter from Gillows, 23 January 1800, 344/174, Westminster City Archives, London. 
33 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons to Mr Lamport, 29 May 1812, BR240, Sheffield City 
Council Archives, Sheffield. 
34 Letter from John Leybourne to H. Singers, 3 November 1826, 578/222, Tyne and Wear 
Archives, Newcastle. 
35 13 January 1813, John Goodchild Collection, Wakefield. 
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As the buyer was legally the owner of the goods as soon as they were transferred 
from the seller to the carrier, the seller typically asked for the buyer's instruction when 
arranging transport, and was required to comply with any instructions from the buyer 
with respect to carrier or transport mode.36 A 1795 letter from Thomas Bradbury & 
Sons asks for instructions on which mode the buyer would prefer for sending their 
order of silver;  
[t]he goods…being nearly ready and the canal…being froze we shall be glad 
to know whether you will have them by land carried…as…many of the Goods 
which are so heavy as…to pay for Land Carriage…would amount to near of 
the cost of the whole order.37  
 
In other cases the seller offered a suggestion, requesting the buyer to inform them if 
it was not acceptable, as in this letter of 1812 from silversmiths Thomas Bradbury & 
Sons: 
[We] purpose sending the principal part of your Goods…this week, and the 
remainder we will forward [by] Coach free of expence to you to arrive same 
time as those [by] Waggon…We hope you will allow the Goods to be sent [by] 
Waggon…if sent [by] Sea the time of delivery will be uncertain but should you 
still prefer the latter please inform us [by] return of Post.38 
 
On occasion sellers consulted buyers about the details of shipping, as with this 1813 
letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons: 
as the Dishes will pack in the Tureen and the Plates be 4 on ea Side, we think 
they would be better in one Box, as they would take two Boxes…to divide them 
in equal Weights and you observe they must not exceed 80 lb ea shall 
therefore wait your Answer.39  
 
The details were agreed, and Thomas Bradbury & Sons wrote again the following 
month,  
[w]e have this Day forwarded…the Goods…in 2 Mahogany Cases…one of 
which weighs 23 lb the other 23 1/2 lb which are enclosed in a deal Case to 
prevent their being damaged and suppose will save expence in Shipping as 
being only one Package.40 
 
                                                 
36 Letter from Gillows to Henry Tomkinson, 15 July 1801, 344/175, Westminster City Archives, 
London; Letter from Gillows to Rev. Mr. Calvert, 14 August 1801, 344/175, Westminster City 
Archives, London; Letter from Gillows to B. F. Hesketh, 21 December 1801, 344/175, 
Westminster City Archives, London. 
37 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 23 January 1795, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
38 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 31 August 1812, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
39 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 25 October 1813, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
40 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 20 November 1813, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
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Though many buyers allowed sellers to make carrying arrangements, some indicated 
that they would arrange for their own delivery and others provided sellers with detailed 
instructions for how, where and to whom goods should be sent. Such instructions as 
the following letter written in 1797 to George Trollope for an order of wallpaper are 
not untypical: ‘send them in a parcel by Cook's Salisbury Coach which sets Off at 4 
O'clock in the afternoon from the Old White Horse Cellar Piccadilly, & direct it to Wm 
Chute Esq the Vyne Basingstoke’.41 Buyers often provided instructions for several 
segments of a journey. When requesting goods to be sent to them, for example, 
Thomas Bradbury & Sons wrote in 1814, ‘you may send the 5 Blocks of tin 
immediately by Water to Manchester, from there by Johnsons Waggon’.42 A buyer of 
machine parts from George Hattersley & Sons in 1824 requested them to ‘be so good 
as to forward them addressed as under by Canal to Liverpool, directed to be 
afterwards forwarded to Wrexham by Coffields Chester Waggon.’43 A letter from J. & 
N. Philips & Co. indicates how instructions were often provided to direct the actions 
of several parties: 
[p]lease to give Orders…to pack [a shipment of yarn] up 27 Bundles in a pack 
and to send it off immediately by the Maxfield carrier with directions to be left 
at Mr. Joseph Stokes's at the Post Office in Maxfield to be forwarded from 
thence by the very next Leek Carrier.44  
 
Buyers occasionally specified a reason for choosing a specific mode or carrier; a 
buyer of wallpaper from George Trollope wrote in 1804, ‘I duly recd the papers this 
morn & begs to inform you that in future we shall be glad you will send by the Stafford 
coach instead of the one the papers came by for they charge 14d carriage wh would 
be only 10d by our coach’.45 Another common reason is mentioned in an 1808 letter 
to George Trollope: 
I have been waiting for these five days past for Paper.… There being but one 
Carrier & so many things to bring to Totness is the cause of the delay & it 
appears also that he is careless of her Ladyship's Parcels & would much rather 
oblige the shopkeepers in Totness hope for the future you will send by the 
Devonshire Coach from the Black Bear Piccadilly it being cheaper than the 
Coach from the white horse Cellar46  
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It was not uncommon for buyers to request that their goods be sent by, for example, 
'any Carrier but not Robt Lawton'.47 In 1778 wine merchant Jonathan Michie replied 
to a buyer assuring him that his request had been complied with: ‘I had the honour of 
yours last week desiring to send your Hock by the first Opportunity Except the 
Endeavour. I have sent it by the Lamb; Thos Miles Master, who was to sail this day’.48 
A 1788 letter following up a shipment of silver plate demonstrates that sellers followed 
buyers’ directions carefully:  
the article was positively forward…by Coach…with…directions…to go by 
the…most speedy conveyance…to Chester the Coach from hence goes to the 
White Bear Inn…we have wrote to [the] bookkeeper there to make immediate 
enquiry after said box’.49  
 
Sellers followed buyers’ instructions even when they were not advisable. Gillows 
wrote to a disappointed customer in Falmouth in 1800: 
We were advised...that your…Furniture…were shipt…for Falmouth the first 
Opp[ortunit]y…[w]e are sorry for the unavoidable delay occasioned by the 
want of communication between Liverpool & Falmouth but as the Goods were 
sent by that route by your own Recommendation, we don't conceive any blame 
can attach to us.50 
 
Not following the buyer’s instructions could have consequences, as buyers had the 
right, and were willing to use it, to return goods sent incorrectly or to refuse payment 
for their carriage. In 1806, for example, leather tanners Edward & James Richardson 
seem to have refused a shipment from a supplier who had not followed instructions: 
The balonica [acorn husks]…thou sent us is arrived here…I am astonished at 
thy want of discretion in sending it by wagon…I desired thee to send me 10 
cwt which is charged 24s…at which price it is totally unfit for my purpose. I am 
therefore under the necessity to refuse taking it in - it Lays…with Wm 
Anderson the carriers agent, to wait thy directions.51 
 
Negotiating costs and payments for carriage 
Because the seller was not a party to the contract for carriage, sellers did not typically 
record carriage costs, or charge customers separately for carriage, and the 
correspondence of sellers does not typically mention the cost of carriage. Although 
carriage costs were rarely included in the correspondence I analysed, or in attached 
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bills or invoices, the figures which occasionally appeared substantiate Dorian 
Gerhold’s assessment that the cost of carriage generally comprised about three per 
cent of the value of the goods carried.52 As I mentioned in my introduction, this 
percentage is somewhat less than, and clearly less significant to both buyers and 
sellers than, the frequently debated 5 to 10 per cent discounts that many firms offered 
for payment within six months.53  
 
Some goods appear to have been sent carriage paid, possibly a standard practice 
with customers or agents with whom a firm had a running account.54 Occasionally the 
cost of carriage was used as a bargaining point, as in correspondence between 
Fielden Brothers and a prospective buyer of finished cloth in 1813; 'bleaching and 
Carriage to be charged to and paid by me to the parties here'.55 Other arrangements 
might include the seller paying a portion or fixed amount of the cost of carriage; for 
example, in 1814 silversmiths Dixon & Smith agreed with Armstrong, Hunt & Co. that 
'[c]arriage [would be] Paid by Waggon & if Orderd by Coach you Pay half the 
Carriage'.56 Gillows sometimes paid for the carriage of their furniture by waggon to 
the nearest transfer point, but this is difficult to ascertain as this cost was rarely 
itemised on customers' bills.57  
 
Sellers often agreed a rate with carriers and then reported the rate to buyers. In 1796 
Gillows informed a buyer in Hoxholes, for example, that their furniture was ‘pack'd in 
a large packing Case & a Crate weigh 70 Stone 2 lb for which Scot charges 6p per 
Stone to Manchester’.58 For a buyer in Newcastle in 1800 Gillows paid carriage to 
Kendal ‘from whence [the buyer’s furniture was] convey’d to Newcastle by David 
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Hewitson at which warehouse they will be found, his charge for carrying them from 
Kendal to Newcastle is 8 [pence] per Stone’.59 If necessary, Gillows arranged for 
transport and reported costs for several legs of a journey, as in this letter of 1800: 
The Chairs…are this Day forwarded by Tho. Salt the Warrington Carrier, from 
whence they will be taken to Chester by Shaw the Carrier from hence to 
Warrington 3-6 per Cwt and from Warrington to Chester Salt informs about 4 
[pence] per stone or 2/ Per cwt, we have sent them by Land Carriage as there 
is no opportunity of sending them…[by water] to Chester in less than 10 Days60 
 
Sometimes, however, Gillows did not have the necessary connections or information 
to report costs for an entire journey, as they explained in this letter of 1801: 
[the buyer’s billiard table] was forwarded yesterday…by Thomas Salt the 
Warrington Carrier who arrives there on Thursday Evening, and will forward 
it…by the Northwich Carrier, who…will deliver it at the Crewe Hall on Saturday 
next Salt is to take it to Warrington at 4s per Cwt it weighs about 6 Cwt, we 
cou'd not agree for the Carriage any further than Warrington.61 
 
It was to the advantage of the buyer for the seller to negotiate carriage rates, as sellers 
had established business relationships with carriers and were familiar with routes and 
customary costs, as indicated by a 1796 letter from Gillows to a buyer in Chorley: 
‘[t]he chairs…are this day forwarded by Scot…and we think 3 [shillings per] Cwt a fair 
charge…we mention this because carriers sometimes take advantage of Gentlemen 
unacquainted with the rates of Carriage’.62 Sometimes a seller reported a carriage 
rate to a buyer, but could not subsequently obtain that rate from the carrier; depending 
on the nature of the agreement between buyer and seller, the seller was then 
sometimes responsible for making up the difference, as in an agreement an agent 
arranged in 1831 between wine and vinegar merchant H. Singers & Co. and a buyer: 
‘The carr'r of the 4 casks we are to pay in the first place but it is not to be more than 
10/vir or 2/6 each, & if you cannot get them sent for that we will have to pay the 
difference’.63  
 
Although after consultation with the carrier a seller could indicate to a buyer what the 
carrier's rate would be, as the seller was not party to the contract between buyer and 
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carrier he was unable to verify or enforce that rate. Occasionally the carrier charged 
the buyer a different rate from what Gillows had reported; in these cases Gillows 
sympathised but could do little. They wrote to one disappointed buyer in 1800, ‘the 
pattern Chair being a Trifle we sent it by land Carriage as being more certain in point 
of time, but it is charged more than three times as much as it should have been’, and 
to another in 1801, '[w]e think the charge of £2.12.6 rather high we pay no more than 
4. per Cent to Manchester for our Goods'.64 Although Gillows were not obliged to 
intervene with the carrier on behalf of the buyer, they occasionally attempted 
reconciliation, as in this letter of 1800: 
[We] are truly sorry they have charg'd you more than we mention…. [W]e find 
that Tho Salt the Carrier…inform'd us that Shaw wou'd take the goods…for 
about 4p per stone…but presume he was not certain as he said about that 
Price. We are sorry that you have paid more than we mentioned…it will be out 
of our power to obtain any thing back from Shaw…but will try which we can do 
with Salt.65  
 
While buyers directly paid carriers the cost of carriage, sellers typically charged 
buyers directly for packing and for packing materials, which could be a significant 
expense. Gillows, for example, informed buyers that their bill included the services of 
the firm's large and skilled packing department: 'the furniture was packed by 
experienced people who have been in the habit of packing furniture for 30 years and 
has been their sole occupation'.66 Gillows’ bills included charges for ‘packing the 
above cartage tolls & Booking’, ‘box packing’, and ‘all Expences of Carriage and fixing 
up excepting the Conveyance from Manchester to Hart Hill’.67  
Sellers appear to have put a great deal of thought into the most cost-efficient way to 
use packing crates; as Gillows explained in a letter of 1800, ‘[r]ather than put you to 
the Expence of making a new Packing Case for the Glass we have packed it in one 
which is considerably too large if it is sent back…we shall charge only 3.6 for the use 
of it & Packing the Glass’.68 Sheffield silversmiths Fenton, Watson & Co. suggested 
in 1798 that an item needing repair not be sent from London until a box became 
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available: ‘You had better send down the Liquor Bottle with the broken stopper to have 
one fitted when you have a box’.69 Some correspondence indicates that shipping 
boxes were valuable enough to be worth returning empty; ‘on the 9th of Nov we Paid 
5/ for the Carriage of 3 Empty Boxes from London’.70 Wine merchant Archibald 
Singers wrote to his father in 1831 suggesting the best way to get their containers 
returned: ‘[y]ou had better direct Thomas to mark the name of the vessel on the lid of 
the casks as they can more easily return the empty ones by the same ship, & there 
cannot be too much...caution used in this respect’.71 The practice of shipping empty 
containers is also evident in their reuse for subsequent shipments of the same items 
to the same buyers. In 1845 machine parts manufacturer R. Hattersley & Sons wrote 
to a supplier, for example, '[a] few days ago I return'd you the Empty Cask and will 
thank you to refill it with the same Kind of Oil and return it soon as possible'.72 Given 
the cost of these materials, sellers often accepted their return for credit. Gillows’ 
policy, for example, at least through the early nineteenth century, was to rebate up to 
two thirds of the cost of packing crates if they were returned in satisfactory condition 
for reuse, 'as you are only charged for the use of them'.73 The fact that sellers were 
willing to reimburse buyers for the cost of returning shipping containers suggests that 
the cost of their transport was less than the cost of the labour and materials to make 
them.  
 
Analysis of correspondence relating to the cost of and payment for carrying, like the 
analysis of the logistics of and arrangements for goods transport, shows a 
collaborative and iterative process in which all parties participated and negotiated. 
While in some cases buyers made decisions based on reducing the cost of carriage, 
and in a few other cases buyers were surprised by unexpectedly high costs, the 
decisions buyers and sellers made about transporting goods, particularly empty 
boxes, suggest that transport costs were a relatively small part of the cost of 
purchasing goods and that for the most part customers paying for goods transport did 
not find the cost or conditions of transport unreasonable.  
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Dealing with problems 
As I described in chapter 1, the law held carriers responsible for loss of or damage to 
the goods in their care. A rare letter from a carrier to woollen merchants Benjamin 
Gott & Sons, written in 1820, acknowledges this fact: 
[w]e hereby engage to make good the damage done to Three Bales…on their 
way from this place to Liverpool by our Waggons…as the amount of the 
damage cannot be ascertained at present…we hold ourselves responsible 
until such time as you receive a statement of the injury sustained.74  
 
As the contract for carriage was between the carrier and the buyer, if a shipment was 
lost or damaged it was the buyer's responsibility to negotiate mitigation or 
compensation with the carrier, though the seller could facilitate the resolution of the 
problem. Letters from Gillows to carriers and buyers indicate that carriers were 
expected to repair damage, or arrange for a damaged item to be repaired, rather than 
simply reimburse the buyer, although disputes were occasionally resolved by the 
latter means; a letter written to a customer in 1800 states, ‘we are sorry the table 
sustain’d any damage as it is evidently the fault of the carrier he will pay for repairing 
it without any hesitation’.75 Although Gillows had no formal obligation to do so, as they 
had business relationships with carriers they often took responsibility for arranging 
and negotiating refunds or repairs, as in this letter of 1800:  
[w]e beg leave to repeat that the Carrier is liable to make good any damage 
your Goods might sustain…as we can prove…the damage must have 
happen'd from the Carelessness of the Carrier. [W]e will endeavor to settle the 
Matter with Scott having an Account with him here which we have to settle in 
a few days.76  
 
Gillows could use relationships with its regular carriers to negotiate a satisfactory 
outcome for the buyer, as they did in this letter of 1800: ‘[t]he Goods went through the 
hands of two or three Carriers which makes it difficult to manage…we prevailed on 
Greenwood the Carrier…to abate £8 from the charge, which he considers will also 
clear them of any expence of repairing any little damage’.77 In this case, although it 
appears that it was possible that the damage to the buyer’s goods was caused by one 
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of the carriers that transported the goods after they left the custody of Greenwood, 
the first carrier, Greenwood was willing to make a concession, at Gillows’ behest and 
after ‘some difficulty’, to preserve his relationship with Gillows.  
 
On the other hand, if the seller could prove the goods were received undamaged by 
the carrier their responsibility was discharged, and typically other firms were less 
interested than Gillows in pursuing the matter any further. Harrisons Nursery wrote to 
a buyer in 1819, ‘I can readily prove that your Seeds were forwarded for the Waggon 
& Book'd and sign'd by the Waggon Bookkeeper - it is with you therefore to rule it with 
them.'78 They wrote a month later, possibly to the same person: 
[W]e certainly undertake to supply your orders...we do not thereby however 
make ourselves Common Carriers or liable to their misconduct it must be well 
known to every Man in business that when the Goods...are delivered...to the 
purchasers Carrier they become the immediate property of the purchaser and 
should any…delay occur to such Goods...the purchaser should…object to 
receiving such Goods till the Carrier has made himself answerable for any 
injury…. To prove the delivery of your Goods into the Carriers Possession is 
all that can be acquired from Your most ob't Svt79 
 
Gillows were unwilling to hold a carrier responsible for returned items damaged due 
to a buyer’s improper packing; in 1800 they wrote to one buyer that the damage 
suffered by an improperly packed dining table ‘puts it out of our policy to call upon the 
Carrier to pay the loss which we could have done (and would have done) had it been 
properly packed’.80 It also appeared that Gillows were willing to spare the carrier when 
they believed the carrier was not at fault, in order to appease a dissatisfied customer, 
as in this letter of 1800:  
[t]he People who packed [the damaged goods] are ready to certify that they 
were well & efficiently packed…however to show our willingness to 
accommodate this matter we will allow half the amount [£10] which we 
trust…Mr Liddle will be perfectly satisfied with.81 
  
Carriers were paid by buyers, but competed for the business of sellers, which gave 
sellers some leverage to negotiate with carriers on behalf of buyers to obtain lower 
rates for them. For example, in 1787 a supplier wrote to Thomas Maltby in Newcastle,  
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[t]he Lead I bought for you of ayres would have been shipped before now but 
they are asking an advantage in the Freight which I was unwilling to give 
however as you are much in want of it I shall endeavour to ship it tomorrow & 
take my remedy against the Ship Owners in future.82  
 
This communication from buyers to carriers via sellers was indirect, but could be 
effective in convincing carriers to reduce their rates if sellers chose to exercise their 
prerogative to recommend carriers, as this 1814 letter from silversmiths Dixon & Smith 
to Hunts Carriers suggests: 
[A] number of our Customers Complain that they are chargd 1/- Porterage for 
small Boxes while Pickfords charge 6C. I complained in London but did not 
find it Sufficiently remedied - I now address you saying we are sending many 
of our Goods by Pickfords Waggon a Box sent from Birm and del by the same 
Porter & is only charged 6C, but if it has come from Sheffd it is charged 1/- I 
think you will find it your Int[erest] to have this Imposition removd but if I find it 
continues - we shall be Obliged to leave you altho you have had the Principal 
of our Carr[ia]ges Ever since we was in Business.83 
 
These exchanges among buyers, sellers and carriers indicate that, although the roles 
and responsibilities of each party were clearly delineated by law and custom, and 
generally well understood by the parties involved, when something went wrong or 
someone was dissatisfied parties were generally willing to be flexible and 
collaborative, and occasionally to step out of their assigned roles, in order to preserve 
business relationships and maintain their own reputations. 
 
Personal relationships among participants in trade 
Goods carriage arrangements, like business arrangements in general, typically 
prioritised developing and maintaining amicable business relationships among the 
parties involved, and protecting each party's reputation. Like many sellers in the 
correspondence I reviewed, Gillows' partners expressed caution about doing 
business with anyone with whom they did not already have a relationship. They often 
requested persons known to them to investigate or vouch for strangers, as in this 
example from 1801:  
[a] Mrs Jackson whose Daughter married one of the Fieldings of Blackburn 
has ordered about £150 or 200 value of Goods…Wou’d you have the 
Goodness to enquire concerning…how far it wou’d be eligible to trust 
her…your kind Assistance in making the above enquiry without mentioning 
our names would oblige.84 
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A letter from Henry Escricke, who bought yarn and sold cloth, requested similar 
information from his correspondent, pointing out the risk involved in misjudging a 
buyer's character: '[p]lease to let me know his character if you know him. James…got 
an order to buy him 4 packs of grey cottons…if he be a good man I'll pay for them and 
send them and draw upon him for them. If you do not know him please to inquire into 
his character.'85 In 1849 George Hattersley wrote to a prospective buyer of machine 
parts to request that he negotiate the purchase with someone known to both of them, 
explaining the roundabout process by saying, 'I trust you will excuse me when I say 
that as you are entire strangers to me, this being the first transaction'.86 Thomas 
Bradbury & Sons accepted new customers for their silver goods based on character 
references, though this policy did not ensure prompt payment; an 1800 letter 
addressing a bill that had been outstanding for four years stated, ‘[o]ur Friend Mr 
Torby informed us when we opened an Account with you he had no doubt you would 
be very regular in your payments - we are very sorry to observe the contrary.’87  
 
This same concern for and reliance on relationships can be seen in correspondence 
discussing payment and credit arrangements. For example, although Gillows seems 
typically to have been paid by direct credit note, the partners used their relationships 
with other parties to arrange alternative methods of payment that were more 
convenient for buyers, as in this example from 1796:  
[t]he Rev Isaac Crackett of Ambleside is indebted to us £28 10 10 1/2 which 
he wou'd find more convenient to pay at Kendal than here we have therefore 
taken the Liberty to request him to pay it into your hands…we should be much 
oblig’d to you if you wou'd give him a satisfactory acknowledgement if he pays 
you the same.88  
 
These payments were often arranged to be convenient for all parties involved, as 
shown in this letter to wool-stapler Joseph Jackson: 
[a]s you have had some dealings with Mr Marriott…a Neighbour of mine who 
does business with him, wish'd me to take £6 note, a pound Each of him - 
please to pay him this sum, on Account of Mr Rd Mouldig…and take his 
acknowledgment for the same and will bring you when I come to mark't.89 
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Aside from the passing references to settling accounts with carriers that I have 
mentioned above, there is no direct evidence in the correspondence I reviewed that 
demonstrates that this ‘web of credit’ extended to carriers specifically. Such evidence 
might be drawn from the few carriers’ cash books, account books and day books held 
in archives around the country. It is possible that one account book in the Bath Record 
Office, dated June 1819 to July 1822, documents the transactions between a carrier 
and an innkeeper; this book shows that accounts were settled every few months, and 
that the innkeeper collected his due from the carriers’ customers, passing the 
remainder to the carrier. The book also indicates the informality of the arrangement; 
one transferred sum was ‘left on a Great Coat’.90 
 
Gillows’ partners used intelligence gained from their social network to determine when 
a customer was in a position to pay an overdue bill, as in this 1801 example: 'Mr 
Cawthorne informs us that the latter has a speedy prospect of the means & intends 
to settle the whole of his concern'.91 Silversmiths Thomas Bradbury & Sons used 
personal connections to apprise themselves of their customers’ financial 
circumstances, writing to a debtor in 1798 that they have ‘the satisfaction to find that 
affairs in general with you have taken a favourable turn’.92 They were comfortable 
asking one customer to check up on another, as in this 1814 letter:  
We take the Liberty of addressing these few Lines to you requesting you will 
have the goodness to call upon Mr Benjn Smith…to know the Reason why he 
has never Reply'd to our Requests; Mr Ware wrote him Several times but have 
never Recd any answer Nor can we Imagine the cause of his thus so treating 
us - If You could procure the needful for us Should feel ourselves highly 
obliged93  
 
These requests and considerations demonstrate the tangible financial value of 
personal relationships with colleagues and customers.  
 
Buyers and sellers maintained the personal relationships they relied on to protect their 
income by giving and accepting favours, including choosing with whom to do 
business. Both sellers and buyers preferred to work with carriers and captains with 
whom they had established relationships. For example, in the late-eighteenth century 
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lead and painters’ colours manufacturer Walkers, Fishwick & Co. seemed to rely on 
a particular coastal ship captain, and if their goods were sent with someone else it 
was specifically mentioned, as in this letter from 1787: ‘we shall ship you some Red 
Lead per next Vessel without waiting for Petrie’.94 Another letter the same year stated, 
‘[i]f Petrie be not come away & you can furnish us conveniently with 10 or 15 Bar's 
more of the same Lead Ore send us them by him, if he is sailed send us for the present 
only 4 Barrels & the remaining part by him the next Voyage.’95 Favours extended 
beyond preferential choice of carriage. Business owners often maintained 
connections through gifts, as when Walkers, Fishwick & Co. wrote to their agent in 
1786 that ‘Petrie has on board for you a Cask of excellent Newcastle Ale & for Mr 
Ward a Clock, a Cask of potatoes, 20 Chickens in 2 Coops with provision for the 
Voyage’.96 Gillows’ partners used their connections to find employment for relations, 
obtain such domestic goods as lime juice and potatoes, and monitor the progress of 
the sons of a colleague travelling home to Scotland for the school holidays.97  
 
Businesses resolved conflicts with customers by doing what they felt necessary to 
'make good', addressing business issues as if they were personal misunderstandings 
and considering the feelings and opinions of all parties concerned. An 1813 letter from 
a customer to wool-stapler Joseph Jackson stated that an order had not been 
correctly fulfilled, but expressed concern over the carrier’s feelings and reputation and 
agreed to withhold a decision about how to address the situation until all parties had 
been consulted: 
[O]n weighing [a shipment of wool]…find 3 out of the 7 deficient…the 
Boatman…positively declares they are in the same state as deliver'd to him, 
and thinks it will be hard if he must make good another man's neglect…on his 
return will call, consequently will think what we are to do.98 
 
An 1814 entry in the Directors' Minutes of the Mersey & Irwell Canal Company 
demonstrated this personal style of conflict resolution: 
A letter…was read, stating that Sir Richard Brooke felt hurt at the charge made 
upon him…. Ordered that a letter be written…to express the Company's regret 
                                                 
94 Letter from Walkers, Fishwick & Co. to Thomas Maltby, 6 January 1787, 11321, Tyne & 
Wear Archives, Newcastle. 
95 Letter from Walkers, Fishwick & Co. to Thomas Maltby, 2 March 1787, 11321, Tyne & Wear 
Archives, Newcastle. 
96 Letter from Walkers, Fishwick & Co. to Thomas Maltby, 19 December 1786, 11321, Tyne & 
Wear Archives, Newcastle. 
97 Letters from Gillows, 5 July 1800, 344/174; 23 June 1801, 344/175; 344/174; Westminster 
City Archives, London. 
98 Letter from Edmondson Co., Halifax, to Joseph Jackson, 10 June 1813, John Goodchild 
Collection, Wakefield. 
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at any cause of misunderstanding should arise…and their readiness to have 
the Charge reconsidered.99 
 
When necessary, people involved in disputes could draw on the goodwill established 
by their relationships to resolve conflict informally and personally, without resorting to 
expensive or time-consuming legal processes. Machine parts manufacturer George 
Hattersley & Sons wrote to the Union Canal Company in 1835, ‘[w]e have received a 
quantity of Iron this day by one of your Boats & find we are...3 of 35 short, if you have 
it in your Possession, I will thank you to forward it Immediately & say what quantity 
you had for us’.100 An 1807 letter relating a dispute between Richardsons, leather 
tanners, and a supplier suggested that the disputants ‘refer the matter to two of our 
common friends in London’.101 A similar request can be found in the minutes of the 
directors of the Mersey & Irwell Canal Company in 1798: 'Ordered that Mr Wright get 
two indifferent persons to value the Damage done, and the amount of such value 
together with such further sum as may be thought necessary be tendered to Messrs 
Naylor & Summers at the same time given to them'.102 Wool-stapler Joseph Jackson 
wrote to a customer in 1821 that 'he agrees to let any respectable Person examine 
the wool' to determine compensation for it being 'falsely wound'.103 Parties involved in 
these types of disputes were aware that the formal legal system could be engaged as 
a last resort, if such informal negotiations proved unworkable or unsatisfactory. By 
comparison, until statute law was changed in 1871, similar disputes involving railway 
companies were inevitably drawn into the formal legal system, as they could not be 
resolved through informal negotiation on third-party adjudication. 
 
Goods transport also relied on and facilitated personal relationships through the 
common practice of including multiple buyers’ purchases in one package, and 
requesting the party to whom the package was sent to arrange delivery to the others. 
An 1800 letter from Gillows to a customer informed him that the wardrobe they were 
sending him contained items for his neighbour ‘as they pack safely and at less 
                                                 
99 Directors' Minutes, Mersey & Irwell Canal, vol. 3, 3 October 1814, Waterways Archive, 
Ellesmere Port. 
100 Letter from George Hattersley & Sons to Union Canal Co., 1 December 1835, 32D83/32/1, 
West Yorkshire Archives, Bradford; letter from R. Hattersley & Sons to Union Canal Co., 23 
April 1828, 32D83/32/1, West Yorkshire Archives, Bradford requests that they search their 
boat for a missing iron bar.  
101 Letter from Edward & James Richardson, c. June 1807, 161/52, Tyne and Wear Archives, 
Newcastle. 
102 Directors' Minutes, Mersey & Irwell Canal, vol. 2, 3 October 1798, Waterways Archive, 
Ellesmere Port. 
103 Letter from Joseph Jackson, 13 January 1821, John Goodchild collection, Wakefield. 
95 
 
 
expence to him’.104 Silversmiths Thomas Bradbury & Sons wrote to a buyer in 
Doncaster in 1787 that they ‘have made the freedom to include 4 qt. Muggs for Mr 
Donald which shall be oblig'd you will send to him and Charge him for his proportion 
of Carriage.’105 An 1811 letter from the firm to Mrs J. Jacobs lists items for several 
people that had been included in a package addressed to her.106 An 1814 letter from 
silversmiths Dixon & Smith arranged a similar shipment: ‘[w]ill thank you to send off 
by Land on the receipt of this the 10 Cwt of Candle…as agreed with you, as also at 
the same time send her Browne's…with them if he has got them'.107 The Boulton and 
Fothergill factory in Soho wrote to one customer in 1773, 'Miss Jermy having lately 
been at our Manufactory and having been requesting us to send her a Silver filigree 
Box we send it you along with your Goods and shall be obliged to you for causing it 
to be delivered to her.'108 Occasionally Gillows asked a supplier for a similar favour, 
as in this letter of 1800: '[t]hese or half, of them are wanted immediately therefore 
shou'd be glad you wou'd send them in any other person['s] Parcel if you have none 
coming to us, as soon as possible.'109 This practice of sending goods for more than 
one person in a single package, as a way to maintain and draw on personal 
relationships between sellers and buyers as well as reduce the cost of carriage, is 
particularly notable because, as I will describe in chapter 5, railway companies' strong 
objection to it resulted in it becoming the subject of the most contentious legal disputes 
between carriers and railway companies. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I used evidence from the correspondence of several businesses that 
employed carriers to describe how the carrying trade operated and to highlight the 
role of trust, credit, reciprocity and personal relationships in the communication 
among the parties involved. I have based my analysis of this ‘sociable economy’ 
primarily on the work of Craig Muldrew, who highlighted the importance of personal 
relationships in an economy where money was scarce, as well as on the work of other 
scholars who have investigated the nature and role of social connections in 
                                                 
104 Letter from Gillows, 3 May 1800, 344/174, Westminster City Archives, London. 
105 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 14 September 1787, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
106 Letter from Thomas Bradbury & Sons, 2 September 1811, BR240, Sheffield City Council 
Archives, Sheffield. 
107 Letter from Dixon & Smith, 22 February 1814, A302, Sheffield City Council Archives, 
Sheffield. 
108 Letter from Boulton and Fothergill, 19 April 1773, MS3782/1/21/1, Birmingham Central 
Library, Birmingham. 
109 Letter from Gillows to Sam Timmins, Birmingham, 23 July 1800, 344/174, Westminster City 
Archives, London. 
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occupational and other subgroups. My research substantiates their conclusions, and 
shows how the relationships they identified as part of the business practice of the 
period were formed and used in managing the transport of goods. 
 
The carrying trade facilitated connections between people separated by long 
distances. Carriers themselves established personal relationships with their 
customers, for whom they often performed non-contractual personal services. In 
addition to participating in these interactions themselves, carriers provided the means 
by which other economic actors established relationships, transporting personal gifts 
as well as purchased items, facilitating favours between parties, and passing on 
valuable commercial information about trends, fashions and prices. 
 
I have suggested in chapter 1 and in this chapter that the carrying trade was a 
significant component of the ‘sociable economy’ of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century England, integrated into it both in the way carriers did business 
themselves and the way they facilitated the relationships of other participants in the 
economy. In the next chapter I will contrast this personal, trust- and credit-based 
business model with the business model adopted by the mainline railway companies 
Parliament began to authorise in 1825, that of the joint-stock company, in which such 
personal relationships had no place.  
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Chapter 3: The business culture of joint-stock companies 
Introduction 
My analysis in chapter 2 of the correspondence of 20 companies active between 1741 
and 1866 suggests that the carrying trade, in common with the wider economy in 
which it operated, acted according to a business model that relied on the extension of 
credit based on personal relationships, a model recognised by E. P. Thompson, 
Gillian Cookson, and Deborah Valenze, and described in detail by Craig Muldrew. 
Carriers facilitated transactions between businesses connected by social 
relationships, and operated using similar business practices and social norms.  
 
In this chapter I contrast this type of business model with the managerial, profit-driven 
and contractual business model of joint-stock companies, which became increasingly 
visible, and the cause of increasing concern and conflict, in the 1830s and 1840s. The 
evidence I present in this chapter suggests that joint-stock companies, legal entities 
created by Parliament to accumulate capital and resources to accomplish specific 
economic objectives, operated according to a business model primarily concerned 
with economic rationality and shareholder value, due at least in part to the fact that in 
these companies decisions were often made by salaried professional managers 
rather than producers of goods and services. These companies did not ensure 
success by establishing and maintaining personal connections, but instead sought to 
reduce risk and manage their economic environment using strategies of vertical 
integration - controlling suppliers, customers, competitors and regulators.  
 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first, I explore the definitions and 
characteristics of joint-stock companies, and argue that the conclusions drawn from 
the research of historians and economists on the nature and activities of joint-stock 
companies can be applied to the first mainline railway companies. Establishing that 
the first mainline railway companies can be considered examples of ‘modern’ 
management helps us understand both the motivations for their representatives’ 
policies and the responses of customers, other companies, the government and the 
general public to these policies. In the second section, I suggest that these responses 
to the actions of railway companies during the 1840s were part of a growing hostility 
among business owners, government and the public toward joint-stock companies in 
general, expressed as concerns about monopoly and competition. Customers, other 
companies, the government and the general public responded in several ways to the 
growing power of joint-stock companies and the resulting general change in business 
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practices, with varying degrees of success in curtailing this power. In the final section 
I present as a case study these groups’ responses to the actions of the joint-stock 
companies that provided water to London between 1818 and 1821. Evidence 
including newspaper articles, pamphlets and testimony before Select Committees 
illustrates a range of responses to the business practices of these joint-stock 
companies, and their effectiveness in compensating injured parties and restoring 
business practices based on personal relationships. Both water companies and 
railway companies took advantage of natural monopolies to provide needed services 
to customers with little choice but to employ them; both water companies and railway 
companies provided services customers considered too costly and of unacceptable 
quality, and both sets of companies appeared unwilling to adapt to meet the needs 
and expectations of their customers although, as I will show below, water companies 
proved more willing than railway companies to adapt to the expectations of their 
customers. In chapter 5 I will argue that the actions of railway companies in the 1840s 
and 1850s provoked similar responses for similar reasons, and that these responses 
proved ineffective in changing the policies and business practices of the railway 
companies. 
 
The joint-stock company and its business practices 
As I described in chapter 2, although businesses competed for profit and advantage 
they observed common social norms when participating in economic interactions, 
engaging as ‘friends’, with whom they developed relationships more complex than 
simply that of buyer and seller, with other firms and with customers. These companies 
were sole proprietorships or partnerships at common law; between the early 
eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century almost all domestic businesses 
were of this type.1  
 
Paddy Ireland defines a joint-stock company as ‘an association with certain distinctive 
economic characteristics: most notably, a relatively large number of members, a 
separation of management and ownership and more or less freely transferable 
shares.’ He contrasts this type of business with partnerships, ‘highly personal 
association[s] based around a few specifically defined and closely related people, 
many of whom were likely to be involved in the running of the concern.’2 The first joint-
                                                 
1 Wilson, British Business History, 27-29. 
2 Paddy Ireland, ‘Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company share and the 
emergence of the modern doctrine of separate corporate personality’, Journal of Legal History 
17 (1996). 
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stock companies, also known as ‘public companies’ because they were authorised by 
Parliament, were the regional trading companies created during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries to allow projectors to raise the substantial sums needed to pay 
for the infrastructure (ships, warehouses, trading posts, forts and administrative 
facilities in other countries) and staff required to achieve their economic objectives.3 
By the early eighteenth century joint-stock companies had become so effective in 
aggregating capital and managing resources that Parliament began to authorise them 
to trade and manufacture glass, paper, broadcloth, wool-cards, sail cloth, ropes, 
cordage, sugar, rum, and soap; by 1720 the capital invested in joint-stock companies 
represented 13 per cent of the nation’s wealth.4 Managing such large sums effectively 
and honestly proved to be challenging, however, and the lack of accountability of and 
to anonymous investors led to widespread fraud. In 1720, in response to the collapse 
of the South Sea Company (or in order to protect the South Sea Company’s unique 
position), Parliament passed the Bubble Act requiring any new public company to 
obtain a royal charter. This law severely curtailed the formation of joint-stock 
companies, although between 1720 and its repeal in 1825 Parliament authorised 198 
companies, more than half to construct and operate utilities and infrastructure.5 
 
Although the shares issued by joint-stock companies before 1825 were typically 
legally transferrable, the general market in shares was minimal and rudimentary. 
Starting in that year, however, the first joint-stock railway companies, which required 
substantial amounts of initial capital, began to issue large volumes of shares. Railway 
companies soon became the dominant class of companies on the Stock Exchange, 
raising £230 million in capital by 1849.6 Buying and selling railway shares increased 
                                                 
3 Ann M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Theory and History: Seventeenth-Century Joint-Stock 
Chartered Trading Companies’, Journal of Economic History 56 (December 1996): 916-924; 
S. R. H. Jones and Simon P. Ville, ‘Efficient Transactors or Rent-Seeking Monopolists? The 
Rationale for Early Chartered Trading Companies’, Journal of Economic History 56 (December 
1996): 898-915; Ireland, ‘Capitalism without the Capitalist’, 43-44; A. J. Arnold and S. 
McCartney, 'Financial capitalism, incorporation and the emergence of financial reporting 
information', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 25 (2012): 1297-1299. There do 
not seem to be many book-length histories of the English joint-stock company; B. C. Hunt, The 
Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800–1867 (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard 
University Press, 1936) appears to be the best-known. 
4 C. E. Walker, ‘The History of the Joint Stock Company’, Accounting Review 6 (June 1931): 
103. 
5 A.J. Arnold and S. McCartney, ’The transition to financial capitalism and its implications for 
financial reporting’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 21 (2008): 1191; Robin 
Pearson, Mark Freeman, and James Taylor, 'The promotion and foundation of joint stock 
companies in Britain and Ireland before 1844', paper for the European Business History 
Association conference, Athens, 24-26 August 2011; Wilson, British Business History, 44, 48-
49. 
6 Ireland, ‘Capitalism without the Capitalist’, 64. 
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the activity of the London Stock Exchange and led to the opening of stock exchanges 
in Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol.7 This explosive growth in 
railway shares, and their perceived value to shareholders, prompted the development 
of an impersonal investment market in which purchasers knew nothing of a company 
or its activities beyond its expected share dividend.8 
 
The joint-stock company was legally, and ethically, separate from its owners, the 
shareholders, and the company’s business decisions were often made by people with 
no ownership of or personal connection to the company. In his pioneering work The 
Genesis of Modern Management, published in 1965, Sidney Pollard describes how 
the directors of the first joint-stock companies drew on available cultural and labour 
resources to create a new occupation, the salaried manager.9 Pollard finds precursors 
to modern corporate management in the armed forces (managing large groups of 
men), the government (managing fixed assets), and the regional trading companies 
(managing information). In addition, other businesses and organisations such as 
landed estates and mines had by the early eighteenth century developed many tools 
later adopted by corporate managers.10 Joint-stock company managers integrated 
these skills, tools and techniques into a system of management to meet the needs of 
the new corporate form.11  
 
Pollard and other historians of modern management - J. F. Wilson and A. W. J. 
Thompson, Alfred Chandler and Takashi Hikino, and Leslie Hannah - generally 
suggest that this 'modern' style of management did not appear until the late nineteenth 
or early twentieth centuries, though Leslie Hannah does acknowledge that ‘it is 
possible to discern many of the characteristics of modern corporations in the large 
railway enterprises of the [early nineteenth century]’ and Chandler identifies the 
American railroad companies of the 1850s as ‘pioneers of modern corporate 
management’.12 Hannah suggests that early railway companies are not typically 
                                                 
7 Ireland, ‘Capitalism without the Capitalist’, 64. 
8 Ireland, ‘Capitalism without the Capitalist’, 66. 
9 Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management. Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 1, similarly defines 'modern management' 
as distinct operating units overseen by salaried executives. 
10 Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management, 6, 25, 54-57.  
11 I describe the management structure of carrying firms in chapter 1. 
12 J. F. Wilson and A. W. J. Thompson, The Making of Modern Management  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alfred D. Chandler and Takashi Hikino, Scale and 
Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990), 18; 
Leslie Hannah, Rise of the Corporate Economy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), 12; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ‘The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate 
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considered examples of modern corporate management because their institutional 
knowledge was not transferred to other types of business. Maurice Kirby and Mary 
Rose add that the institutional knowledge developed within railway companies in the 
1840s and 1850s was not transferred to the manufacturing sector because railway 
company staff did not leave the railways, as other sectors did not compensate 
managers as well as railway companies did.13 Wilson also suggests that it was 
questionable whether early railway companies ‘were able to surmount the obstacles 
presented by the prevailing business culture'.14  
 
These objections seem tentative, however. It may be that railway companies are not 
generally considered examples of ‘modern management’ because, as essentially 
service industries, they do not fit the mass-production business model more typically 
studied by historians of management. In addition, it may also be the case that to these 
scholars railway companies appeared 'old-fashioned'. Wilson, for example, uses such 
language as ‘stages’, ‘progress’, ‘advance’ and ‘evolve’, and Rose refers to 
‘advancement’ and ‘backwardness’ when describing companies; it may be difficult to 
place the first mainline railway companies into this type of narrative.15 However, I 
argue that ‘modern management’ is at least a generation older than these scholars, 
with Hannah’s and Chandler’s tentative exceptions, suggest, as the first railway 
companies incorporated in England after 1825 generally exhibited the characteristics 
Pollard identifies as the hallmarks of modern managerial control. If this is the case, 
we can use the tools these and other scholars have developed to understand the 
behaviour of and reactions to joint-stock companies to understand railway companies’ 
decisions and actions and the responses of customers, other businesses, the 
government and the public. 
 
Pollard defines modern management as separation of business activities into 
functional and geographical divisions overseen by salaried managers rather than 
owners or partners. The earliest joint-stock railway companies exhibit this type of 
organisational structure. Although the first railway companies were initially managed 
                                                 
Management’, Business History Review 39, no. 1 (Spring 1965): 16-40; Wilson, British 
Business History, 39-40. 
13 Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose, ‘Introduction,’ in Business Enterprise in Modern Britain, 
eds. Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (London: Routledge, 1994), 9. 
14 Wilson, British Business History, 37. 
15 Leslie Hannah, ‘Business development and economic structure in Britain since 1880’, in 
Leslie Hannah, ed., Management Strategy and Business Development (London: Macmillan, 
1976), 3; Wilson, British Business History, 10, 12-15, 39, 57; Rose, Firms, Networks and 
Business Values, 61. 
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by groups of shareholders through boards, committees and subcommittees of 
directors, once a line came into operation departments began to be overseen by 
salaried managers with the required technical expertise.16 Management of the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company, for example, was divided among several 
departments, including locomotives, waggons and carriages, track, bridges and 
structures, each overseen by a separate manager; this model was emulated by later 
railway companies.17 Railway companies also pioneered the separation between line 
functions (those directly concerned with the operation of the business) and staff 
functions (legal, real estate, finance, accounting, personnel, land management, and 
other work which supported the business's profit-making operations).18 By definition 
the operational decisions of a railway company had to be made over a wide 
geographic area, and railway companies employed managers based at terminal 
stations and occasionally at intermediate stations to oversee geographical divisions 
along their lines.19  
  
In addition to their segmented structure and reliance on salaried managers, the first 
joint-stock railway companies conform to Pollard's definition of modern management 
in that directors worked to quantify and systematise costs and revenue, and to 
develop new sources of revenue such as excursion trips.20 Managers developed 
administrative processes to help ensure that shareholder money was being used 
effectively, that shareholders were receiving appropriate dividends, and that 
Parliamentary requirements to disclose financial information, in the companies' 
enabling acts and later as part of the Board of Trade's review of railway company 
operations, were satisfied. Company information was not always accurate, or even 
honest, however; paying dividends out of capital rather than revenue in order to 
increase the value of shares, for example, was a common practice.21 
 
                                                 
16 Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, 61-63. 
17 Railway company board meeting minutes include reports from representatives of identified 
departments; RAIL 371/1-5, RAIL 384/1-5, RAIL 220/7, The National Archives, London. 
18 Clement E. Stretton, The History of the Midland Railway (London, Methuen & Co., 1901), 
72, 74; Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, 25-26; Wilson, British 
Business History, 38-39. 
19 Jack Simmons and Gordon Biddle, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 306-307. 
20 Hannah, 'Business development and economic structure’, 8. 
21 J. S. Toms, 'Calculating profit: A historical perspective on the development of capitalism', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010): 205–221; A. J. Arnold and S. McCartney, 
'Financial capitalism, incorporation and the emergence of financial reporting information'; 
MT11/4, 30 January 1844, The National Archives, London. 
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Finally, the first railway companies are similar to companies that fit Pollard’s definition 
of modern management in their behaviour toward other businesses. Like the later 
companies Pollard describes, railway companies grew by buying out competitors and 
smaller businesses, particularly during the wave of railway company amalgamations 
of the mid-1840s.22 Consistent with the ‘Chandlerian narrative’ of increasing 
internalisation of resources within a corporation, but in contrast to the prevailing trend 
of management at the time in which ‘management was avoided rather than embraced 
and activities were more usually organized on the basis of external networks rather 
than being internalized within firms’, railway companies vertically integrated resources 
and processes in order to increase control over their economic environment and to 
reduce risk.23 For example, railway companies developed the resources and labour 
to build their own locomotives rather than continuing to purchase them from other 
companies.24 In the 1840s railway companies began to assimilate the carrying trade 
as part of this strategy of vertical integration, by developing their own carrying 
services, hiring carriers as their agents or entering into agreements with them, and 
excluding carriers from their lines.25  
 
Siobhan McGovern and Ziene Mottiar describe two types of networks, vertically 
controlled and horizontally controlled. In the former, the most powerful participant 
dictates the rules to the other parties and deviation from these imposed rules has a 
cost. Horizontally controlled networks, by contrast, are made up of ‘conceptually 
equivalent units’ whose actions conform to a set of rules which all parties have agreed 
to; the consequence of not following these rules is not punishment per se but simply 
disconnection from the network, thus the cost is self-imposed, rather than imposed by 
                                                 
22 Robbins, The Railway Age, 86-87; Pollins, Britain’s Railways, 39, 44-47. Almost every 
history of a rail line will include some information about it being bought by a larger company, 
or buying smaller companies, in the 1840s. Some examples include John Marshall, 
The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1977), 77, 121; William 
Tomlinson, The North Eastern Railway: its Rise and Development (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: 
Andrew Reid & Company, 1914), 453-427; Martin Bairstow, The Leeds, 
Huddersfield & Manchester Railway: The Standedge Line (Pudsey: Martin Bairstow, 1984), 
14-15; Wilfred L. Steel, The History of the London & North Western Railway (London: ‘The 
Railway and Travel Monthly’, 1914), 109-110. 
23 Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose, ‘Introduction,’ in Business Enterprise in Modern Britain, 
eds. Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (London: Routledge, 1994), 6; Andrew Popp, Steve 
Toms and John Wilson, ‘Industrial districts as organizational environments: Resources, 
networks and structures’, Management and Organisational History 1, no. 4 (2006): 350; 
Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, 139-140. 
24 Chandler, The Visible Hand, 67-70; Pollins, Britain’s Railways, 61. 
25 I describe these processes in more detail in chapter 4. 
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an authority.26 The carrying trade, as well as the larger economy of which it was a 
part, operated as a horizontal network, until it was subsumed into the railway 
companies’ vertical network. 
 
Public responses to the business practices of joint-stock companies 
Pollard and others have described the internal development of joint-stock companies 
- the skills and tools required to manage them, the antecedents and precursors of 
these skills and tools, and their evolution over time. Carleton Hunt, Ron Harris, G. R. 
Searle, and particularly James Taylor have viewed the development of the joint-stock 
company during the early nineteenth century in its political, legal and social context.27 
They suggest that, although Parliament authorised a joint-stock company when it 
could be argued that it was necessary to achieve one or more of a specific and narrow 
range of potentially beneficial economic and social objectives, the public in general 
remained suspicious of the joint-stock business model. In The Wealth of Nations 
Adam Smith argued that joint-stock companies, which were not managed directly by 
their owners, could not operate as efficiently as companies in which owners were 
directly involved in the business: 
it cannot well be expected that [managers of joint-stock companies] should 
watch over [joint-stock companies] with the same anxious vigilance with which 
the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.… 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail...in the management 
of the affairs of such a company.28  
 
The business community in early nineteenth-century England held views on the joint-
stock business model similar to Adam Smith’s 1776 analysis, considering it generally 
wasteful, inefficient, and prone to facilitating unethical behaviour.29 In 1826, for 
example, commenting on the possibility of Parliament authorising a public company 
to produce flour, the Times directly echoed Smith's argument: '[t]he trade is of a nature 
more likely to flourish in the hands of private houses than of corporate bodies, which 
last can never successfully resist the vigilance or skill of their more active rivals.'30 
                                                 
26 Siobhan McGovern and Ziene Mottiar, ‘Co-Operative Competition: A Foucauldian 
Perspective’, DCU Business School Research Papers, no. 20 (1997), 3 
27 Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England; Ron Harris, Industrializing 
English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); G. R. Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); James Taylor, Creating Capitalism; Rose, Firms, Networks 
and Business Values, 62. 
28 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 3 (London: 
A. Strahan, 1799), 124. 
29 Mary B. Rose, ‘The Family Firm in British Business, 1780-1914’, in Business Enterprise in 
Modern Britain, eds. Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (London: Routledge, 1994), 65-66. 
30 The Times, 1 September 1826. 
105 
 
 
Contemporary observers generally held that joint-stock companies were poorly run 
and prone to 'waste, extravagance and inefficiency’, and believed that they required 
government-granted monopoly privileges because they would otherwise not be able 
to compete successfully with 'private enterprise'.31  
 
In addition, because owners did not control joint-stock companies, and were generally 
both anonymous and impermanent, in the early nineteenth century contemporaries 
believed that joint-stock companies ‘undermined the importance of character in 
business’; as legal scholar John Horne Tooke stated, ‘Public Companies have no 
bodies to be kicked, and no souls to be d----d’.32 The absence of the social control 
exercised on individuals desiring to preserve their reputations in order to participate 
in economic life, combined with the vast resources joint-stock companies controlled 
and the unclear legal responsibility for their actions, could lead such companies to act 
unethically, and to make decisions in order to manipulate the stock market rather than 
for sound business reasons. John George, in his 1825 review of the law respecting 
joint-stock companies and recommendations for reform, suggested that part of the 
problem was that the owners of joint-stock companies were not individually 
responsible for their actions as they could not be sued separately in a court of law.33 
G. R. Searle points out that ‘[w]ith the advent of the limited liability company, investors 
had anyhow ceased to be entrepreneurs of the old kind, but more closely resembled 
a social group to which severe moral opprobrium still attached, gamblers', and George 
Robb points out that these characteristics of the joint-stock company made it 
particularly vulnerable to fraud.34 Contemporary observers contrasted the actions of 
joint-stock companies with the behaviour of partners or sole proprietors, motivated to 
act ethically to uphold the good character necessary for their firms to remain 
economically viable.35  
 
One example of unethical behaviour, the Attwood case, was observed closely by the 
contemporary business community; it demonstrated both the type of unethical 
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behaviour joint-stock companies were capable of, and the fact that, although Attwood 
was ultimately vindicated, the impeccable reputation of a wealthy businessman was 
no protection against such behaviour. In 1825 the British Iron Company purchased 
an ironworks from John Attwood. The following year iron prices dropped and, in an 
attempt to renege on the contract, three directors of the joint-stock company took 
Attwood to court, alleging that he had fraudulently misled them about the value of the 
property. The company lost their first case against Attwood in 1828 but won a 
judgment against him in 1832. Attwood petitioned the House of Lords to have his case 
reheard in the Court of Exchequer, and in 1838 he received a substantial settlement 
from the company as well as a 'complete justification of the character of a most 
honourable man, whom it suited the purpose of the plaintiffs in this case wrongfully to 
asperse'.36 One of the numerous pamphlets published about the affair claimed that 
[f]ew cases have excited greater interest, as well from the magnitude of the 
sum at stake…as from the length of time the suit has been pending, the 
extraordinary character of the proceedings, and the excessive and almost 
ruinous expenses the parties have been subjected to.37  
 
Between 1826 and 1834 the parties spent more than £100,000 in legal fees, and 
generated more than 50,000 folios of documents; another pamphlet pointed out that 
more than £500,000 in capital was at stake in the judge's decision. The legal 
settlement in Attwood’s favour was so substantial that the British Iron Company went 
bankrupt and was dissolved in 1844.38 
 
This series of lawsuits, in which the company named its own agent as a co-defendant 
to prevent him from testifying in support of Attwood, demonstrated to observers how 
little personal reputation mattered when dealing with a joint-stock company, and how 
challenging it could be for an individual to defend himself against one.39 'On the one 
hand,' one report stated,  
there was Mr. Attwood, who appeared in that court as an individual, (a wealthy 
one he admitted,) and on the other the British Iron Company, with a vast 
capital, amounting...to some millions, possessed of endless resources, having 
two sets of attorneys always to attend them, and the best counsel that could 
be obtained to plead their cause.40  
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Suspicion of joint-stock companies was evident in the media coverage of the case. 
Several newspaper reports and pamphlets mentioned that Attwood had been clear 
when the sale took place that he did not choose to do business with a joint-stock 
company, as doing so had 'led to the ruin of several individuals', and had only been 
willing to deal with its three representatives as individuals.41 He believed that doing 
business with a joint-stock company would cause friction between himself and both 
other ironmasters and his own workers.42 Sir Edward Sugden, representing Attwood 
in the 1832 hearing, stated while explaining how joint-stock companies functioned, 
that  
the object of them was to destroy all competition, to interfere with the 
arrangements of individuals, and to monopolize the whole of a trade...[h]e did 
not mean to say that a great body united together...might not be of public 
advantage, but...a greater calamity could not visit a country than the desire of 
overthrowing the established forms of conducting business, and carrying 
every trade on by means of a large body of persons united together as a 
company.43 
 
The issue of differing business norms and expectations between partnerships or sole 
proprietors and joint-stock companies was significant in the arguments in this case. 
Part of the British Iron Company’s case against Attwood depended on 
communication; according to one report, the company pursued its case against 
Attwood because its representatives took Attwood's communications to them as 
contractual commitments rather than informal advice and helpful suggestions. It is 
clear that Attwood was dealing with the company using the personal style of business 
interaction that he was accustomed to; as evidence of this, he had been willing to 
accept a reduced offer for the property when the price of iron dropped after the 
agreement had been made, even though he had not been obligated to do so.44  
 
Concerns over conflicts between customary business behaviour and the behaviour of 
joint-stock companies were typically expressed in terms of competition and monopoly. 
The participants in the debates over joint-stock companies seemed to agree that 
competition created public benefit and that 'monopoly' was something to be deplored, 
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but the determination of what policies promoted or hindered competition, the definition 
of what constituted a monopoly, and which of the conflicting parties was the 
'monopolist', was subject to debate.45 Monopoly, first described in Aristotle’s Politics, 
was commonly used to describe the practice of ‘engrossing’ a product so that a single 
seller, or a group of sellers colluding to fix price and supply, controlled the product’s 
price and availability at the expense of buyers; farmers would be accused of monopoly 
if it appeared that they were artificially increasing the price or scarcity of grain, or 
charging more than a ‘just price’ for their goods.46 In addition to it being considered 
unjust, disapproval of monopoly stemmed from belief in the value of competition both 
to benefit the general public and as a moral good. John Stuart Mill, writing in 1848, 
promoted the idea of competition even as he advocated for a more planned economy, 
as ‘wherever competition is not, monopoly is; and that monopoly, in all its forms, is 
the taxation of the industrious for the support of indolence, if not of plunder’.47 E. P. 
Thompson, in his essay ‘The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century’, refers to the ‘moral economy’ that provided ideological justification for such 
public actions as food riots and for government regulation of economic behaviour and 
the distribution of goods and services.48 Thompson argues that in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries most people considered it appropriate for the 
government to intervene when the public good was threatened by monopoly. Rather 
than restraining or controlling economic activity, government intervention was seen 
as preserving competition and allowing the market to act in a ‘natural’ way, which 
promoted the public good.49  
 
Thompson's description of government intervention in the economy is at odds with 
the views of later politicians and historians. In his study of management, for example, 
Pollard states that corporations found themselves pursuing their economic objectives 
while facing a ‘hostile State and an unsympathetic legal system’, not acknowledging 
that the state had itself created both the corporations and the conditions for their 
success.50 Although he and later historians describe regulation as ‘government 
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interference’ in the actions of ‘private’ joint-stock companies, contemporary observers 
would not have shared this view; they considered ‘private enterprise’ to be 
partnerships and sole proprietorships, while joint-stock companies were creations of 
the government.51 Taylor suggests that the fact that Parliament, using the public 
benefit criterion, authorised some but not all public corporations made it appear that 
the government was ‘controlling’ business, and legitimised the later ‘fair trade’ 
arguments in favour of reducing government regulation of joint-stock companies.52 
 
For their own protection, companies, businesses and suppliers accustomed to the 
forms of business interaction characteristic of ‘private enterprise’ were forced to adopt 
new strategies to deal with joint-stock companies. Their first, sometimes successful, 
strategy was to continue to follow familiar norms of business interaction. When these 
norms were ignored, people interacting with joint-stock companies developed a 
variety of alternative responses. Businesses and individuals, like John Attwood, 
attempted to gain redress or concessions by taking companies to court. When legal 
judgments against joint-stock companies proved ineffective in altering the behaviour 
of these companies, those objecting to these companies’ actions collectively 
petitioned Parliament, a strategy which directed government attention to their 
concerns and encouraged it to help negotiate resolutions or pass legislation to prevent 
future abuses.53 In combination with these two strategies, people and businesses also 
appealed directly to the ‘court of public opinion’ by making their case in books and 
pamphlets. Finally, often less practical for those dealing with natural monopolies, 
some people and businesses exercised a fifth strategy, that of declining to do 
business with joint-stock companies or finding alternative ways to obtain similar 
benefits. 
 
Responses to conflict with municipal water supply monopolies in London, 
1818 to 1828 
A natural monopoly can be defined as a situation in which competition to provide a 
good or service is limited by high barriers to entry such that the original supplier has 
an overwhelming advantage over potential competitors, and a single supplier can 
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provide the good or service at a lower cost than two or more suppliers.54 In the 1840s 
the government, when regulating railway companies, and the public, when attempting 
to resolve conflicts, had no precedent for dealing with a national natural monopoly. 
However, a similar situation had arisen in London twenty years earlier, with the 
consolidation of and agreements among companies providing municipal water 
supplies.55 In this section I analyse the testimonies of witnesses appearing before 
Parliamentary Select Committees investigating customer complaints about London’s 
water supply, to understand the strategies customers of the joint-stock municipal 
water companies used to attempt to resolve conflicts with the companies, and the 
ways in which the companies responded to these strategies. In chapter 5 I will argue 
that those objecting to similar business practices of railway companies employed 
similar strategies; in contrast to the water companies, however, railway company 
representatives exhibited a much narrower range of responses to these strategies. 
 
Before 1800, three companies had provided water to London - the New River, the 
London Bridge and the Chelsea. In the early nineteenth century Parliament authorised 
three new public water companies, the East London, the West Middlesex and the 
Grand Junction. In 1818 all of these companies except the London Bridge entered 
into informal non-competition agreements which in effect established local 
monopolies. These companies' customers employed several strategies to deal with 
the resulting increase in the cost of piped water and decrease in the quality of service 
and supply. Some negotiated with directors and company staff with whom they had 
personal connections, and successfully achieved mutually beneficial agreements. 
Some considered taking the companies to court although, as I will explain below, due 
to the provisions of the water companies’ enabling acts this strategy posed a high risk 
to potential plaintiffs. Some successfully petitioned Parliament to investigate and 
resolve their conflicts with the companies. Some who were unsatisfied with the 
government's initial response in 1821 enlisted public opinion in their favour by writing 
pamphlets and letters to newspapers.56 And, finally, some customers disconnected 
from piped water altogether, digging their own wells or finding an alternative supply.57 
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Water company representatives exhibited a range of responses to their customers’ 
and the public’s objections to their practices and policies. In many cases these 
representatives were willing to engage with customers, both individually and 
collectively, within the context of the ‘sociable economy’; they offered concessions, 
changed policies, or demonstrated that they were willing to negotiate a ‘fair’ resolution 
to a dispute. Railway company officials exhibited a much narrower range of responses 
to similar strategies by those objecting to their practices and policies. They appeared 
less concerned with conforming to customary business norms or accommodating or 
communicating with their customers; rather than acknowledging and accommodating 
these objections, they behaved according to their own business model and focused 
exclusively on their own internal objectives and priorities.  
 
In this section I investigate the strategies employed by water companies’ customers, 
and the responses of company representatives, largely through the records of 
testimony before a House of Commons Select Committee appointed in 1821 to gather 
evidence and recommend legislative action. According to Peter Jupp, the 
composition, operation and influence of Select Committees has not yet been subject 
to detailed historical analysis;  
[w]e...know little of how committees were selected, the number and type of 
members who sat on them, how they conducted their business...[a]bove all, 
there has been no assessment of the contribution...made to the relationship 
between Parliament and the wider public.58  
 
Select Committees, as distinguished from open committees in which any MP could 
participate, could be formed in either house. They were typically formed to consider 
issues for which research could lead to more informed outcomes - law and order, 
Ireland and colonial issues, Poor Laws, and ‘conditions of trade’; the Select 
Committees investigating both municipal water supply and the carrying question could 
be classed in the last category.59 Members were typically appointed by the MP raising 
the issue, who typically served as chairman. Committees consisted of between 12 
and 40 members, depending on the number of factions or interests that needed to be 
represented. In general, although membership was slightly weighted to favour the 
most powerful party, chairmen selected members to ensure that committees were 
diverse, balanced and representative.60 Jupp suggests that Select Committees 
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typically heard between 15 and 20 witnesses, which made both the committee hearing 
evidence about London’s water supply and the committee hearing evidence about the 
behaviour and policies of railway companies atypical.61 The first Select Committee on 
London’s water supply heard 43 witnesses - water company representatives, 
customers and experts - and the second, convened in 1828, heard 76 witnesses. 
Historians are divided on the effectiveness of Select Committees in influencing 
legislation; although it appears that the most important legislation was considered by 
Cabinet, that the influence of Select Committees was low compared to that of powerful 
MPs, and that the actions of Select Committees were often manipulated to produce 
the results their convenors wanted, Select Committees could both provide useful 
information to Parliament and help to get issues into debates, onto legislative 
agendas, and into the media.62 
 
In addition to providing information and recommendations to Parliament, Select 
Committee records and reports were also available for public consumption. 
Parliament itself published evidence and reports, and newspapers printed extracts 
from committee hearings and full committee reports starting in the 1820s.63 Peter Jupp 
estimates that in the 1830s about 3 million people read English newspapers, about 
the same number as the adult male population of Britain; it is likely that this number 
increased substantially after newspaper stamp duties were reduced in 1836.64 
Witnesses also published their own accounts of Select Committee proceedings, and 
used their interpretations of their and others’ testimonies to shape their own narratives 
defining a contentious issue. I will describe this process in more detail with respect to 
the carrying question in chapter 5.  
 
Several witnesses in the Select Committee hearings on London’s water supply made 
statements reflecting a personal style of business interaction, and explained their 
actions in terms of protecting reputations or maintaining relationships. One customer 
testified that he had accepted service from one of the new water companies because 
'I should oblige certain persons with whom I was connected in trade, by taking water 
from them', and another was induced to change providers by a personal friend.65 A 
customer declined to change to a less expensive provider because 'I neither thought 
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it honourable nor just that such old servants of the public should be turned away 
without just cause.'66 Another customer changed from the New River to the Grand 
Junction, but due to the latter's poor water quality returned to New River service; when 
he did so he specifically asked the New River company to compensate the Grand 
Junction for the cost of providing a pipe to his house as, despite their poor service, he 
considered it unfair that they had to cover this expense.67 Some customers testified 
that they felt it was possible to negotiate directly with water company officials; one 
wrote to friends associated with the company to propose an agreement on future 
water rates, and a few others stated that they had successfully negotiated as 
individuals with their providers.68 Some customer witnesses expressed confidence in 
the value of water company officials' reputations; one stated, for example, that he was 
sure an official 'would rather resign...and sacrifice his whole property in the concern, 
than countenance any underhand attempt to obtain a further increase', while another 
asserted his trust in the word of another official, stating 'I have known [him] many 
years, and I think [his] word [that the company would not increase water rates] will 
answer my purpose as well.'69  
 
Most customers speaking to the Committee, however, stated that they had not 
succeeded in negotiating directly with their water providers, despite approaching bill 
collectors, representatives at company offices, and company directors with whom 
they were acquainted.70 These customers seemed well aware that their disputes 
would probably end up in court, and that if this happened the water companies could 
easily outpay and outwait them.71 They were also well aware of the power imbalance, 
and implied injustice, of individuals forced to 'contend against a public company, 
dealing with a corporate fund'.72 In addition to these considerations, these witnesses 
also hesitated to employ legal means to seek redress because clauses in the 
companies' enabling acts stated that anyone challenging them in court must give 
notice before doing so (and the definition of 'notice' was both vague and specific 
enough that any discrepancy between the complaint and the lawsuit could be grounds 
                                                 
66 Minutes of Evidence, 94. After the noncompetition agreement the Grand Junction ended up 
taking on his water supply anyway, raising his rates 25 per cent. 
67 Minutes of Evidence, 127. 
68 Minutes of Evidence, 115, 127, 142. 
69 Minutes of Evidence, 113, 156. 
70 Minutes of Evidence, 87. 
71 Minutes of Evidence, 87. 
72 Minutes of Evidence, 89. 
114 
 
 
to dismiss the latter), and would be required to pay twice the court costs (triple for the 
Grand Junction) if they lost.73  
 
Several witnesses suggested that the fact that the water companies were joint-stock 
companies contributed to their difficulties. One customer, James Weale, pointed out 
that private companies could not compete with these joint-stock firms as the latter had 
been given the legal right to break up pavements to install water pipes. He argued 
that 'the defects to which I have alluded are all involved in the fact, that the supply is 
vested in the hands of trading joint stock companies'.74 J. T. Hope, a customer of the 
Grand Junction company, said that in a conversation with William Matthew Coe, 
secretary of the company, Coe honestly admitted that the company could afford to 
provide better service without raising the rates, but 'if the proprietors do not get 
something more, to enable them to share a satisfactory dividend, they would not be 
content', and that the company felt it necessary to disburse a high dividend to ensure 
that shareholders did not sell their shares.75  
 
The Select Committee hearing records reveal several examples of water company 
representatives expressing concern for personal connections and reputation. Richard 
Till, superintendent of the London Bridge company, stated that the company had 
refused to participate in the non-competition agreement, agreeing with his questioner 
that the company were 'destroying [themselves] by that point of honour' but unwilling 
to alter their business practices.76 Some officials acknowledged the complaints of their 
customers and, while defending their own actions, expressed understanding of others' 
positions.77 On an individual level, the Grand Junction company agreed to defer 
payment and not terminate the service of a sick customer.78 On a collective level, 
James Davis, the chairman of the directors of the East London company, stated that 
he had attended a meeting of dissatisfied customers, and offered to consider 
compromising on issues in dispute.79 In his testimony M. K. Knight, secretary of the 
West Middlesex company, appeared to be open to negotiation, suggesting the 
appointment of an arbitration committee to determine a fair rate.80 In addition, some 
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company officials seemed to imply that they considered their firms as simply unusually 
large partnerships; for example, Mr. Knight made a clear distinction between 
shareholders involved with the firm, whom he considered owners, and others who 
were merely stock speculators; he expressed concern that three people who had 
recently purchased stock were 'quite strangers' to him.81  
 
Some dissatisfied customers, unable to negotiate acceptable terms and declaring 
legal remedies 'without effect' and 'costly and tedious', took the next step to ameliorate 
their situation - engaging government action on their behalf by forming associations 
and petitioning Parliament. Some dissatisfied customers formed an 'Anti-water 
monopoly association' in October 1819, and petitioned Parliament to form a tribunal 
to set fair rates for water provision.82 Colin Leys suggests that this method of engaging 
government, via associations and petitions, has a long history, originating in medieval 
‘quasi-judicial’ attempts by individuals to gain justice and ‘redress grievances’.83 
Henry Miller states that petitioning was a popular method of addressing government 
partly because of its ‘ancient constitutional pedigree’.84 In the late eighteenth century, 
as people began to find it necessary to attempt to influence lawmaking at the national 
rather than local level, the number of petitions read in Parliament began to increase.85 
Between 1785 and 1789 800 petitions were read in Parliament, rising to 17,006 
between 1822 and 1827.86 In 1839 Parliament received 13,657 petitions containing 
4.5 million signatures, and in 1843 it received a record number of nearly 34,000 
petitions with more than 6 million signatures.87 Leys suggests that these increases 
were related to the general unrest and political organisation of the time and to the 
activities of a newly-seated group of radical MPs who used petitions to raise issues in 
the House.88 Petitions calling for reform of London’s water supply providers, as well 
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as those supporting the carrying trade, were typical of most petitions presented to 
Parliament, which addressed ‘conditions of trade’ and economic issues.89 
 
In addition to personal negotiation, legal challenges and appeals to government, 
some water supply customers attempted to ameliorate their situation by appealing to 
the ‘court of public opinion,’ publishing information about the municipal water supply 
companies and their unsavoury practices. In 1827 the battle was again taken up with 
the publication of The Dolphin; or, Grand Junction Nuisance: proving that seven 
thousand families in Westminster and its suburbs, are supplied with water, in a state, 
offensive to the sight, disgusting to the imagination, and destructive to health. 
Throughout the pamphlet the anonymous author (identified as John Wright) employed 
the language of monopoly and competition to criticise the water companies and ask 
Parliament, which had intended them to compete with each other, to reengage with 
the issue in order to 'unfetter the commerce of the country'.90 He described the 
problems with monopoly: '[t]he highest legal authorities have long ago denounced all 
such monopolies, as being not only contrary to the ancient and fundamental laws of 
the realm, but injurious to the public' by increasing the cost and decreasing the quality 
of the product they offer.91 He pointed out the power imbalance between individuals 
and joint-stock companies, stating that corporations benefited from the 'natural 
reluctance of individuals to contend against a confederacy, having a lawyer ever ready 
at their elbow, and a banker at their back.'92 He also pointed out that those making 
decisions on behalf of these companies were able to hide behind anonymity: '[w]ith 
all the attention I have bestowed on the subject, I do not now know the names of the 
Directors [of the Grand Junction company]'.93  
 
If negotiation, legal action, appeals to government and adverse publicity did not serve 
to redress their grievances and change the behaviour and policies of joint-stock 
companies, dissatisfied customers could exercise one more response - boycotting 
their products, where possible. The Select Committee heard testimony from some 
former customers who had given up purchasing water from the water supply 
companies, determined to 'resort to other means' to obtain the water they required.94 
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Summary and conclusions 
I began this chapter by arguing that, although not always viewed as such, the first 
mainline railway companies incorporated in the 1820s and 1830s are examples of 
modern corporate management, employing similar organisational structures, 
decision-making techniques, criteria and objectives (I will analyse this decision-
making process with respect to railway companies in more detail in the following 
chapters). I have argued this point to suggest that as early as the 1830s railway 
companies had already adopted and were acting according to a business model 
unfamiliar to, and at odds with, the business model that I described in chapter 2, the 
model used and understood by railway companies’ customers and competitors.  
 
To help us understand the origin and nature of this business model, and the nature of 
others’ responses to it, in the wider context of the development of the joint-stock 
company during this period, I reviewed the work of scholars who have researched 
contemporary attitudes toward joint-stock companies, and the reasons behind them. 
As joint-stock companies, railway companies were viewed with the suspicion of joint-
stock companies in general that Taylor and others describe in their work. 
 
Finally, in this chapter I presented as a case study the public’s and government’s 
responses to the business practices of the joint-stock companies providing London’s 
water supply in the 1820s. This case study serves to illustrate two points about the 
carrying question that I will develop in chapter 5. First, it demonstrates how people 
accustomed to one business model responded when they found themselves in conflict 
with people behaving according to another business model. They first attempted to 
negotiate as individuals with the people representing these companies. If this was 
unsuccessful, they escalated to legal action, publicising their grievances through 
pamphlets and public meetings, and petitioning the government to look into and 
address their concerns. Finally, if these strategies were still ineffective in changing 
problematic behaviour, where possible they attempted to disengage from or boycott 
these companies. 
 
Second, as I will demonstrate in chapter 5, while the strategies employed by those 
interacting with the joint-stock companies providing London’s water supply and 
operating railway services were similar, the responses of people representing these 
two groups of companies were different. Representatives of municipal water supply 
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companies often engaged with their customers directly, agreeing to make 
concessions, modify their practices, or negotiate new terms of agreement. They also 
modified their behaviour and policies in response to legal or government action, and 
appeared to be affected by adverse public opinion. As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, 
by contrast, railway company officials seemed to be motivated only by internal 
interests, and resisted any modification of their behaviour or policies either by the 
direct request of their customers or through legal or government action.
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Chapter 4: Reorganisation of the carrying trade 1840-1850 
Introduction 
The second report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Railways, 
published in 1839, identified a variety of ways in which railway companies managed 
their goods traffic.1 Most operated some kind of goods carrying service, but most also 
opened their lines to carriers. Between about 1840 and about 1850, however, railway 
companies began to vertically integrate goods carriage, internalising the carrying 
business by employing carriers directly, making new agreements or cancelling 
existing agreements with the carriers that used their lines, and instituting policies that 
made using railways less economically viable for carriers. As carriers began to work, 
formally and informally, for railway companies, national and regional carrying largely 
disappeared, while local carriers, adapting their operations to the requirements of 
railway companies, continued to serve places too small or remote to be connected to 
the rail network, picking up goods from and delivering them to railway stations.  
 
The development of the national railway network, combined with railway companies' 
general adoption of policies which made them the sole carriers of goods by rail, 
caused a significant change in the way goods were transported. In this chapter I 
describe this reorganisation of the carrying trade in the 1840s, providing and analysing 
evidence for the process as well as its causes and effects. In this chapter I set out an 
argument and review evidence not covered in other historical work since, as I 
mentioned in my introduction, historians generally consider railway company goods 
carriage unproblematic; no current historical literature critically considers the 
contemporary arguments for and against it, the processes by which it came about, or 
the resulting changes in goods transport.  
 
This chapter has six sections. In the first section I review the precedents for railway 
company carrying in the ‘self-carrying’ practices of inland waterway companies. 
Although it was illegal until 1845 for most canal and navigation companies to operate 
their own carrying services, many did, but it appears that these services were 
generally only developed as a last resort and were operated to increase the revenue 
of the company’s infrastructure asset rather than as businesses in themselves. In the 
second section I outline the development of a perceived need for railway company 
carrying beginning in the early 1840s. In the third section I analyse evidence of the 
                                                 
1 Second Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 9 August 1839, viii-ix. 
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debate among railway company officials over developing their own goods carrying 
businesses in addition to constructing, operating and maintaining rail infrastructure 
and providing passenger transport. In the fourth section I outline the ways railway 
companies vertically integrated the carrying trade by employing some carriers directly 
and signing agency agreements with others. In the fifth section I use quantitative 
evidence from business directories and demographic information, from the 1841 and 
1851 Census of Great Britain and the work of Leigh Shaw-Taylor, to observe the 
change in the carrying trade during this period. In the final section I look at the broader 
change in goods transport as railway companies expanded their collective reach and 
consolidated their influence through amalgamations and organisations like the 
Railway Clearing House. 
 
The evidence I use in this chapter comes from several sources including newspaper 
articles, published pamphlets, internal records of railway and inland waterway 
companies, business directories, census data and other demographic information. I 
do not include evidence from business correspondence in this chapter, as the dates 
for the correspondence available for most of the companies whose correspondence 
has been preserved do not extend through the transition period of the 1840s. The 
records of only three of the companies whose correspondence I reviewed in the 
previous chapter - Hindley & Sons, William Lupton & Co., and R. Hattersley & Sons - 
contained correspondence from this period. Neither Hindley & Sons’ nor William 
Lupton & Co’s. correspondence includes many details of carrying arrangements, 
presumably because they were sending goods to a few regular correspondents, 
whose arrangements were familiar to both parties, rather than directly to individual 
customers with whom they had to negotiate delivery. The few letters from this period 
in the R. Hattersley & Sons correspondence do not mention railway companies and 
seem to suggest that the company continued to use carriers to send its goods, which 
is not surprising as rail service came relatively late to the region in which this company 
was located. 
 
Precedents in inland waterway company ‘self-carrying’ 
Before the conflict between carriers and railway companies arose over access to rail 
lines, a similar situation existed on some canals and navigations, whose owners 
operated goods carrying services which competed with carriers using the waterway. 
Historians have not generally considered canal and navigation company carrying a 
subject worth investigating, on its own or as a precedent for railway company carrying, 
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partly because it is generally agreed that ‘canal companies did not go in for carrying 
in a big way.’2 Jackman states that canal companies did not appear on carrier lists, 
although he did identify one canal company that appeared to offer carrying service: 
‘[w]e grant the possibility of this, although we have not found any other instance to 
establish it as a fact.’3 Bagwell acknowledges that while canal companies were not 
legally permitted to carry they occasionally did, although reluctantly and as a last 
resort; ‘since it was sometimes difficult to persuade those whose capital was geared 
to land carriage to switch to the new means of transport, groups of the canals’ 
proprietors, or even the canal concern itself, sometimes undertook the carrying 
business’, although this assessment of the situation disregards the fact that carrying 
firms used rivers for goods transport long before canals were constructed.4  
 
Until the passage of the Common Carriers Act of 1845, enabling acts generally 
prohibited canal and navigation companies from operating services that competed 
directly with carriers.5 However, some companies did operate carrying services, 
legally or illegally and directly or indirectly.6 Concessions in some companies’ 
enabling acts allowed them to operate a carrying service. As early as 1619 King 
James I granted a Letter Patent giving the Mayor and Aldermen of Bath the right, in 
exchange for financing improvements of the River Avon, ‘for ever hereafter…to have 
and take the sole carying and conveying’; other carriers were prohibited from 
operating on the navigation ‘upon paine of the heavy indignation and displeasure of 
us’.7 The 1740 enabling act for the Medway Canal Company authorised its proprietors 
to operate a carrying service, though it prohibited them from exercising a monopoly 
on carrying.8 Other inland waterway companies seem to have disregarded any legal 
constraint on offering carrying services. The Mersey & Irwell Navigation Company 
appears to have been carrying at least as early as 1753, when it published a table of 
carriage rates ‘inclusive of tolls’.9 Other companies developed carrying services more 
indirectly, most commonly through subsidiary companies or companies belonging to 
company officials. While some companies, like the Oxford Canal Company, 
                                                 
2 Davies, ‘Josiah Wedgwood and canal management’, 55. 
3 Jackman, Development of Transportation in Modern England, 434, 436. Canal companies 
did often appear on carriers’ lists; see my analysis of city business directories later in this 
chapter. 
4 Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 13. 
5 Aldcroft and Freeman, Transport in the Industrial Revolution, 124. 
6 Maw, Transport and the Industrial City, 113. 
7 Willan, River Navigation in England, 25. 
8 Willan, River Navigation in England, 115. 
9 Hadfield and Biddle, The Canals of North West England, 19; Porteous, Canal Ports, 62. 
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specifically forbade their staff or agents from owning boats, others, like the 
Birmingham Canal Company, permitted the practice.10 The directors of the Kennet & 
Avon Canal Company determined in 1817 that 'it is inexpedient that any Servant 
employed by the Company be permitted to be a Trader on the Canal or River Kennet 
or Avon', but some subsequently set up their own carrying company, formally 
separate from the canal company.11 In 1843 John Farquhar, manager of the Chard 
Canal Company, and George Cooke, a partner in the firm of solicitors employed by 
the company, formed the Bridgewater and Chard Coal Company to offer carrying 
services on the canal, and ‘other and competing traders in coal were discouraged’.12  
 
Other inland waterway companies went into the carrying business temporarily, to 
encourage trade on their routes, to prevent a single carrier from monopolising the 
route, to prevent carriers 'combining' to inflate carriage rates, or to allay concerns that 
carriers were cheating them by misrepresenting the weight and type of cargo they 
were transporting. These companies often ceased carrying when these specific 
issues were resolved.13 The Aire & Calder Navigation’s Wakefield committee began 
carrying coal in 1702, but stopped once a regular independent trade had been 
established.14 In 1774 the Leeds & Liverpool Canal Company began carrying to 
reduce coal prices.15 In an 1829 letter the director of the Wiltshire & Berkshire Canal 
Company wrote, ‘I have found that it is better to hire freight than to have anything to 
do with Boats, and accordingly I have very few, just sufficient to keep me independent 
of the freighters in case of combination to raise prices.’16  
 
The proprietors of the Rochdale Canal Company tailored their offerings to the 
availability of other carrying services. In 1799 they advertised for carriers to operate 
between Hull and Rochdale by water, and between Rochdale and Manchester by 
road, but only received one offer, from Edward Thompson. The company arranged 
for him to transport all goods on the route that were not specifically consigned to 
another carrier. In 1801 the proprietors changed their arrangements, attempting to 
hire boats and work directly with consigning agents, but gave up this system in 1804. 
                                                 
10 Hanson, The Canal Boatmen, 18. 
11 RAIL 842/10, letter from Kennett & Avon Canal Navigation Company Management 
Committee, 20 March 1817, The National Archives, London. 
12 Charles Hadfield, The Canals of Southern England (London: Phoenix, 1955), 59-61, 231. 
13 Maw, Transport and the Industrial City, 120-121. 
14 Hadfield, The Canals of Yorkshire and North East England, 20. 
15 Hadfield and Biddle, The Canals of North West England, 57 
16 Hadfield, The Canals of South and South East England, 286. 
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By 1807 the canal company was operating the Rochdale to Manchester route itself, 
but sold the operation to a carrier named Cogswell in 1811. They were again carrying, 
between Liverpool and Wakefield, in 1817, but gave up the route when a carrier took 
it on.17  It seems clear from this series of decisions that the company preferred to act 
as carriers as a last resort. Inland waterway companies generally seem to have begun 
‘self-carrying’ reluctantly, after first attempting to increase traffic by encouraging and 
subsidising carriers through offering rate reductions ('drawbacks'), free stabling and 
warehousing, agent services, and financial support for capital improvements. These 
companies do not appear to have undertaken carrying operations primarily for profit, 
but rather to optimise the value of their capital-intensive infrastructure asset.18 
 
Some canal companies also seem to have developed their own carrying businesses 
for the same reason that some early railways did, to experiment with steam traction. 
The Ellesmere & Chester Canal Company formed a carrying department in 1836, 
apparently in order to acquire steam tugs to tow the company’s boats between 
Liverpool and Ellesmere Port. The company authorised the purchase of a steam tug 
in February 1837, but appears to have decided to build its own by August of that year. 
They may still have not achieved their vision of steam-hauled vessels by July 1838, 
when a letter from the company’s carrying committee mentions the use of steam in 
the future tense; 'it being evident that if these Vessels were unrigged and towed wholly 
by Steam a considerable proportion of this expenditure would be saved, and the 
business done in a much more expeditious and advantageous manner'.19 Although 
canal companies had built and hired boats to carriers since their inception, this letter 
suggests a change in companies’ thinking; like railway companies, this company 
seems to be starting to consider boats and motive power part of its infrastructure, 
along with the canal itself and associated buildings and equipment. 
 
Although inland waterway companies operating their own carrying services were 
required to make their infrastructure available to anyone who paid the toll and followed 
the by-laws, as infrastructure owners and operators they were naturally in a better 
position than ‘bye-carriers’ and both inherently and deliberately disadvantaged other 
carriers in several ways.20 Dobbin directly states, ‘despite the fact that they were 
                                                 
17 Hadfield and Biddle, The Canals of North West England, 272-281. 
18 Hadfield and Biddle, The Canals of North West England, 278-281; Bagwell, The Transport 
Revolution, 13; Hadfield, The Canals of the West Midlands, 163, 182. 
19 RAIL 826/6, letter from Ellesmere and Chester Canal Company Carrying Committee, 12 
July 1838, The National Archives, London. 
20 Hanson, The Canal Boatmen, 113. 
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required to allow public carriers to use the canals…they had driven independent 
competitors out of business by colluding to depress their own rates until independents 
disappeared’, though this seems exaggerated as carriers continued to offer inland 
waterway services despite canal companies’ efforts.21 Carriers employed by the Aire 
& Calder Navigation, for example, did not pay a toll to use the navigation, and could 
thus charge less than their competitors.22 The Trent & Mersey Canal Company 
operated its own carrying service, and according to a complaint of 1795 were willing 
‘so to molest and harass all their competitors as to secure to themselves all the profit 
of the Carrying trade and its attendant advantages.’23 Canal companies often provided 
free loading and storage space, particularly during the first years of their operation, 
but space was always at a premium and companies typically exercised preferences 
toward their own, preferred or larger carriers at the expense of smaller independent 
carriers.24 Canal companies often restricted or denied access to goods transfer or 
storage space on the land surrounding the canal.25 The Mersey & Irwell Navigation 
Company owned all of the warehouse space on their route; while their tolls were 
regulated by their enabling act, their warehouse rents were not, and could thus be 
made prohibitively expensive for independent carriers.26 The 1699 act to improve the 
Trent specified that no warehouses could be built without the consent of the 
navigation’s commissioners; the navigation company subsequently built warehouses 
only for themselves, leaving independent carriers only wharf space.27 In 1714 a 
petition was brought against George Heyne, manager of the Trent Navigation as well 
as operator of the Burton Boat Company which carried on the navigation. According 
to the petition Heyne 'insist[ed] [t]hat his is a private Wharf…at which no Goods can 
be landed, or received, without his, or Fosbrooke’s Boats; by which illegal Practices 
they engross the whole Navigation to their boats; to the Destruction of Trade.’ Records 
indicate that in 1748 Nottingham merchants attempting to unload goods on the banks 
of the navigation, in the absence of permitted wharf space, were blocked from doing 
so; Heyne continued to operate both businesses until 1757, fighting off 'interlopers' 
building unauthorised wharves and warehouses.28 After 1739, however, another 
carrier, the Nottingham Boat Company, secured warehouse space, and by the 1750s 
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Heyne controlled less than half the traffic on the navigation.29 One carrier, Henry 
Wright, complained to the directors of the Oxford Canal in 1794 that he had been 
unable to unload coal at the wharf at Fenny Compton, owned by the company but 
used by Jas. Griffin and Co., even when he offered to pay for access. Wright was 
forced to unload on the nearby turnpike road, but was thwarted in that as well as the 
land between the road and the canal was rented by the same Mr. Griffin.30  
 
It has been said that the Bridgwater Trustees were notorious for prioritising their own 
carrying service and disadvantaging others. Until 1777 their docks and warehouses 
at Castlefield were open only to the company’s boats; they were later opened up to 
other carriers including Hugh Henshall and Co., Worthington & Gilbert and Pickfords. 
By 1804 twelve carriers had facilities there, and by 1821 22 firms operated at 
Castleford and the Bridgwater Trustees carried less than half of the traffic on the 
canal.31 At Runcorn Gap, where the Bridgwater Canal connected the Grand Trunk 
Canal and the Mersey River, the trustees constructed a basin for boats entering the 
Mersey and gave priority to their own boats, which could pass through without having 
to pay an additional toll.32 Once at the terminus, independent carriers were again put 
at a disadvantage: 
these two lines...are at all times open to any parties who may choose to 
navigate them with their own vessels, but…that this is little better than a 
nominal right, for the Old Quay have not sufficient warehouse room at 
Manchester, and the Trustees of the Duke have monopolised so much of the 
land and the warehouses there, that...a Bye Carrier is subject to delays, costs, 
and impediments which completely put an end to all fair and open 
competition.33  
 
However, both Hadfield and Biddle and Maw suggest that these impediments were 
exaggerated in the early nineteenth century by supporters of the Liverpool & 
Manchester Railway, and that canal companies in general, and the Bridgewater 
Trustees in particular, in fact supported the carriers that generated most of their 
revenue.34 The records of the Bridgewater Canal company suggest that it did not 
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make a profit from its carrying operations; the accounts of 1844 to 1848, which 
separate carrying revenue from toll revenue, show that the company’s carrying 
business ran at a loss three years out of the five.35 
 
The evidence on canal and navigation company ‘self-carrying’ appears to be mixed. 
Although it was illegal until 1845 for most inland waterway companies to offer carrying 
services, it appears that many did, but these services were often intermittent, and 
inland waterways were always open to other carriers. The first mainline railways were 
expected to operate in the same way, and their enabling acts reflected this 
expectation - they authorised railway companies to carry, but most of the legislation 
around goods transport was designed to manage the relationship between the 
company constructing the line and the line’s users. In the 1840s, however, railway 
companies became increasingly focused on developing their own exclusive goods 
carrying services and disadvantaging, and ultimately removing, competitors. 
 
The origin of railway company carrying 
As I described in chapter 1, the carrying trade used whatever infrastructure was 
available to transport goods. Carriers operated on roads, rivers and coastal waters, 
and provided services on navigations, canals, and turnpikes as they became 
available, realising that the profit from transporting more goods at less cost 
outweighed the cost of paying tolls for access to this infrastructure. The first railways 
were financed, constructed and operated using the same business model as that of 
earlier transport infrastructure - a private or public company raised funds to construct 
and maintain a transport asset for use by others, recovering the cost of its investment, 
the cost of maintaining and operating the asset, and profit for investors through 
collecting tolls from these users.36 The Lancaster Canal Company, for example, which 
operated several railways, kept a register of railway waggons as it did of canal boats, 
and waggons were identified with the carrier's name on an iron plate. The company 
was responsible for maintaining the waggon wheels; the carrier was responsible for 
the rest. Users were typically charged by the ton for use of a railway, rather than by 
the ton-mile for use of a canal, and were required to comply with company by-laws 
imposing limits on such parameters as load weight and number of waggons in a 
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train.37 Other railway companies, like the Mansfield & Pinxton, rented waggons to 
carriers, in the same way some canal companies rented boats.38 
 
Enabling acts for the first joint-stock railway companies regulated the tolls these 
companies could charge for access to their lines. The 1826 enabling act for the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company, for example, authorised it to collect 
between one and three pence per ton-mile for goods transported on the line, and also 
specified maximum tolls for transporting people and animals.39 Enabling acts also 
typically permitted companies to carry passengers and goods. As railway companies 
were originally expected to compete with coach services for passenger traffic, initially 
passenger fares were unregulated; as railway companies came to monopolise 
passenger carriage, however, later laws regulated passenger fares. As railway 
companies were also expected to compete with carriers, goods carriage rates were 
also not regulated in company enabling acts, and companies were permitted to charge 
any ‘reasonable’ rate for goods carriage.40  
 
By 1829 the Liverpool & Manchester Railway company, owners of the first mainline 
railway, had decided that they would be 'carriers of general merchandise, as well as 
of coals and passengers' but would not exclude other carriers from the line.41 R. H. G. 
Thomas records that the company set up its goods carrying service in the same way 
a new canal company would. The directors accepted offers from two carriers, 
Harrisons and Pickfords, each suggesting a different business arrangement. 
Harrisons agreed to collect and deliver goods, load and unload their own rolling stock 
on the railway, and accept the risks attendant on the business, in return for a payment 
of 2s or 3s per ton (the remainder of the charge to the customer to go to the railway 
company). Pickfords agreed to operate one ‘contract waggon’ per day on the line, 
paying the company £2 for each journey.42 Wheat suggests that in addition 
‘[n]egotiations had been in progress for the Mersey & Irwell [canal company] to 
operate all the traffic on the railway, but these were unfruitful.’43  
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The minutes of the company’s board of directors record that while the company 
reserved the exclusive right to carry passengers and coal, they intended to look to 
carriers to oversee goods carriage. In 1829 several carriers including Pickfords, the 
New Quay Company, and Carver and Co., already serving the Liverpool to 
Manchester route, requested to open negotiations on their use of the line; the New 
Quay Company proposed rates and requested to rent storage space in the company’s 
yards in Liverpool and Manchester.44 They expected the railway company to supply 
the vehicles as well as infrastructure, in the same way that some canal companies 
provided boats.45 In November 1830, two months after the line's official opening, the 
company accepted Pickfords’ proposal to pay the company 40s per trip ‘to have a 
moveable body to be transferred to Cart Wheels at each end of the line’.46 By January 
1831 the company had not provided facilities for goods carriage, and carriers were 
expressing concern about access. At that time '[a] discussion took place respecting 
the Company becoming Exclusive Carriers of Merchandise on the Rail-Way, and it 
was agreed, that the Company should adhere to their former recorded resolution to 
be Carriers, but not exclusive carriers on their own Line.’47 The following month the 
company advertised that they would be ready to ‘receive independent Carriers on the 
Road’; Thomas writes, ‘[a]n advertisement of 3 February announced that the railway 
would be open to carriers…from 1 May 1831, and that patterns of approved carriages 
and waggons could be seen at the Company’s yards.’48  
 
Although Thomas, Carlson and Maw recognise that the line had initially been open to 
carriers, others, such as Robbins, Bagwell and Dyos and Aldcroft state that the 
company had exercised a monopoly over all traffic, both passenger and goods, on its 
line from the start.49 Evidence indicates, however, that although the Liverpool & 
Manchester company acted as carriers they used the business model common to 
other privately-owned transport infrastructure assets, in which anyone paying the toll 
and conforming to the by-laws could operate their own goods carrying service on the 
infrastructure. 
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Although railways are commonly associated with coal transport, due to the origins of 
locomotive technology in the coal mines of northeastern England, the first mainline 
companies were typically uninterested in bulk goods in general and coal in particular 
as the profit margins of this market sector were low.50 Freeman and Aldcroft point out 
that the first significant shipment of coal to London by rail did not occur until 1844, and 
that by the late nineteenth century most coal was still coming to London via coastal 
shipping.51 He states that ‘coal did not become a universal item of railway traffic until 
after 1850.’52  
 
The prospectuses for the first mainline railway companies suggested that promoters 
expected most of the companies’ revenue to be derived from the tolls collected from 
carriers of general merchandise. The 1824 prospectus of the Liverpool and 
Manchester Railroad Company, for example, begins by identifying the potential 
revenue from transporting general goods. It then mentions coal, agricultural products 
and lime and manure for agricultural purposes, before stating, 'as a cheap and 
expeditious means of conveyance for travellers, the railway holds out the fair prospect 
of a public accommodation, the magnitude and importance of which cannot be 
immediately determined.'53 Once the first mainline railways came into service, 
however, it quickly became apparent to their directors that higher profits could be 
made from the coaching trade, transporting passengers and small packages, the 
maximum rates for neither of which were regulated by their enabling acts, and through 
the 1830s companies focused on providing these services. Looking back at this 
period, Dionysius Lardner, a contemporary academic, science populariser and 
economist, wrote in 1850 that:  
[t]he transport of merchandise is the branch of railway business on the due 
improvement and cultivation of which the ultimate and durable success of 
these vast enterprises, and the extent of their public utility, will mainly depend; 
yet it…has been hitherto comparatively neglected. The brilliant and 
unexpected results of the business in passenger traffic have…dazzled the 
public, and engrossed the attention of proprietors, directors, and managers.54 
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In the 1830s railway companies developed different business models for transporting 
goods. In 1839 the House of Commons Select Committee on Railways identified four 
models companies were using at the time: railway companies contracted with one or 
more carriers; provided locomotives, and sometimes waggons, to carriers but 
permitted them to manage their own services; opened their line to carriers but also 
operated their own carrying service, or maintained a monopoly on carrying, excluding 
carriers from their line.55 The committee noted that, per the first model, John 
Hargreaves managed goods carrying for the Bolton & Leigh company. The London & 
Birmingham, and later the Manchester & Leeds and Midland Counties companies, 
had an open carriage policy. Similar to the model employed by many canals, the North 
Union Railway was technically open to carriers, though at the time of the hearings 
only John Hargreaves carried on it. The directors of the newly formed North Midland 
Railway Company had determined to ‘throw the line open to every carrier who should 
be willing to pay the appropriate rates’ while reserving the option to become carriers 
themselves ‘should [there be] any combination among the carriers to raise their 
charges to an improper amount'.56 The Grand Junction retained a monopoly on goods 
carriage between London and Birmingham, but allowed carriers to operate on the rest 
of the line. The Stockton & Darlington owned and operated all locomotives on its line, 
but carriers ran their own services using horse traction. The committee reported that 
the Liverpool & Manchester, Leeds & Selby, and Newcastle & Carlisle companies 
exercised a monopoly over carrying services, although there is evidence for carriers 
operating on the Liverpool & Manchester line at least through the 1840s.57  
 
Thus, of the 11 companies the Select Committee reviewed in 1839, five had an open 
carriage policy, one contracted with a carrier to manage goods traffic, two exercised 
partial monopolies, and three claimed to be monopolies, although this was not the 
case for at least one of these. Of these 11 lines, three (the London & Birmingham, the 
Grand Junction and the Liverpool & Manchester) could be considered 'major' lines in 
terms of length and revenues; of these three, one (the Liverpool & Manchester) 
claimed to be a monopoly, one (the London & Birmingham) had an open carriage 
policy, allowing any party who paid the appropriate toll access to the line, and did not 
operate its own carrying service, and one (the Grand Junction) operated its own 
                                                 
55 Second Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 9 August 1839, viii-ix. I will describe the origins, objectives, composition and 
work of this committee in more detail in chapter 5. 
56 The Sheffield Independent, and Yorkshire and Derbyshire Advertiser, 16 February 1839. 
57 Manchester Times and Gazette, 26 August 1843; First Report from the Select Committee 
on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 26 April 1839, 23. 
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carrying service but shared part of its line with carriers. The superiority of railway 
company carrying was not self-evident at that time. 
 
As early as 1841 railway company stock dividends began to fall, as the economic 
benefit of extending existing lines or constructing new ones became increasingly 
marginal and operation and maintenance costs proved to be greater than anticipated. 
As a way to increase revenue and improve share performance, railway company 
officials began to develop goods carrying services on their lines in competition with 
the carrying trade. As I mentioned in my introduction, several historians writing about 
the development of the railway network have recognised this gap between the 
opening of the first mainline railways and the growth in rail goods transport. Pollins 
notes that in the early 1840s goods revenue made up only 35 per cent of total railway 
company revenue; between 1843 and 1852, however, passenger revenue increased 
by 140 per cent while goods revenue increased by 470 per cent.58 Robbins notes that 
1852 was the first year railway goods traffic revenue exceeded passenger traffic 
revenue.59 Freeman and Aldcroft note that in 1845 the percentage income split 
between railway company passenger and goods transport revenue was 74/26; the 
increase in goods revenue had changed this proportion to 49/51 by 1850, as income 
from goods transport increased sevenfold between 1842 and 1850.60 The change in 
railway companies’ focus during this period from passengers to goods can be seen in 
the following table showing the growth of goods carriage both in absolute terms and 
as a percentage of total company revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 Pollins, Britain’s Railways, 60. 
59 Robbins, The Railway Age, 9. 
60 Freeman and Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain, 73. 
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Table 2: Comparison of railway company goods and passenger revenue, 1842-1865 
Year Passenger 
revenue 
(£million) 
Goods revenue 
(£million) 
Percentage of total 
company revenue 
from goods 
Goods 
transported 
(million tons) 
1842 3.1 1.6 34 5.4  
(1.4 non-coal) 
1846 4.7 2.8 37 17 (7 non-coal) 
1850 6.8 6.4 48 38 
1865 16.6 19.3 54 114.6 
Source: Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, 26; Mitchell, The Coming of the 
Railway, 16; Freeman and Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain, 74; 
Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth, 55. 
 
Notes: The authors compiled these figures from the yearly Railway Returns which 
companies were required by their enabling acts to provide to Parliament. 
 
The table shows a steady rise, starting in the early 1840s, in the proportion of railway 
company revenue earned through goods carriage; although most revenue was 
generated by passenger fares until 1850, by then most of the larger railway 
companies were earning at least 50 per cent of their revenue from goods transport.61 
 
Through the 1840s two models of railway goods carrying developed, exemplified by 
the London & Birmingham Railway Company and the Grand Junction Railway 
Company. The London & Birmingham company managed what had formerly been the 
coaching trade, operating passenger services and carrying small parcels on 
passenger trains, but did not operate a goods carrying service. Carriers paid the 
company tonnage rates for warehouse space, loading and unloading facilities, 
waggons and scheduled locomotive service; they provided all other services 
associated with carrying including collection and delivery, loading and unloading, 
documentation and administration, and accepted liability for loss or damage of the 
goods they transported except by fire, collision, or the criminal behaviour of railway 
staff, for which the railway company was responsible. The Grand Junction company, 
on the other hand, operated their own goods carrying service; carriers transporting 
goods on the line paid the same rates as any other user but were rebated between 
10 and 20 per cent as reimbursement for the services they provided. 
 
The debate over railway company monopoly carrying 
Although some observers suggested that the increased revenue generated from 
goods carriage in the 1840s helped to increase railway company share prices, it was 
                                                 
61 Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, 129. 
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unclear to investors whether this revenue was actually translating into profit. The 
earliest evidence of the internal debate over railway company carrying, in testimony 
before the House of Commons Select Committee on Railway Communication in 1840, 
suggests that by this time both railway company officials and their customers were 
aware that the companies' highly profitable passenger services were subsidising their 
goods carriage operations. Some witnesses argued that railway companies by 
definition could carry goods more cheaply than carriers, because there would be no 
need for ‘two profits’, to the railway company and to the carrier. The committee, 
however, explained to one witness, Samuel Aspinwall Goddard, a Birmingham 
merchant, that when a railway company carried goods on its line the company itself 
earned 'two profits', as carrier and as infrastructure operator and maintainer.62 
Goddard eventually ceded the point by acknowledging that railway company carriers 
subsidised their carrying operations: ‘I consider that the railroad companies get their 
principal profit out of passengers, and that they can afford to carry goods at a much 
lower rate than if they were confined to merchandize’.63 J. R. Chorley, treasurer of the 
Grand Junction Railway Company, explicitly stated that the company did not profit 
from its collection and delivery services, and provided the committee with a circular 
explanation of why the company should perform them if this were the case: 
Then for what reason do you undertake a business from which you derive no 
profit? - Because the business is profitable on the Grand Junction line, and we 
consider that the very reduction of rates we shall effect by this means, will 
increase the quantity of goods received on the line, and consequently the 
profits of the Grand Junction Company will be greater on their own line.64  
 
As railway company meeting minutes generally record decisions and actions, but not 
debates, the discussions among railway company officials over the decision to carry 
goods is largely outside the view of historians.65 It is, however, partly visible in a series 
of pamphlets published between 1841 and 1849 in which railway company officials 
and interested parties marshalled such statistics as were available to argue their 
positions. Many of the authors of these pamphlets were associated with railway 
companies, and all were concerned with these companies’ financial health, but which 
                                                 
62 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, 10 July 1840, 157-158. 
63 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, 10 July 1840, 160. 
64 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, 10 July 1840, 295. 
65 The railway company minutes I have reviewed for this study include those of the Grand 
Junction Railway Company (RAIL 220), the Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company (RAIL 
371), the London & Birmingham Railway Company (RAIL 384), and the Stockton & Darlington 
Railway Company (RAIL 667), all in the National Archives, London. 
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side of the question they supported related to their own backgrounds, experience, 
areas of expertise, and roles in the companies.  
 
The pamphlet authors in favour of the ‘open’ system of rail goods carriage, in which 
both carriers and railway companies carried goods, included J. T. Norris, a London 
politician and publisher; James Shipton, a Wolverhampton carrier; an anonymous 
‘Sufferer’; and most significantly John Whitehead, a banker and promoter of railway 
stock, and former secretary of the South Eastern Railway Company. These authors 
generally argued that competition among carriers provided the best service and 
lowest prices to customers, and that carriers were better placed to solicit and manage 
goods traffic than railway company staff. They argued that the evidence indicated that 
railway companies carried goods at a loss, subsidising their goods carriage service 
with passenger revenue, and that they would be more profitable, and pay higher 
dividends to shareholders, if they focused on their more profitable passenger services 
and left goods carriage to carriers.  
 
Those supporting the ‘closed’ system, in which railway companies alone carried 
goods on their lines, included Henry Booth, secretary and treasurer of the Liverpool 
& Manchester Railway Company; Braithwaite Poole, goods manager of the Grand 
Junction Railway Company; Peter Eckersley, controller of the Lancashire & Yorkshire 
Railway Company; and most significantly Mark Huish, general manager of the London 
& North Western Railway Company. These authors argued that allowing railway 
companies exclusive control was the most efficient means of undertaking goods 
carriage, and that carriers at best added no value to rail goods carriage and at worst 
extorted unwarranted and unearned profits from both their customers and the railway 
companies. 
 
'A Sufferer' began his pamphlet by stating that '[f]ew controversies have 
occurred...which have excited such a deep interest' as the carrying question.66 
Although all of these pamphlets were published, it is unclear how widely they 
circulated; as their subject was railway company profitability, however, and a large 
number of people had a financial interest in railways, the subject itself was likely of 
general interest. Analysis of the apparent significance of each of these pamphlets, 
                                                 
66 'A Sufferer', Railway Policy. A Letter Addressed to George Carr Glyn, Esq., M. P., … on the 
Correspondence Addressed to him by Captain Huish and Mr. John Whitehead (London: Smith, 
Elder & Co., 1848), 3. 
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measured by the number and type of citations of each pamphlet’s publisher in the 
Nineteenth-Century Short Title Catalogue, suggests that the influence of the works of 
authors arguing for ‘open’ and ‘closed’ company policies was fairly evenly distributed. 
Pamphlets written by ‘A Sufferer’ and Whitehead, supporting the ‘open’ position, and 
by Eckersley and Huish, supporting the ‘closed’ position, were published by high-
profile publishers in London, and appeared to have had a wide circulation. The work 
of the anonymous author, Booth, Norris, Poole and Shipton appears to have been 
published by publishers of lesser significance, and (except for Norris) outside 
London.67  
 
It does not appear that either side of the debate attracted much attention in general-
interest newspapers, although in 1848 the Times mentioned Whitehead’s pamphlet 
in a letter from someone identified as ‘F’ who called on the shareholders of the London 
& North Western and other railway companies to ‘compel their directors to “amend 
their ways”, and not remit them to indulge in the luxury of carrying goods or doing any 
other business at a loss, until…they are in a condition to pay…the maximum dividend 
allowed by law.’68 Two weeks later the newspaper mentioned Mark Huish’s reply to 
this statement, adding, however, that ‘[t]he calculations and statements of Mr. Huish 
are clearly given, but his pamphlet is not wholly undisfigured by that taunting tone 
which characterizes railway discussions, and which renders allusion to them at all 
times disagreeable.’69 The Liverpool Mercury printed a ‘Literary Notice’ in 1844 
announcing the publication of Braithwaite Poole’s first pamphlet, stating that ‘if the 
public be properly guaranteed against the usual practices of monopolists, they will be 
much inclined to encourage the realization of the able suggestions here made.’70 The 
word ‘monopolists’ in this sentence appears to refer to the carrying trade, an indication 
that ‘opposition to monopoly’ (of the railway companies or, allegedly, the carrying 
trade) was a talking point on both sides of the carrying question. 
                                                 
67 The publishers of authors favouring the ‘open’ policy (‘A Sufferer’, Norris, Shipton and 
Whitehead) were Smith, Elder & Co. and J. T. Norris (based in London) and J. Bridgen (based 
in Wolverhampton). Of these, Smith, Elder & Co. has more than 1,500 titles listed in the 
Nineteenth-Century Short Title Catalogue while the others have few or none. The publishers 
of authors favouring the ‘closed’ policy (Booth, Eckersley, Huish and Poole) were Bradshaw 
and Blacklock (whose significance I will discuss below); Thomas Baines; Simpkin, Marshall, 
and Co.; W. H. Smith & Son; and Wareing Webb. All but Thomas Baines and Wareing Webb 
were based in London; Thomas Baines and Wareing Webb were based in Liverpool. Of these, 
Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. were prominent, with thousands of titles listed; W. H. Smith & Son 
published several titles, and the others have few or no titles listed. 
68 "Money-Market and City Intelligence." The Times, 17 November 1848, 6. 
69 "Money-Market and City Intelligence." The Times, 30 November 1848, 6. 
70 Liverpool Mercury etc, 26 July 1844. 
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The terms of the debate over the benefit of exclusive goods carrying by railway 
companies were couched in the language of statistics, accounting and finance. 
Several historians who have investigated the decision-making processes of 
corporations during this period generally agree that while the directors of corporations 
at the time may have valued quantitative information and objectivity, the information 
to support such decisions was generally lacking. Pollard, for example, states that 
quantitative methods to gather information for decisions were not used to any 
significant extent.71 J. R. Edwards argues that during this period quantitative 
information became valuable as joint-stock companies, particularly railway 
companies, found it necessary to gain the support of external investors who had no 
involvement with the operation of the company.72 Other historians point out, however, 
that, contrary to this ‘agency hypothesis’, methods of quantitative information 
gathering and the use of such information in business decisions actually appear to 
have been pioneered by partnerships rather than joint-stock companies.73 In addition, 
Arnold and McCartney’s analysis of the financial records of joint-stock canal 
companies suggests that as late as the 1850s these companies were still not 
providing complete financial information to investors or potential investors; what 
information they did report related more to deflecting social censure of excess profit 
than accountability to shareholders.74  
 
Businesses’ interest in the collection and use of quantitative information can be seen 
against a background of the growing interest in the early nineteenth century in 
obtaining and analysing statistical information in the public sphere, to guide legislation 
and policy decisions. In Britain, interest in informing government decision-making with 
quantitative evidence dates back to the ‘political arithmetic’ of the late-seventeenth 
century, when individuals and government began to gather and interpret various types 
of demographic and financial information. Julian Hoppit argues that this interest in 
quantitative information carried on through the eighteenth century and into the 
nineteenth.75 Although, as now, the use of statistics to support arguments was 
                                                 
71 Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management, 248-249. 
72 J. R. Edwards, A History of Financial Accounting (London: Routledge, 1989), 12-15; Arnold 
and McCartney, ‘Financial capitalism’, 3-4. 
73 Neil McKendrick, ‘Josiah Wedgwood and Cost Accounting in the Industrial Revolution’, 
Economic History Review 23, no. 1 (April 1970): 45-67; Arnold and McCartney, ‘The transition 
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74 Arnold and McCartney, ‘Financial capitalism’, 1295, 1300. 
75 Julian Hoppit, ‘Political Arithmetic in Eighteenth-Century England’, Economic History Review 
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sometimes perceived as manipulative, dehumanising, confusing, or tedious, by the 
1830s government and public institutions were regularly using demographic and 
financial statistics to inform arguments and support legislation and policy decisions 
relating to military and colonial matters, trade, crime and population movement.76 In 
the next section I will explore how railway company officials and interested parties 
presented arguments for and against exclusive railway company carrying, and how 
some of them attempted to justify their arguments using financial statistics 
(quantifying and comparing rates, revenue and profits). I will assess the effectiveness 
of these arguments before considering the outcome of the debate and the possible 
explanations for this outcome, then conclude the chapter with a quantitative 
demonstration of the effects of railway company policy on goods carriage in England 
in the 1840s and 1850s. 
 
Railway companies were typically required by their enabling acts to collect and publish 
various kinds of financial information. As we shall see in the debate I describe below, 
however, this information was difficult to use for decision-making because, although 
companies were generally required to report income, they were not required to report 
expenses to the Board of Trade until 1854; as Dionysius Lardner noted in 1850, 'the 
receipts alone are ascertainable with precision; the expenses and profits are left to 
conjecture.'77 In addition, railway company directors and managers had a disincentive 
to be transparent about financial matters, and an incentive to manipulate information 
to increase the price and value of shares.78 Hawke, Pollins, Reed, and Arnold and 
McCartney have used the evidence available in government and company records to 
assess the profitability of railway companies before the 1850s, each drawing different 
conclusions from incomplete information.79 As the calculation of profitability is not 
straightforward for modern historians, it would have been even more challenging for 
contemporaries; Arnold and McCartney state directly that 'shareholders would not 
have been able to calculate the company's rate of return on capital from the 
information available'.80 Thus although several of those debating the profitability of 
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railway company carrying presented their arguments in quantitative terms, these 
scholars suggest that contemporary accounting and reporting practices were not yet 
robust enough for them to be definitive. The quantitative arguments deployed on both 
sides were probably ultimately less persuasive than those appealing to such common 
values as ‘public service’ and ‘competition’. 
 
In 1841, in response to the testimony critical of railway company carrying that I cited 
above, Henry Booth, secretary and treasurer of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway 
Company, published a pamphlet arguing that railway companies should operate their 
own carrying services. In it he introduced several talking points and 'frames' repeated 
in later arguments for railway company carrying. He introduced the argument from 
efficiency - why should multiple collectors, transporters and distributors of goods, 
each with its own staff and infrastructure, use a rail line, when a single company would 
be more efficient?81 This argument is the opposite of the 'argument from competition', 
that multiple providers lead to competition and thus improvement of service. He 
referred to the largest regional carriers as if they were equivalent in size, power and 
function to railway companies, framing the question of whether railway companies 
should carry goods as a conflict between two equally matched interests. Booth 
referred to these regional carriers as 'Water Carriers', thus framing the conflict 
between railway companies and carriers as between rail and canal transport modes, 
and suggested that carriers were trying to ruin the railways by 'diverting' goods traffic 
to canals.82 He argued that by developing their own goods carrying services railway 
companies were breaking the monopoly of canal carriers. Finally, he described the 
work of carriers as 'intervention' into the carriage of goods by railway; in modern 
terms, Booth suggested with this argument that carriers on railways provided no 
'added value' and could thus be easily and profitably dispensed with. 
 
The same year J. T. Norris, a London politician and publisher, wrote and published a 
pamphlet strongly arguing the case for carriers on railways. Norris pointed out that 
railway companies did not seem to be profiting from goods carriage, noting that the 
Grand Junction Railway Company appeared to be subsidising goods carrying with 
passenger revenue and raising passenger fares while lowering goods rates. He 
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argued that while it may have been true, as several railway company officials claimed, 
that goods rates were dropping, such a reduction in rates was not sustainable if it 
were being subsidised by increasing passenger revenue.83  
 
Three years later Braithwaite Poole, goods manager of the Grand Junction Railway 
Company, raised arguments similar to Booth's in a pamphlet outlining 'twenty short 
reasons' why railway companies should not only be allowed but 'compelled' to be 
exclusive goods carriers on their lines.84 Many of Poole’s arguments were similar to 
those Booth had introduced. Like Booth, Poole pointed out the inefficiency of multiple 
carriers on a railway maintaining their own infrastructure, claimed that because 
railway companies owned and operated locomotives carriers provided no added 
value, and referred to carriers as 'intervening parties' in the carriage of goods by rail. 
Poole also suggested (without any evidence that I have identified) that carriers had a 
financial interest in canals, and that they sometimes transported goods by canal rather 
than by railway and that this was somehow unethical. Poole claimed that carriers 
colluded in clandestine meetings to increase carriage rates. Although there seems to 
be no other evidence of such meetings, Poole had been a canal carrier before working 
for the Grand Junction company so would have had direct knowledge of carriers’ 
business practices. It is unclear how many of the examples of good and affordable 
railway company carrying service that Poole mentioned in his pamphlet referred to 
the parcels (coaching) rather than goods (carrying) trade; if he drew his examples 
from the parcels trade, Poole’s information was likely to be correct, as it is likely 
railway companies carried parcels at lower rates than coaches did. He also proposed 
some unique arguments against the carrying trade, such as that canal carriers worked 
on Sundays and that some carriers had two offices.85  
 
In this pamphlet Poole reversed some of the arguments others used to support the 
carrying trade - that carriers were private enterprises rather than public companies, 
that carriers adapted their business practices to those of their customers, and that 
carriers understood the goods carriage market better than railway company officials 
and employees. Poole instead argued that railway companies were better suited than 
carriers to transport goods because as public bodies they were responsible to the 
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government.86 He claimed that railway companies' business practices were superior 
to those of carriers; 'a tradesman, knowing he can obtain long credit from a private 
carrier...thus frequently defrauds the merchant from whom he buys goods'.87 Finally, 
Poole seemed to suggest, though his wording is unclear, that in some unspecified 
way railway companies were somehow closer to their customers than carriers: 
‘Railway Carrying Companies also immediately feel their interests closely identified 
with those of the public, instead of with the carriers’.88 A table appended to Poole’s 
pamphlet purported to demonstrate that railway companies acting as carriers charged 
less per ton for goods carriage than those that did not, by dividing the sum of the 
average rate per ton for the total mileage of the railway lines in each column by the 
total mileage of the lines. Not only does this calculation leave out several significant 
variables, such as the services included in these rates, the results seem clearly 
distorted by the fact that an asterisk against some of the railway company rates noted 
'Add 5s per Ton Carriage on these Lines'.89 
 
Later that year Poole published another pamphlet with an additional 'dozen reasons' 
to remove carriers, which he referred to as 'so called Carriers' and 'Middle-men', from 
railway lines.90 This pamphlet reiterated previous grievances, but also criticised 
several business practices of carriers, including reducing goods carriage rates by 
selecting the cheapest mode and route and blaming railway companies for damage 
or loss of goods.91 Again, as Poole had been a canal carrier himself, it is difficult 
completely to discount his descriptions of some illegal and unethical practices carriers 
used to increase their profits. He stated, contrary to the evidence I present in chapter 
5, that when railway companies acted as carriers 'any irregularities that might, but 
very seldom do, occur with themselves' were immediately rectified.92 
 
In this pamphlet, as in his previous one, Poole's comparison of the cost of goods 
carriage by railway company and by carrier unintentionally supported the carriers’ 
case. When describing a situation in which the cost a carrier charged to a customer 
was far in excess of what the railway company charged the carrier he mentioned that 
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the railway company’s charge to the carrier was 'Locomotive Power exclusive'; the 
fact that he left this charge to the carrier out of the comparison is significant because 
it was not limited by a railway company's enabling act, and was thus as high as the 
railway company chose to make it; it was therefore likely to have been a significant 
but unrecorded cost to the carrier.93 In addition, as James Shipton pointed out in his 
rebuttal to Poole's pamphlet, Poole also left out the railway company’s charges for 
collection and delivery, which were likely to have been similar to a carrier’s charges 
for the same services.94 
 
James Shipton, a Wolverhampton carrier, published a pamphlet later that year 
rebutting Poole's arguments. He pointed out that if Poole (and Booth before him) were 
arguing that carriers were reaping unearned profits on work done solely by railway 
companies, what advantage would a carrier have to 'divert' goods traffic to canals?95 
Shipton did not categorically deny the abuses Poole described in his second 
pamphlet, but pointed out that anyone, including employees of railway companies, 
might break the law, and that if they did so they would be punished.96 Furthermore, 
Shipton pointed out, unethical behaviour in the carrying trade was strongly 
discouraged by the nature of the economy within which carriers operated and the 
relationships between carriers and their customers.97  
 
Shipton argued that railway company officials had enough to do managing the line 
itself without getting involved in the routine operations of goods carriage, with which 
most had little or no experience. He suggested that they were not as well positioned 
to understand customers' requirements as ‘we who devote our energies and labour 
to that portion which comes within the sphere of each district, noting the changes and 
circumstances continually varying in the wishes and wants of those with whom we 
deal'.98 Shipton used company returns reported in the Midland Herald to compare the 
1844 revenues for the London & Birmingham company, which did not carry, and the 
Grand Junction company, which did. He pointed out that based on this information 
not only had the London & Birmingham company earned more than 50 per cent more 
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than the Grand Junction company on tolls and locomotive power fees for goods 
carriage, the actual net revenue for the Grand Junction company was even less than 
reported as the figure did not subtract the costs of operating and maintaining the 
company’s carrying department.99  
 
During the time these pamphlets were being published, carriers were still using, and 
fighting for their right to use, rail lines. The next round of published debate on the 
carrying question, however, began in November 1848, nearly 18 months after the 
amalgamation of the Grand Junction and London & Birmingham companies into the 
London & North Western Railway Company had eliminated the last major rail line 
open to carriers. John Whitehead, a banker and promoter of railway stock, and former 
secretary of the South Eastern Railway Company, published an open letter to George 
Carr Glyn, chairman of the London & North Western company, in which he asked a 
question pertinent to any shareholder - 'is all the...traffic carried at a profit?'100 He 
suggested, based on comparing the company's published returns to evidence from 
Select Committee hearings, that in the case of goods carriage the answer was no, 
and that '[a] considerable portion of the profits derived from passengers cannot fail to 
be absorbed by the losses which are incurred in the conveyance of goods.'101 
Whitehead pointed out that it was clear that passenger traffic was far more profitable 
than goods traffic; his calculations suggested that even third class passengers 
brought in five times more revenue per carriage than the highest class of goods.102 
Calculating cost and revenue per passenger, 'one First Class Passenger of true 
Aldermanic proportions, pays for the conveyance of his twelve stone weight more than 
is paid for the carriage of one ton and a third of goods'.103 He concluded that either 
passenger fares were far too high or goods rates were far too low; if the latter were 
the case, however, increasing goods rates would reduce the amount of traffic and 
thus the revenue obtainable from goods carriage.  
 
Whitehead also pointed out two additional advantages of passenger carriage 
compared to goods carriage - passengers paid before they rode, while collecting 
payment for goods transport was an additional cost to the company, and the company 
expended additional effort and took on additional responsibility to transport goods 
                                                 
99 Shipton, A Letter Addressed to Railway and Canal Directors, 16. 
100 John Whitehead, Railway Management. A Letter to George Carr Glyn (London: Smith, 
Elder, and Co., 1848), 4. 
101 Whitehead, Railway Management, 7. 
102 Whitehead, Railway Management, 8. 
103 Whitehead, Railway Management, 9. 
143 
 
 
(preparing waybills, ensuring goods were offloaded at the correct locations, 
understanding and implementing procedures for storing and handling various types 
of goods) while passengers required no more documentation than a ticket, and loaded 
and unloaded themselves. Furthermore, he pointed out, goods trains on the line 
slowed down passenger trains and precluded the company from operating more of 
these more profitable services. 
 
Whitehead provided financial analysis to support his position, though he 
acknowledged that it was difficult to prove either side of the carrying question 
conclusively because, although company revenues were published yearly, company 
costs were either uncollected or unavailable. Using the information he had, he 
concluded that the 'mutuality' of the London & Birmingham company's system of 
allowing carriers on the line was more profitable than the monopoly goods carriage 
system of the Grand Junction and London & North Western companies.104 Whitehead 
called for more accountability from company directors, suggesting that it would lead 
to more trust from shareholders, more investment, and ultimately more profit, as 
opposed to simply more revenue.105  
 
Whitehead's pamphlet provoked responses from those who supported railway 
company carrying. Mark Huish published his own letter to Glyn two weeks later, which 
began by suggesting that there was now no point in debating the carrying question 
further, as 'that matter is settled by the almost universal fiat of Railway Boards'.106 At 
this time Huish was the general manager of the London & North Western company; 
presumably he could have spoken directly with Glyn rather than addressing him in an 
open letter. Huish used the financial records of the London & North Western company 
between July 1847 and July 1848 to argue that since passenger revenue was higher 
than the total cost of operating the line the revenue obtained from goods carriage 
should be considered purely as additional profit.107 This argument is unconvincing for 
two reasons. First, as Huish did not have, or did not provide, information on the 
comparative cost of passenger and goods carriage he was unable to demonstrate 
that goods carriage cost the same as or less than passenger carriage (which, as 
Whitehead had argued, is unlikely); second, Huish's argument did not address 
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Whitehead’s point that diverting resources used for goods carrying to passenger 
carrying could generate even more revenue, and thus more profit. Huish attempted to 
undermine Whitehead's arguments by questioning his comparisons; Huish pointed 
out that passenger carriages were rarely completely full, that passenger trains 
generally had fewer carriages than goods trains, and that faster passenger trains were 
more expensive to operate than goods trains.108 However, as Whitehead pointed out, 
goods waggons were also rarely completely full, and Whitehead had already taken 
into account Huish's other two objections by calculating cost and revenue by carriage 
rather than by train and by comparing goods carriage to third class passenger 
services, which used the same locomotives and travelled at the same speeds. Even 
taking into account Huish's altered parameters, and even ignoring, as Huish did, the 
additional work involved in managing goods carriage as well as the additional 
infrastructure maintenance required to operate heavy goods trains, his own figures 
suggested that the net income per mile (which is difficult to determine from Huish's 
text, as he deducted 'terminal expenses' rather than total costs from his revenue 
figures) was still higher for passengers.109 Huish’s own figures indicated that in the 
first year the company began operating its own goods carrying service, 1847-1848, it 
made twice as much revenue from passengers and parcels as it did from goods and 
coal.110 
 
Whitehead responded two months later in a 'second letter to George Carr Glyn', in 
which he analysed Huish's figures, identifying several ways in which he considered 
them misleading. Whitehead suggested, for example, that the profit Huish assigned 
to goods carriage included the lucrative parcels trade, which railway companies had 
always carried, which was carried on both passenger and goods trains, and which 
had formerly been part of the coaching rather than carrying trade.111 He pointed out 
that Huish's figures assumed that goods travelled in full waggons while passengers 
only travelled in half-full carriages, and noted that the proportion of passenger classes 
Huish had used to calculate company costs was unrealistic. Whitehead's recalculation 
of Huish's figures reduced the cost of passenger service to between 20 per cent (all 
third class) and 50 per cent (first and second class) of Huish's estimate, which again 
suggested that passenger traffic provided a higher net income than goods traffic.112  
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Soon after Whitehead published his second letter, Peter Eckersley, controller of the 
Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Company, weighed in with a pamphlet supporting 
Huish's conclusions. Eckersley backed up his arguments with financial information 
from his own company, arguing that as in early 1847 the Lancashire & Yorkshire 
'became more completely their own carriers than they had previously been' financial 
returns for the company before and after that date provided a valid comparison of 
carrying policies.113 Although presumably Eckersley had access to detailed financial 
information for the company he worked for, he determined the profit from each type 
of traffic by dividing total revenue by total cost, which did not indicate how cost and 
revenue were allocated (for example, whether parcel traffic was included in the 
revenues for goods traffic).114 Like Huish, he stated that 'quantity is one of the great 
elements of success in railway traffic', and although he did not discuss carriers in any 
detail he claimed that railway company profitability was damaged by the 'ruinous 
competition' of carriers, a claim that, if it had ever been the case, by this time was 
certainly exaggerated.115 
 
The same year yet another open letter to Glyn was published by 'A Sufferer'. This 
person, having read both Huish's and Whitehead's letters, provided additional 
arguments to support Whitehead's position. He pointed out that Huish's argument that 
if passenger profits were greater than company expenses then goods carrying must 
be operating at a profit neglected the significant and continuing capital outlay for both 
rolling stock and infrastructure to support goods carrying.116 He argued that the role 
of carriers in goods transport on railway lines was 'from the multiplicity of its details, 
and its dependence on minutiae, particularly suitable for the display of individual 
exertion and individual economy', and 'quite unsuitable to the energies of a leviathan 
concern' like a railway company.117 He suggested that railway companies would make 
more profit from supporting carriers, in the same way that a wholesale importer 
benefits from the activities of retail grocers without taking on their role.118 
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In this series of pamphlets John Whitehead had the last word, publishing a third open 
letter in February 1849, two months after those of Huish and 'A Sufferer'. He pointed 
out that it had been within Huish's power, as general manager of the London & North 
Western company, to disprove Whitehead's arguments with actual statistics, but he 
had not done so. Whitehead again used the information available to him to build a 
case against the profitability of railway company carrying, including the testimony of 
witnesses at an 1846 Select Committee hearing, the published accounts of the 
London & North Western company and the three companies it had been formed from, 
Huish's February 1848 report to the London & North Western company's directors, 
and the report of the line's Resident Engineer to a committee of shareholders.119 He 
noted that the London & North Western company had reduced goods carriage rates 
after the amalgamation, despite taking on the substantial additional work and expense 
of running a larger goods carrying department.120 He determined the company's total 
costs and revenues of passenger and goods transport for the year 1848; a simple 
calculation indicated that although the company's gross revenue had increased 
substantially, the revenue for the same traffic per mile was lower, and costs higher, 
after the company became the sole carrier on its line.121 He claimed that dividends to 
the shareholders of the London & North Western company, which carried on its line, 
were substantially lower than they had been for shareholders of the London & 
Birmingham company, which had not.122  
 
My assessment of the arguments in each of these pamphlets suggests that 
Whitehead had the strongest command of the facts, and the clearest evidence that 
railway companies were constraining their financial performance by taking on the 
work of the carrying trade. Whitehead seemed principally concerned with the value of 
investments in railway companies; neither he nor the others participating in this 
debate seemed interested in the long-term profitability of the rail network or railway 
companies, or the effect of companies’ carrying policies on the wider economy. As a 
banker and investor, Whitehead seemed more clearly focused than the other 
participants, most of whom were involved in operating railway companies, on the idea 
that companies should be as profitable as possible for investors. He had no personal 
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investment in the management of a railway company, and thus no reputation to lose 
from having been mistaken about decisions affecting its profitability.  
 
It does not appear that the intended recipient of Whitehead’s advice was swayed by 
it. At the London & North Western Railway Company’s half-yearly meeting in February 
1849 George Carr Glyn claimed that the company had  
repeatedly warned the carrying interest, that unless they saw fit to give the 
public the benefit of our low tolls, and not add to these low tolls by their heavy 
‘delivery’ charges, we should be obliged to follow the system which, I believe, 
all other companies in the kingdom had followed, of becoming carriers for 
ourselves.123  
 
He went on to read a statement that, contrary to what Whitehead had argued, ‘the 
Company having become carriers on their own account had been beneficial both to 
their own interests and to the public.’124 It was Booth's, Poole's and Huish's position, 
that railway companies, and railway companies alone, should carry goods on the 
railways, that ultimately prevailed. In the next section I will discuss how the ‘closed’ 
policy of the Grand Junction Railway Company became universally adopted over the 
entire railway network; I will conclude this chapter with an analysis of how this change 
in railway company policy affected goods carriage in England. 
 
The change in railway company carrying policy, 1840-1850 
During the 1840s the policies of the Grand Junction Railway Company, and the 
arguments of Captain Huish, began to be accepted by both railway company 
managers and by investors. For example, in 1844 Liverpool businessmen investing in 
the new Dover Railway Company insisted on the company being an exclusive carrier 
on its line, though there is some indication in the newspaper account of a ‘stormy 
meeting’ and requests for ‘peace and conciliation’ that this decision was not 
unopposed: 
The determined stand made by the Liverpool proprietors on the question of 
the goods traffic cannot…be compromised…it is quite certain that the point of 
the railway becoming its own carrier is a sine qua non with the northern 
gentlemen. The shareholders, and the public in general, may be assured, that 
this point is unalterably settled.125 
 
The same year it was reported that several railways ‘have resolved henceforth to 
become carriers, or...“to labour for themselves”…These lines...have...resolved on 
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making no allowance whatever for carriers, but to be carriers themselves, and to give 
the public every possible facility.’126  
 
Some railway company officials took a stand against monopoly railway company 
carrying. Constantine Richard Moorsom resigned as chairman of the board of 
directors of the Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Company over the carrying 
question. He had acted as secretary of the London & Birmingham Railway Company, 
which supported the carrying trade, and became a director of the company in 1839; 
he became chairman of the board of directors of the Birmingham & Gloucester 
Railway Company in 1841.127 In December 1843 he resigned his position as ‘a 
majority of the directors [had] declared in favour of the company becoming extensive 
carriers themselves instead of depending so largely as at present upon the revenue 
paid them by private carriers.’128 Moorsom reportedly considered the board’s decision 
a 'breach of faith committed against the carriers', though the report stating Moorsom’s 
opinion argued that the company’s agreements with its carriers terminated on 1 
January 1844, before the company began its own carrying services on 1 February.129 
Moorsom seemed to have reconsidered his position on carrying, however, as he 
became a director of the London & North Western Railway Company, which 
supported railway company monopoly carrying, on its formation in 1846.130 When the 
carrying question was raised at a general meeting of the Midland Railway Company 
in 1847, ‘when all the railway companies were becoming their own carriers, it would 
be for the interest of the Midland Company to be so too’, George Hudson, the 
chairman of the company, disagreed, stating that ‘[h]e would be no party to excluding 
the carriers from the line.’ He went on to say, however, that ‘carrying was gradually 
coming into the hands of the company, in an ordinary way, which he conceived was 
much better than for them to attempt to crush everybody around them.'131 Hudson 
continued to object to railway company monopoly carrying, as I will mention later in 
my discussion of the effects of the Railway Clearing House in standardising railway 
company policy on carrying. 
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The carrying question can be considered to have been effectively settled in 1846, 
when the Grand Junction, London & Birmingham, and Manchester & Birmingham 
Railway Companies were amalgamated into the London & North Western Railway 
Company, creating a 350-mile long network under the management of Mark Huish. 
The London & Birmingham company's policy of supporting carriers was subsumed 
into the Grand Junction company's monopoly goods carriage policy. By 1849 this 
business model prevailed among railway companies; at a meeting of the London & 
South Western Railway Company a speaker stated that ‘[i]t was generally admitted 
that it was the policy of railway companies to become their own carriers of goods 
(hear, hear), and he thought the interests of the South-Western Company were much 
injured by the adoption of the “mixed system” on that line.’132  
 
Railway companies excluded carriers from their lines in several ways. First, they 
attempted to reduce the economic viability of carriers using their lines. The techniques 
canal and navigation companies used to disadvantage competing carriers, which I 
described in chapter 1 - charging them tolls while not charging their own company, 
restricting access to docks, wharfs and warehouses, and giving their own boats 
priority access to locks - were similar to some of the techniques later used by railway 
companies. In addition, as I will describe in more detail in chapter 5, in my review of 
the many lawsuits carriers brought against railway companies, railway companies 
also undermined carriers’ business by imposing higher or additional charges and 
delaying or misdirecting consignments.  
 
Second, railway companies both directly and indirectly co-opted carriers into their own 
business. Many railway companies directly hired carriers to manage their goods 
traffic. Braithwaite Poole, the Grand Junction Railway Company’s goods agent in 
Liverpool and later the general goods manager of the London & North Western 
Railway Company, had previously worked for the carrier Crowley and Co.133 The 
London & Birmingham company hired Andrew Comber, Pickfords’ Liverpool agent, 
paying him twice his former salary and providing him with free housing.134 City 
business directories and newspaper advertisements often identify men formerly listed 
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as carriers as agents of railway companies. For example, in Bath’s 1854 business 
directory John Tanner was identified as the Great Western Railway’s agent. He had 
been listed as a road carrier in Bath as early as 1826.135 In Manchester’s 1853 
business directory three of the seven railway agents listed had previously been listed 
as road carriers.136  
 
As early as the mid-1840s local carriers had begun to describe themselves as ‘railway 
carriers’. Hunts carriers, for example, based at the Castle and Falcon pub in Sheffield, 
carried goods for the London & Birmingham Railway Company in 1844; 'he sent carts 
and vans about town with goods coming from the country to the station'.137 A few 
regional carriers also signed contracts with railway companies to act as their agents. 
In July 1847 the London & North Western Railway Company signed agency 
agreements with Pickfords and with Chaplin & Horne, in which the company paid the 
carriers a percentage commission, service charges, salaries and bonuses, and gave 
them exclusive access to goods yards and other facilities, in return for picking up and 
delivering goods to and from London & North Western Railway stations.138 Pickfords' 
internal correspondence suggests that its directors agreed to the company's terms 
partly out of concern that if they declined to become its agents the company might 
have enough influence to limit Pickfords' long distance operations, reducing them to 
'mere London Carters'.139 Records of negotiations over Pickfords' contract suggest 
that it also served as a non-competition agreement; the contract obliged Pickfords to 
'use every occasion to transfer their present Canal and Road business to the London 
and North Western Railway all goods destined for places on or beyond the line', to 
'use their best endeavours to prevent Goods being switched to other routes', and to 
inform the company if they became aware that another railway or carrier was 
attempting to undercut them.140 It had apparently not been clear at the time whether 
this agreement was meant to be exclusive; Pickfords seems to have initially 
considered it simply a formal agreement with a new customer, while they maintained 
their existing customers on canals and other railways, while the London & North 
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Western company considered it essentially an employment contract which gave the 
company the right to control Pickfords’ business activities. By 1850 the latter was 
understood by both parties, although both Pickfords and Chaplin & Horne later signed 
a similar agreement with the Midland Railway Company and several others.141  
 
Finally, railway companies simply refused carriers access to their lines. Starting in the 
mid 1840s, several railway companies that had operated their own carrying services 
alongside carriers began to announce that they would no longer transport other 
carriers' goods, and proceeded to take action against carriers using their lines.142 John 
Sutcliffe Pixton, Manchester agent for Kenworthy & Co., testified to the Select 
Committee on Railway and Canal Bills in 1852 that his firm and others had been 
driven off the railways by companies' ‘systematic plan of bad treatment’, including 
increasing existing charges and imposing new ones, failing to maintain the 
infrastructure, and hiring away key staff members.143 Although Pixton believed some 
of the company’s tactics were illegal, '[t]he North Western Railway company being 
such a powerful company, we thought there was only one course for us to adopt, and 
that was to abandon the trade.’144  
 
As a result of both competition from railway company carriers and railway company 
policies and actions to drive them out of business, most regional carriers stopped 
service during the 1840s, greatly reducing the size, scope and significance of this 
sector of the carrying trade. The effect of railway company carrying on local carriers 
was less obvious. Railways could not connect every population centre, so there 
continued to be a role for local carriers transporting goods between stations and 
surrounding areas, and to and from places not served by railways. The number of 
local carriers did not appreciably decline after a population centre was connected to 
the railway network; in fact, based on a quantitative analysis of business directories, 
Alan Everitt suggests that the number of local carriers grew during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.145 
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The effect of railway company policy on goods carriage 
In this section I identify the effects of the change in railway company goods carriage 
policy, and the subsequent reorganisation of the carrying trade, in city business 
directory listings and in occupational information from the census and other 
demographic records. My analysis of business directories published in four cities 
between 1816 and 1853 shows a decrease in the number of London and provincial 
carriers as well as a change from competing independent carriers on regional routes 
to one or two carriers acting as agents for railway companies. My analysis of 
demographic information from the 1841 and 1851 census and from sources providing 
occupational information for earlier periods suggests that the number of people 
employed in the carrying trade dropped between the 1820s and the 1840s, with a 
slight increase between 1841 and 1851.  
 
As well as providing useful information for tourists and newcomers, city business 
directories helped local businesses and individuals obtain the goods and services 
they required by listing the names and locations of providers of these goods and 
services. Scholars have used business directories to construct various types of local 
history, and as evidence for changes in urban geography, types and sizes of 
businesses, employment patterns, and for the histories of specific trades and 
businesses. Scholars have also used these directories to study the carrying trade; 
Neil Raven, Jon Stobart, and Alan Everitt have used listings in business directories to 
determine the number of carriers serving various destinations.146 In this section I use 
business directories in a similar way, to explore how the introduction of rail service 
affected the number and types of carriers doing business in four urban areas. 
 
I reviewed business directories from Bath, Leeds, Leicester, and Manchester to 
assess the effect of the development of the national railway network on the carrying 
trade in these cities. I chose these cities because largely-complete runs of business 
directories for them are available between about 1830 and about 1855. They 
represent four different regions of the country (southwest, north, Midlands, and 
northwest) with different timings, levels and types of rail and other transport service; 
while this does not guarantee that the patterns I describe in these four cities were 
repeated elsewhere, their diversity suggests that any patterns common to most or all 
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of them are likely to be replicated elsewhere, and any variable that appears to affect 
change over time (like quality and directness of railway service) would affect other 
cities in a similar way. While it is not certain that directories identify all relevant 
businesses, or identify them correctly, it is unlikely that some are appreciably different 
than others in this respect so using them to understand change over time should not 
pose significant problems of interpretation or comparison. As I will describe below, 
directories format information about carriers in different ways, and these formats 
change over time, so it is not usually possible to compare listings directly. However, 
directories can be used to get a general sense of how the carrying trade changed, 
particularly as the distinction between London and regional carriers and local carriers, 
however they are referred to, seems to be consistent among directories in different 
places and times. 
 
Keenes’ Bath Directory for 1829 listed 13 regional carriers by name; these and others 
not named served 27 routes, including four daily waggons (and two fly boats) to 
London. The directory also listed seventy local carriers connecting Bath with the 
surrounding area.147 The 1833 and 1837 business directories listed carriers by 
destination rather than by business owner, but the number of local and regional 
listings in the directories for these years appears not to have changed appreciably 
since 1829.148 Listings for carriers in Bath began to change with the introduction of rail 
service. The Great Western Railway began service between Bath and Bristol in 
August 1840, and service to London after the completion of the Box Tunnel between 
Bath and Chippenham in June 1841. Immediately after the line opened between Bath 
and London, the number of London carriers began to decrease and the nature of 
London carrying changed. The 1841 Bath business directory listed only nine regional 
carriers, three carrying to London; one, C. & J. Tanner, advertised that they carried 
goods to London in one day ‘in conjunction with the Great Western Railway’.149 By 
1846 the Great Western Railway Company was listed as a carrier, and the directory 
mentioned that four other carriers, Bennett, Parker, Pickford and Tanner, 'convey 
goods by the railway.'150 By 1850 the city directory listed five regional and London 
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carriers, but included the warning, 'Parcels, Goods, etc. are subjected to delay and 
overcharges unless booked at the Company’s Stations, or by their appointed 
Agents.'151 In 1852 the directory listed four of the same five carriers but referred to 
them as 'carriers by rail', with no warning about bookings. By this time the pattern of 
carrying by rail through carriers acting as agents for the Great Western Railway 
Company was established; the company's Bath agent was identified as John Tanner, 
who had previously appeared in the directory as a road carrier.152 One major carrier 
who disappeared from the public record during this period was Edward Mitchell, listed 
in the Bath business directories of 1829, 1833 and 1837 as offering daily service 
between London, Bath and Bristol.153 The Great Western Railway Company opened 
its line between Bath and London in 1841; in June 1842 Mitchell's property at Saw 
Close, large enough to stable 60 horses, was up for auction, and Mitchell disappears 
from subsequent directories.154 Local carriers seem to have declined in importance 
once the railway arrived. While 60 were still listed in the 1841 directory, by 1852 they 
were no longer listed as separate businesses; instead they appeared as a subsidiary 
service to the railway companies, which had taken on the entire task of organising 
goods carriage.155 In summary, with the opening of a rail connection between Bath 
and London the number of regional carriers in the directory dropped from 13 to five 
(all carrying on the railway) in 11 years. While the number of local carriers may not 
have changed during this period, their services came under the management of the 
Great Western Railway Company. 
 
The business directory listings in Leeds show a similar pattern. The 1826 directory 
listed 41 regional road carriers based at 12 locations around the city, and 126 local 
carriers.156 In the 1834 directory the inland waterway carrier listings covered two 
pages; the list of regional road carriers remained largely unchanged, and 130 local 
carriers were listed.157 Rail service to Leeds began in 1834 with the opening of the 
Leeds & Selby Railway; by 1840 the North Midland Railway offered services between 
Leeds and Derby. The section on carrying in the next available Leeds business 
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directory, published in 1842, began with two paragraphs about ‘Railway Conveyance’, 
describing services available from the Leeds & Selby and North Midland stations. 
Thirteen independent carriers, as well as the Leeds & Selby Railway Company, were 
listed as regional carriers; six of these still offered regional waggon service and three 
offered fly boat or steamship service. Local carriers, referred to in this directory as 
'carriers from the Inns', based in 46 inns in the town, were listed separately. 
‘Conveyance by water’ was still offered by the Aire & Calder Navigation Company and 
13 independent carriers.158 In the 1847 directory the section listing carriers began with 
the following notice: 'As the Railway Companies intend monopolising the Carrying 
Business on their respective lines, after Midsummer, 1847, the following brief notice 
of the Carriers who now serve the Leeds public will suffice.' All but two of the 14 
carriers listed below the notice (12 carrying firms and two railway companies) were 
described as having 'Bays at the Midland Station'. Of the remaining two carriers, one, 
E. Cockerham & Co., operated waggons, and the other, Joseph Fletcher, sent goods 
by 'Rails and Schooners'. Inland waterway carriers still operated on the Aire & Calder 
Navigation and the Leeds & Liverpool Canal, though their listings only took up half a 
page.159 In summary, eight years after the introduction of railway service to Leeds the 
number of regional carriers serving Leeds had dropped from 41 to 13; within 13 years 
that number had reduced to two, and the number of canal carriers had dropped to one 
quarter of its previous number. 
 
In contrast to Bath and Leeds, Leicester’s business directories suggest that regional 
carriers continued to operate in the city even after the introduction of rail services. In 
Leicester’s 1815 business directory Pickfords offered daily waggons to London and 
Manchester as well as daily boats to London and less frequent boat service to other 
regional destinations. Deacon, Harrison & Co. offered a boat to London three days a 
week, and three other carriers offered boats to other destinations. The directory also 
listed about 145 carriers serving 113 local destinations.160 Although Leicester is said 
to be the site of the third oldest railway station in the country, opened in 1832 to deliver 
coal to the city via the Leicester & Swannington Railway, mainline rail service began 
with the initiation of Midland Counties Railway service to Rugby, Derby and 
Nottingham in 1840. The next available directory for Leicester, published in 1843, 
listed ten regional carriers carrying by railway, inland waterway and waggon. The 
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number of local carriers listed had increased to about 270, carrying to 175 
destinations.161 By 1853, however, Leicester’s listings resembled those of Bath and 
Leeds - more than four pages of local carriers, inland waterway services from two 
canal companies and one carrying firm, and two regional carriers offering services by 
railway - Chaplin & Horne, acting as agents for the Midland Railway Company, and 
Pickfords offering their own service.162 In summary, although the decline in carrying 
service did not occur as quickly after the introduction of rail service in Leicester as it 
did in Leeds and Bath, within ten years the number of regional carriers had dropped 
from ten to two, and the number of inland waterway carriers from five to three. Only 
one of the regional and one of the inland waterway carriers were not connected to a 
canal or railway company. The delayed response may be due to the type of railway 
service introduced in Leicester - Bath and Leeds were both directly connected to 
London, while Leicester was on a branch line connecting it to other provincial cities. 
 
Manchester's 1821 business directory included 106 local and provincial carriers; 
although only two road carriers serving London appeared in the directory, 31 carriers 
served London via Manchester’s extensive canal network.163 Manchester was one of 
the first cities in England to obtain rail service, to Liverpool in 1830, but it was not 
connected to London, via Birmingham, until 1842. Manchester's 1841 directory listed 
an additional road carrier to London, carrying ‘by railway and canal’, and 48 carriers 
serving London via inland waterways. The 1841 directory no longer listed carrying 
services by carrier, but rather in four pages of destinations, some of which, by this 
time, were listed as served ‘by railway’. As with the removal of local carriers' names 
from the Bath directory, this change in listing format suggests that senders of goods 
could assume that any arrangements required to send something to a given 
destination would be made by the carrier or railway company rather than negotiated 
between senders and receivers as I described in chapter 2.164 The 1853 Manchester 
directory started with a list of seven railway companies, three of which had local 
agents, all of whom had been listed in earlier directories as road carriers. A 
subsequent section listed the railway line or lines carrying to various destinations. In 
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this edition the number of inland waterway carriers had also dropped, from 48 to 26.165 
It is likely that, like Leicester, the change in Manchester's carrying services was less 
immediate than that in Bath and Leeds, not, as for Leicester, because of the city’s 
indirect rail connections but rather because of the lengthier process of establishing 
rail links. In the 12 years after Manchester and London were connected by rail the 
number of carriers actually increased by four road carriers and four railway carriers, 
though the number of inland waterway carriers dropped by nearly half. 
 
Analysis of the change over time in the number of goods transport services in 
business directories for these four cities suggests that the opening of rail lines affected 
the carrying trade in two ways. First, the number of regional and London carriers 
dropped, and in some cases regional and London carriers began to send goods on 
rail lines as well as canals and roads, or act as railway company agents. This effect 
seems to have been mitigated by the type of rail service provided to each city; indirect 
service, as in Leicester, had a less immediate effect, and in Manchester the number 
of railway carriers actually increased while the number of inland waterway carriers 
decreased. Second, although it does not appear that the number of local carriers 
generally decreased significantly, local carrying became subsumed into overall goods 
carrying; local carriers were no longer listed as independent businesses, but rather 
as components of a goods carrying network managed by railway companies.  
 
It is also possible to obtain some idea of the change over time in the organisation of 
the carrying trade by analysing the change in occupational numbers that can be 
determined from available demographic information. Parliament authorised the first 
census of Great Britain in 1800; it was taken the following year, and every decade 
since then. Until the 1841 census, however, the only occupational information 
collected was to determine whether respondents worked in agriculture, 'Trade, 
Manufactures or Handicraft', or other, which is not enough to determine the number 
of people working in the carrying trade.166 It is possible, however, to get some idea of 
occupational numbers before 1841 by extrapolating from other available information. 
After 1812 the law required the father’s occupation to be recorded in Anglican baptism 
registers; Leigh Shaw-Taylor has used this and other more fragmentary evidence to 
assess the occupational structure of Britain between the medieval period and the 
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twentieth century. Shaw-Taylor uses this evidence to reconsider the periodisation of 
the Industrial Revolution by comparing the proportions of men working in the primary 
(agricultural) and secondary (manufacturing) sectors in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. He suggests that transport, the largest component of the tertiary (service) 
sector, accounted for half of all growth in this sector between 1750 and 1850.167 In 
another paper, he notes that 6.2 per cent of men over 20 working in 1817 in England 
and Wales were working in the transport and communications sector, although a more 
detailed analysis later in the same paper suggests that the total number involved in 
the carrying trade, considering that a fraction of those listed as working in ‘sea 
transport’ were involved in the domestic carrying trade, may have been closer to 
3.5%.168  
 
However, it is difficult to relate what Shaw-Taylor includes in the tertiary sector, or the 
transport component of it, to the number of people working in the carrying trade, as 
the numbers Shaw-Taylor uses also include men working in international and 
passenger transport. Of the 155,526 men listed as working in transport in 1817, 
58,771, or nearly 40 per cent, were listed as working in sea transport or 
communication; in addition, of the remaining number some percentage would have 
been working in the passenger rather than goods transport sector, so perhaps half 
the remaining number, or about 50,000, could be counted as working in the carrying 
trade. In addition, the number of men working in the carrying trade may be obscured 
by the increasingly large number of men working for railway companies, or in work 
related to railways, during the latter part of the period Shaw-Taylor analyses. In 1848 
188,000 men were employed in railway construction alone; by 1851 railway 
companies were employing 100,000 people in various roles from building and 
maintaining the infrastructure and rolling stock to serving customers to managing 
railway operations and performing such ancillary work as legal, financial, advertising, 
and personnel management.169  
 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, many women worked in the carrying trade, with husbands 
and children as part of a family business or on their own as widows or single women. 
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Because Shaw-Taylor’s information only includes occupational information about 
men, these women are not included in Shaw-Taylor’s figures. Because women also 
worked in the primary and secondary sectors of the economy, it is difficult to determine 
how much Shaw-Taylor’s percentages would change if women were counted; 
however, as almost no women worked in the railway sector before 1851, and very few 
worked in it after that year (I will discuss this issue and its implications in my 
conclusion), the percentage of people working in the tertiary sector would likely be 
much lower compared to the primary and secondary sectors if women were included 
in the occupational figures. 
 
Although the evidence informing Shaw-Taylor’s analysis of the occupational structure 
of Britain cannot tell us about the carrying trade directly, some of the sources he used 
can provide us with a better understanding of the number of people in the carrying 
trade. Using Shaw-Taylor's tabulated occupational information from the Anglican 
baptism registers for five counties, selected to match five of the regions used in the 
census, my calculations suggest that between 1813 and 1820 about two per cent of 
the male population worked in the carrying trade.170 In my count I included men listed 
as bargeman and boatman but not mariner, sailor, or seaman, as I assumed that the 
majority of these would have served in the Navy or on seagoing vessels, though some 
of these should be included in the carrying trade if they worked in coastal or inland 
waterway shipping. I also did not include 'lighterman' or 'waterman', partly because 
these occupational titles are ambiguous and partly because the vast majority of these 
men would have worked on passenger boats. As I mentioned, Shaw-Taylor’s counts 
from Anglican baptism registers do not include women; they also do not include non-
Anglican men, or men without children born in the parish. Although these assumptions 
and exclusions make it impossible to determine the actual number of people 
employed in the carrying trade, it is unlikely that knowing this information more 
precisely would significantly affect the percentage of people in the carrying trade 
compared to other occupations.  
 
I compared Shaw-Taylor’s figures with the numbers of men listed in the 1841 and 
1851 Census of Great Britain occupational tables to attempt to determine if or how 
the number of men working in the carrying trade changed between 1813-1820 and 
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1851. In order to compare like with like, I have used only the male figures in the census 
tables. As the number of men working in transportation rose at a higher rate during 
the period of the census than the number of women, due to a surge of male-only 
employment on railways, I have attempted to separate out railway workers from those 
in the carrying trade so this change in gender balance should not substantially affect 
the numbers I use for the carrying trade.  
 
Extracting evidence from the census tables about the carrying trade in particular 
requires the same caveats and assumptions as those I used to determine numbers 
from the baptism registers. The 1841 census lists 'porter, messenger and errand boy' 
as a single occupation, which I have included in the count of men working in the 
carrying trade. To offset the additional workers this may have led me to include, I did 
not include any of the seafaring occupations I mentioned above. In addition, many 
respondents may have given census takers their primary occupation without 
mentioning carrying as a secondary occupation. Thus the census figures, like those 
from the baptism registers, likely underestimate the number of men in the carrying 
trade.  
 
The censuses divided England and Wales into 11 regions, breaking down occupation 
figures regionally and, within the regions, into major urban areas. The baptismal 
records data do not include counties in each of these regions, but I have paired up 
counties in regions where I have information in both data sets, to compare the 
percentage of men working in the carrying trade. The table below compares the 
percentage of men (those listed as fathers in the baptism registers, and those listed 
as 20 years old or older in the census) engaged in occupations related to the carrying 
trade from 1813-1821 to 1851. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of men in the carrying trade, 1813-1851 
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County Percentage from baptism 
records, 1813-1820 
Percentage from 
1841 census 
Percentage from 
1851 census 
Cornwall 1.5 0.9 1.1 
Durham 2.6 2.1 1.8 
Lancashire 2.3 1.6 2.8 
Leicestershire 1.7 1.3 1.5 
Oxfordshire 1.7 0.6 1.0 
Source: ‘1841 Census of Great Britain, Occupations’, A Vision of Britain Through 
Time, accessed 14 September 2018, http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/census/table/ 
GB1841OCC_M[1]; Great Britain, Census Office, Census of Great Britain, 1851 
(London: William Clowes and Sons, 1852), ccxli-ccxlvii. For baptism records see 
above. 
 
These figures show a slight reduction in the percentage of men working in the carrying 
trade between 1813-1820 and 1851 (except in Lancashire), resulting from a more 
significant decline between 1813-1820 and 1841 followed by an increase (except in 
Durham). The increase in the percentage of men working in goods transport coincides 
with the phasing out of the carrying trade; however, it is possible than a large increase 
in the number of men working in the rail sector offset a decrease in the number of 
carriers. As I described in chapter 1, the carrying trade included a significantly higher 
proportion of women than the railway sector, and there is no reason to think more 
women remained in the carrying trade than men; therefore the overall percentage of 
the population in the carrying trade, as opposed to the percentage of men only, would 
have decreased far more, and not increased as a result of increased numbers of those 
employed in the rail sector. 
 
It is also possible to compare the male and female occupational data from the 1841 
and 1851 censuses. The 1841 census lists a total of 6,908,157 male and female 
workers; 59,538 of these, or about 0.9 per cent, had occupations directly involved in 
the carrying trade, and 2,491 worked on railways (including both passenger and 
goods transport, construction, and other railway company work).171 The 1851 census 
lists a total of 8,602,989 male and female workers; 79,469 of these, or 0.9 per cent, 
are listed as working in road or inland waterway carrying, and 54,216 as working on 
railways. This gross comparison suggests no significant change in the percentage of 
people working in the carrying trade between 1841 and 1851, though the actual 
number of people increased. The percentage of people involved in goods transport, 
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about 2%, is about the same as the figure I derived from Shaw-Taylor’s data 
(assuming a similar number of men and women working in the non-railway goods 
carriage sector who were not recorded in the earlier data), although nearly half of 
these people were working on railways by 1851. This suggests a reduction in those 
working in the carrying trade of about half between the 1820s and the 1850s. Although 
the reorganisation of the sector makes it difficult to tell from business directory listings, 
the number of carriers listed during this period did decrease, and the larger carrying 
firms, which employed multiple people, all but disappeared.  
 
As I have mentioned, it is difficult to determine, either from Shaw-Taylor’s data or the 
1841 and 1851 census, how many women worked in the carrying trade, and what 
percentage of those working in the carrying trade were women. In the census tables 
nearly two thirds of women not categorised in nonworking roles (such as student or 
prisoner) are listed as 'wife' or 'wife of'; it is likely that most of the women so listed 
were involved in the occupations of their husbands. In addition to the women carriers 
I mentioned in chapter 1, women were also identified in contemporary records in other 
parts of the carrying trade, as wharfingers, ship administrators, ship owners, and 
innkeepers.172  
 
My attempt to determine whether the number of people working in the carrying trade 
changed between 1813 and 1851, using census and other demographic data, is 
inconclusive, as the information is fragmentary and numbers are not sufficiently 
disaggregated to allow comparisons without making assumptions. As I could only 
compare the figures for men from the earlier period, and the number of men in the 
transport sector increased substantially with the growth of the railway network after 
about 1825, when the first mainline railways began construction, it is likely despite my 
assumptions and exclusions that the figures I have provided hide some reduction in 
the number of people working in the carrying trade between 1813 and 1841. Using 
the census to compare the number of both male and female workers in the carrying 
trade I found no decline in the percentage between 1841 and 1851. 
 
In this section I analysed two sources of quantitative evidence - business directory 
listings and occupational data - to identify changes in the organisational structure and 
occupational footprint of the carrying trade before and after the development of the 
national railway network. I used representative samples from different geographic and 
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economic regions for each source to get a sense of both similarities and differences 
in regional experience. The directories provide clear evidence of organisational 
change in the carrying trade as urban areas were connected to the railway network; 
the number of regional carriers appears to have decreased to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on the quality of the railway connection provided. With respect to 
occupational data, the majority of regions showed a decrease in the number of men 
working in the carrying trade between the 1810s and 1841, and a slight increase 
between 1841 and 1851, though it is possible that the increase might be due to an 
increase in the number of men working in the railway sector. This interpretation, 
however, is heavily based on assumptions and is less conclusive. 
 
Collective action by railway companies 
As the businesses, large and small, that comprised the carrying trade were 
incorporated into or taken under the control of railway companies, railway companies 
themselves began to combine into collective organisations, both directly through 
amalgamations and indirectly through participation in coordinating bodies such as the 
Railway Clearing House. These collective structures enabled railway companies to 
act as a single industry to control the goods transport market, and increased the 
influence of railway companies in government and in the economy.173 Amalgamation 
and collective action reinforced the monopoly goods carrying model, as the 
companies using this model absorbed companies that used other models and 
exercised their influence over the entire industry through collective organisations. 
 
The first mainline railway companies were formed to construct and operate lines 
between city pairs; most of these were relatively short, though some companies, like 
the London & Birmingham and the Great Western, constructed lines more than 100 
miles long. Starting in the mid-1840s, however, railway companies began to 
amalgamate into larger groupings. In 1844 the North Midland, Midland Counties and 
Birmingham & Derby Railway Companies joined to become the Midland Railway 
Company. In 1846 20 companies amalgamated into larger businesses, including the 
London & York Company and Direct Northern Railway Companies which merged into 
the Great Northern Railway Company.174 The Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire 
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Railway Company was formed from several smaller companies in 1847. Railway 
company amalgamations led to a reduction in the variety of goods carrying business 
models. For example, the amalgamation of the Grand Junction Railway Company, 
which operated a monopoly carrying service, and the London & Birmingham Railway 
Company, which did not carry, led to the latter business model being abandoned when 
the two lines became part of the London & North Western Railway Company in 1847. 
 
Philip S. Bagwell’s 1968 study is the only book about the Railway Clearing House, 
founded in 1842 to coordinate proportionate payment for journeys that involved more 
than one company, to facilitate the transfer of passengers and goods, and to 'protect 
the interests of the respective Companies'.175 Bagwell is interested in the relationships 
among the companies and in the Clearing House’s role in standardising railway 
operations and consolidating dozens of private companies into a unified railway 
network. In addition to these activities, however, my analysis of the minutes of the 
Railway Clearing House during its formative years, between October 1842 and 
September 1853, suggests that it also played a role in railway companies’ unanimous 
adoption of the monopoly goods carrying business model during the 1840s. 
 
In 1842 the Railway Clearing House consisted of the London & Birmingham Railway 
Company, which had set up the organisation, and eight smaller adjacent companies. 
By 1845 nine more companies, including the Grand Junction, had joined, and 
companies controlling more than half of Britain's railway mileage were participating in 
the system, formalised through the Railway Clearing Act of 1850.176 Companies 
participating in the Railway Clearing House were required to systematise and 
synchronise their accounting practices and pricing schedules to allow for easy and 
equitable transfers of funds. Clearing House staff, whose salaries were paid out of 
membership dues, managed accounting and funds transfer and performed such tasks 
as inspecting rolling stock to ensure that it met the standards the participating 
companies had agreed to.177 Many of the tasks undertaken by the Clearing House and 
its participant companies, such as full financial audits, served to forestall government 
intervention in company affairs, and to keep inter-company disputes out of the legal 
system.178 The Railway Clearing House also looked after the companies' collective 
interests by reviewing new railway bills, to attempt to reduce any potential competition 
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between existing companies and proposed lines.179 The Railway Clearing House also 
took steps to discourage competition between companies through undercutting prices 
or offering additional services; the proposal of an unnamed company to offer road 
service outside its jurisdiction, for example, was rejected as it might 'stimulate 
competition' with other lines.180 
 
Bagwell writes that at the Railway Clearing House’s first goods managers’ conference 
some delegates ‘persuaded the members of the conference to agree to the policy of 
the railway companies becoming exclusive carriers of goods on their own networks, 
a decision which in most cases substantially reduced the cost of carriage’.181 The 
minutes of this and subsequent meetings, however, suggest a more complex story. 
At the first conference, held in January 1847, the delegates of eight companies agreed 
to recommend to their boards of directors that 'the said Railway Companies should 
Carry on their own Account, & in connexion with each other.'182 In April the group 
appeared to suggest that any company that did not request ‘all their Subordinate 
Carriers’ to give up all property associated with railway carrying would not be allowed 
to enter into cooperative agreements for arranging through transfer of goods.183 At a 
meeting in June of that year, George Hudson, representing the Midland Railway 
Company, objected to this agreement as he believed his company would make less 
profit operating its own exclusive carrying service than it would by working with 
carriers.184 No further decision or action with respect to Hudson is recorded in the 
minutes, although the topic of railway company carrying was discussed ‘at great 
length’ again on 20 July and the Midland Railway Company did agree to become 
monopoly carriers.185 Thus it appears that collective 'peer pressure' of the Railway 
Clearing House compelled companies to establish their own carrying businesses and 
to exclude carriers from their lines, even if individual company managers objected that 
this course of action would reduce profits.  
 
When considering the actions of the Railway Clearing House, Bagwell focuses on the 
economic interest of the companies involved as perceived by their representatives. 
He, like the other transport and economic historians whose work I have analysed in 
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this study, generally explains the actions of railway companies in terms of rational 
economic self-interest; my brief analysis here, however, suggests that, although as 
joint-stock companies their highest priority was short-term revenue, profit, and 
shareholder dividends, the motivations for their actions were not necessarily the 
straightforward pursuit of maximising these figures. In this situation, as with some of 
the arguments in the pamphlets I described in chapter 3, it appears that maximising 
profits was not the highest priority when some railway companies determined to 
monopolise carrying on their lines and mandated that all railway companies follow 
suit. Instead, under some circumstances, such as resolving the carrying question, 
vertical integration and control of the economic environment were more important 
than increased profit. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I showed how the business of goods transport changed as railway 
companies began to operate their own exclusive goods carrying services, which led 
to a significant change in the carrying trade. In the first section I identified the 
precedents for railway company carrying in ‘self-carrying’ inland waterway 
companies, suggesting that their motivations and policies were different enough from 
the motivations and policies of railway companies that an equivalent of the carrying 
question did not arise with inland waterway company carrying. In the second section 
I described the various models for railway goods carrying being used in 1840, and 
railway companies’ perceived need to increase revenue by developing their own 
goods carrying businesses. In the third section I laid out the terms of the debate 
among railway company officials and other 'insiders' about how companies should 
manage the carriage of goods. While it seems as if the preponderance of evidence in 
this debate suggested that railway companies would be more profitable if they did not 
get involved in the carrying trade, those supporting exclusive railway company 
carrying prevailed from the 1840s on. In the fourth section I described how railway 
companies began to take over the carrying trade by hiring carriers directly, making 
agreements with carriers, and excluding carriers from their lines. In the fifth section I 
explored the effects of this change in goods transport using city business directories 
and occupational data. Business directories showed that national and regional 
carriers were consolidated and subsumed into railway companies and local carriers 
were reorganised into a network supplementing national and regional railway goods 
carriage. The evidence of occupational data, from the 1841 and 1851 censuses and 
Leigh Shaw-Taylor’s work determining earlier occupational figures, was inconclusive, 
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though it suggests a slight reduction in the number of men involved in the carrying 
trade. In the final section I suggested that the general change in railway company 
policy was facilitated by the consolidation of railway management through corporate 
amalgamations and the Railway Clearing House. 
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Chapter 5: Responses to railway company carrying 
Introduction 
As I mentioned in chapter 3, in The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith suggested that the 
joint-stock business model could be beneficially employed for undertakings that met 
two conditions - if they were 'of greater and more general utility than the greater part 
of common trades' and if they required 'a greater capital than can easily be collected 
into a private copartnery'. He argued that joint-stock companies providing banking, 
insurance, canals and navigations, and municipal water supplies could benefit the 
public.1 Between 1720 and the early nineteenth century Parliament and the courts 
generally agreed that joint-stock companies should not participate in the domestic 
economy; Parliament typically declined to authorise companies that might 'carry on 
any ordinary trade or calling carried on in this country' or compete with existing 
traders, and the courts generally upheld lawsuits against joint-stock companies that 
competed with private enterprise.2 The joint-stock companies Parliament authorised 
in the early nineteenth century, including those to construct and maintain rail lines, 
typically conformed to Smith’s determination of their usefulness. If the joint-stock 
companies Parliament had authorised to construct and maintain transport 
infrastructure had not moved beyond this role, the carrying question would never have 
arisen; it was railway companies’ incursion into the ‘private’ sphere of the carrying 
trade that created a conflict beyond that of competing private businesses on a level 
playing field.  
 
It does not appear that this framing of the carrying question, that it resulted from 
companies authorised to perform one set of activities moving into another, more 
problematic, set of activities, was recognised at the time, nor has it been identified 
since then by transport historians or historians of industrialisation. As I stated in my 
introduction, historians generally consider the change from the carrying trade to 
railway company carrying inevitable and unproblematic. I argue in this chapter, 
however, that in fact the response to railway company carrying was largely negative, 
and that, unlike the transition in passenger travel from coaching to railways, the 
change from the carrying trade to railway company carrying was accomplished only 
after a conflict that lasted nearly two decades. 
 
                                                 
1 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 3, 148. 
2 George, A View of the Existing Law, 72; Taylor, Creating Capitalism, 45-46; HC Deb 18 July 
1834, 25, 192-4; Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 58. 
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In this chapter I describe and analyse the responses of carriers, the business 
community, the general public and the government to the changes in railway company 
policy that I identified in chapter 4. None of these groups accepted railway companies' 
decisions to operate their own goods carrying services and exclude carriers from their 
lines, and each attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully, to change railway company 
policies. The carriers, of course, objected to railway companies constraining their 
ability to do business. Carriers’ customers, largely small businesses manufacturing 
and selling goods, generally preferred to work with the carrying trade, another set of 
small businesses; while railway company carrying was sometimes less expensive and 
often faster, railway companies were less responsive to their customers' needs, less 
willing to adapt their business practices (including extending credit), and reluctant to 
correct mistakes, resolve conflicts or reimburse customers for late, lost or damaged 
goods. As I described in chapter 3, the general public expressed reservations about 
the power of joint-stock companies in general, and preferred competition to monopoly; 
they thus viewed railway company monopoly carrying with suspicion. The justice 
system, when appealed to, ruled in favour of the carrying trade, and against railway 
company policy and practice, and Parliament responded to the concerns of the 
business community and the general public by appointing Select Committees to 
consider their grievances and recommend remedial legislation. 
 
This chapter has five sections. First, I use examples from business correspondence 
to highlight the conflict between the business models of the carrying trade and of the 
railway companies. I analyse the language and negotiation strategies of each party to 
show that carriers' attempts to engage railway companies using a relational business 
model did not influence the actions of railway companies. Second, using 
contemporary legal records, as well as the work of R. W. Kostal, I review carriers’ 
attempts to take railway companies to court to secure their right to use rail lines and 
to operate according to the traditional practice of the carrying trade. Third, I identify 
evidence of the resistance of businesses and the general public to railway company 
goods carriage policies, in pamphlets and other media, petitions and memorials, and 
evidence of boycotts and alternative carrying arrangements. Fourth, I describe and 
analyse Parliament's response to the carrying question using Select Committee 
reports and records of testimony. Finally, I consider why all of these responses proved 
ineffective in changing railway company carrying policy. 
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Communicating with joint-stock companies 
As I described in chapters 2 and 3, in the early nineteenth century conflict began to 
develop between two business models - the relational or sociable model of 
partnerships and sole proprietors, based on credit and personal connections, which 
both carriers and railway companies' customers typically used, and the transactional 
and contractual model of joint-stock companies, based on achieving short-term and 
narrowly defined business interests, which railway companies typically used. The 
difference in communication style and business practice between these models can 
be seen in two examples of correspondence between Joseph Baxendale, general 
manager of Pickfords, and officials representing railway companies. The first, a letter 
from Baxendale to George Hudson, chairman of the York & North Midland Railway 
Company, written in 1845, concerns a member of Pickfords’ staff, and the second, a 
series of letters written in 1842 and 1843, concerns the terms of Pickfords' access to 
the Grand Junction Railway after a lawsuit between the firms was settled in favour of 
Pickfords. 
 
Aside from some agreements between railway companies and carriers acting as their 
agents, dating from the 1850s, I have found no other examples of direct 
communication between railway companies and carriers. The letter from Baxendale 
to Hudson was preserved in the National Archives in a folder of miscellaneous 
correspondence relating to Pickfords, and the correspondence between Baxendale 
and Grand Junction Railway Company officials was preserved as evidence for the 
injunction Baxendale attempted to raise against the Grand Junction after the 
correspondence failed to result in an agreement. Thus direct evidence for how railway 
companies interacted with carriers is limited, though the indirect evidence in the 
records of Parliamentary hearings held between 1839 and 1852, and the writings of 
carriers Richard Parker and John Crouch, which I will discuss below, suggest that the 
transactional and adversarial style of interaction the Grand Junction company officials 
used with Baxendale was not unusual (no reply has been preserved to Baxendale’s 
letter to Hudson, so only Baxendale’s style of communicating is visible in this 
example). 
 
Joseph Baxendale, born in Lancaster in 1785, began his career in the London cotton 
trade, but retired from the business in 1816 and purchased a one-sixth share in 
Pickfords the following year, along with Zachary Langton and Charles Inman.3 
                                                 
3 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 40. 
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Turnbull suggests that Baxendale married into a personal connection with the 
Pickfords partners, although the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography states only 
that Baxendale borrowed the money to purchase his share from his wife’s family.4 
Turnbull points out that the three new partners were related to each other, and that 
their personal connections to the manufacturing, trade and financial community of 
Lancashire facilitated bringing capital into the ailing business; '[k]inship...provided 
entry and acceptability...the opportunity of seeking financial backing and the 
guarantee that it would not be abused.'5 After joining the firm, Baxendale started his 
career as a carrier working with Thomas Pickford at the company’s headquarters in 
Manchester.6 By the early 1820s, due to their continuing supply of capital, the three 
new partners had obtained sole control of the business, and Baxendale had moved 
to London to act as general manager of the entire firm.7 Baxendale’s tenure saw a 
growth in the business, from 80 offices in 1830 to 144 in 1838, serving not only their 
original route between London and Manchester but also destinations as remote from 
their original route as Bristol.8 
 
Baxendale also served on the boards of two railway companies. In 1837 he became 
a director of the South Eastern Railway Company, acting as chairman from 1841 to 
1845.9 He also became an 'advisor on goods traffic' to the London & Birmingham 
company in 1839, serving, according to Turnbull, 'a few months also as 
superintendent of the outdoor department'.10 It would have been during this period, 
while Pickfords was carrying on the line, that the company wrote to other carriers that 
had requested access to the line that the company could not accommodate them; 
these letters 'rather tactlessly carried Baxendale's signature as the railway official 
responsible'. I will describe the ramifications of Baxendale’s dual role as carrier and 
railway manager during this period later in this chapter.11 
 
                                                 
4 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 42, 48-50; T. D. Baxendale, ‘Baxendale, Joseph (1785–
1872), transport entrepreneur’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 4 October 
2018, http://www.oxforddnb.com.libproxy.york.ac.uk/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/ 9780198614128. 
001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-37164. 
5 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 40. 
6 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 43. 
7 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 44-45. 
8 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 48. 
9 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 52; Baxendale, ‘Baxendale, Joseph (1785–1872), transport 
entrepreneur’.  
10 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 52. 
11 Turnbull, Traffic and Transport, 113; Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Committee on 
the London and Birmingham Railway Bill, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 
2 May 1839, 70. 
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In 1845 Baxendale wrote to George Hudson, then chairman of the York & North 
Midland Railway Company, to complain that the company’s Manchester agent had 
hired a Pickfords employee. Without accusing Hudson or his agent of wrongdoing, or 
requesting that Hudson let the ‘poached’ employee go or cease the practice of hiring 
his staff, Baxendale addressed Hudson indirectly in the common language of 
business morality: ‘[y]ou would scorn the idea of taking Servants by means of bribery 
from others…[you] will not desire to do an injustice that you may lighten your labours. 
You know that individuals...were unable to give Incomes such as a Railway Company 
having an object to attain will do.’12 Baxendale structured this sentence in such a way 
as to imply that he believed that Hudson was unaware that he had transgressed 
business norms and would be disturbed to find out that he had done so. Baxendale 
then described his own business practices, possibly as a positive example for 
Hudson: 
For Thirty years I have laboured incessantly to build up a Concern which 
possesses more old Servants than anyone in England…better feeling cannot 
exist between Master & Men than in that Concern - Temptations may be held 
out to some against which they are not proof - others...cannot be bribed.13 
 
It is difficult to determine exactly what Baxendale intended to accomplish with this 
letter, particularly in the absence of any preserved reply from Hudson, if there ever 
was one, but it is clear that Baxendale was drawing on what he perceived to be norms 
of business behaviour to encourage Hudson to reflect on what Baxendale considered 
his unethical action, and possibly shame him into conformity with established 
business practice. Pickfords had lost several senior staff members to various railway 
companies over the previous decade and would continue to do so. In one case in 
1849 Baxendale contacted the Brighton Railway Company to inform them that the 
Pickfords staff member that they had hired had been discharged for dishonesty, 
demonstrating his concern for both Pickfords’ and the Brighton Railway Company’s 
reputations.14 
 
Joseph Baxendale corresponded with several officials of the Grand Junction Railway 
Company between the summer of 1842, shortly after Pickfords won its second lawsuit 
against the company for discriminatory pricing and restrictions on combined parcels, 
a lawsuit which I will describe in more detail later in this chapter, and June 1843, when 
                                                 
12 RAIL 1133/149, 8 November 1845, The National Archives, London. 
13 RAIL 1133/149, 8 November 1845, The National Archives, London. 
14 Gerald L. Turnbull, 'A note on the supply of staff for the early railways', Transport History 1 
(1968): 3-9. 
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Baxendale requested an injunction to force the company to resume transporting 
Pickfords’ goods. This transcribed correspondence was preserved as evidence for 
the request for the injunction.15 Turnbull's history of Pickfords does not mention this 
correspondence. In his book Law and English Railway Capitalism R. W. Kostal 
mentions that Baxendale had attempted to negotiate an agreement with the Grand 
Junction company after the 1841 lawsuit and briefly summarises the correspondence 
between them between the legal decisions of 1842 and 1843, but does not identify its 
significance as an example of the business practices employed by partnerships and 
joint-stock companies. Although he does not consider these interactions in detail, 
Kostal identifies the role each side of the carrying question took: '[Mark] Huish 
[secretary of the Grand Junction company] embodied the aspirations and logic of 
large-scale joint-stock capitalism. Baxendale, by contrast, deliberately cast himself as 
the champion of free and competitive commerce - as the legatee of the proud and 
liberal tradition of English trade.'16 Kostal’s analysis here is correct; in addition, 
however, in the correspondence I review below Huish employs both the transactional 
interaction style of a joint-stock company (or, as I will discuss below, a military officer) 
and the focus on short-term advantage of the joint-stock business model, while 
Baxendale employs the polite and conciliatory interaction style of a participant in the 
‘sociable economy’, and focuses on achieving an agreement that benefits both parties 
and facilitates a long-term relationship between them. 
 
Pickfords had first taken the Grand Junction company to court in November 1840 
when it began to impose restrictions specifically on Pickfords, requiring them to pay 
for carriage in advance and refusing to accept packed or consolidated parcels, boxes 
containing goods to be delivered to more than one destination. As I mentioned in 
chapter 2, packing several persons’ goods into one container was customary in the 
carrying trade, and the reporting of at least one court case suggested that sending 
packed parcels by railway was considered standard practice.17 In 1844, members of 
the Select Committee on Railways pointed out to Charles Alexander Saunders, 
secretary of the Great Western Railway Company, during his testimony that his 
labelling of packed parcels as 'fraud' against the company was entirely the company's 
determination, as no custom or common law forbade it and in fact, as Joseph 
Baxendale had pointed out, it had 'invariably been the case since time immemorial, 
                                                 
15 C14/134/P56, The National Archives, London. 
16 Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 190-195. 
17 The Standard, 4 June 1845, 8. 
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that parties have packed as many parcels as they could into one parcel...to reduce 
the price of the carriage.'18 The judge in Pickfords v. the Grand Junction Railway 
Company saw nothing objectionable about packed parcels, and the lawsuit was 
decided in May 1841 in favour of Pickfords, based on the fact that the Grand Junction 
company, acting as a carrier itself and thus subject to carrier common law requiring 
equal treatment of all customers, could not impose restrictions on one specific 
customer. Seeing no alteration in the Grand Junction's practices after the verdict, 
however, in July 1841 Pickfords brought another suit against the company, this time 
accusing it of attempting to monopolise the carriage of goods, and again won. The 
Grand Junction company appealed this second verdict to the Court of Exchequer, 
which decided conclusively in favour of Pickfords in July 1842.19 
 
Pickfords was not the only carrier to take a railway company to court; in the next 
section I will describe this case in more detail, as well as the legal action carriers 
Richard Parker and John Crouch took in similar circumstances. Pickfords, however, 
was in a unique situation. Geography suggests that England would develop three 
major carrying routes between London and provincial centres - along the south coast 
to Exeter, along the east coast to Newcastle, and ‘cross country’ to Manchester. 
Russells Flying Waggons, which served the south coast, was a large and well-
resourced firm, but had by the early nineteenth century become engaged in lawsuits 
among the partners, as described by Gerhold; in addition, this route competed with 
coastal shipping.20 No research suggests an equivalent road carriage route along the 
east coast; it is likely no major road carrier ever served this route as the Newcastle 
colliers profitably, efficiently, and cheaply transported goods in this corridor. Pickfords, 
the Manchester carrier, was the largest carrying firm in the country, operating on its 
most lucrative road carrying route, and was thus the carrier in the strongest position 
to engage with railway companies on equal terms. 
 
Shortly after the announcement of the appeal verdict in favour of Pickfords, on 21 July 
1842, Baxendale contacted Charles Lawrence, the deputy chairman of the Grand 
Junction company’s board of directors. His first letter incorporated the common forms 
of business politeness, hoping that ‘good feeling may prevail’ and expressing caution 
about bringing up the subject of Pickfords transporting its goods on the Grand 
                                                 
18 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 24 May 1844, 257. 
19 Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 191-194. 
20 Gerhold, Road Transport before the Railways, 92-94, 122-123, 266. 
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Junction Railway under the conditions agreed in the court’s decision ‘lest it might be 
misconstrued’.21 Lawrence did not reply to Baxendale's letter for nearly a month; his 
reply on 19 August simply requested Baxendale to attend him and John Moss, the 
chairman of the company, in Liverpool. Baxendale replied a few days later stating that 
he was unable to meet them in person but restated his desire to know the terms on 
which Pickfords could send goods via the Grand Junction Railway. He added that '[i]t 
was very agreeable to me to find that the Liverpool and Manchester Railway had after 
so many years of close system opened her line to Carriers and I have no doubt they 
will reap the benefit.'22 
 
A week later Moss replied to Baxendale stating that the company wished to see how 
the business of the Manchester & Birmingham Railway Company, which did not itself 
act as a carrier, fared: 
A short time will now solve the long disputed and very difficult question 
whether a line of Railroad where carriers alone can conduct the business or 
one where the Company are carriers is most profitable...if the Carriers aid the 
Manchester and Birmingham and give them the legitimate traffic which fairly 
belongs to them it will afford a strong argument in favor of the line you had 
always taken. If on the contrary the Carriers only use it for goods requiring 
speed then I should say it was decisive in favor of Railway Companys being 
carriers because by that means and that alone can they compete with canals 
and other Railroads. I am sure no Railroad Company could wish to be Carriers 
if they could get the public equally well served and their line supported by a 
full share of legitimate traffic.23 
 
In this letter Moss made an argument that appears in several communications from 
railway companies, in letters and in print, as well as in the testimony of railway 
company officials in Select Committee hearings - that they were entitled to a particular 
type and amount of 'legitimate' traffic.24 The implication is that the government had 
granted the company a right to income from whatever traffic the writer considered 
'legitimate', and should not have to face competition, from carriers on their line or from 
other transport modes, for that traffic. Moss also seemed to suggest that he believed 
he had the right to control what kinds of goods his customers used the railway to carry, 
and for what purposes. 
                                                 
21 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to Charles Lawrence, 21 July 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
22 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to Charles Lawrence, 22 August 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
23 Letter from John Moss to Joseph Baxendale, 27 August 1842, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
24 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, 10 July 1840, 440. 
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Baxendale replied to Moss a week or so later, again asking for a written agreement 
from the Grand Junction company, and Moss responded by asking Baxendale to state 
his requirements. Baxendale replied that ideally he would like the same arrangements 
with the Grand Junction company that he had with the London & Birmingham, and 
added,  
when the Judgment of the court was given in favor of Pickford and Company 
I have been in correspondence asking the intentions of the GJ C on the part 
of Pickford and Company I would not so allow any movement lest it might be 
considered hostile you cannot therefor be surprised at my requesting the favor 
of some definite reply.25  
 
Baxendale was pointing out to Moss that he had been supporting the company’s 
position to his own staff and customers, and that he understood that the situation was 
a delicate one, though he believed he was justified in asking Moss either to propose 
or agree to an arrangement. Baxendale appeared to consider that given that the 
company's actions had been deemed illegal the first move should be the Grand 
Junction's; his hesitant and diffident tone in these initial letters suggested his 
embarrassment at having to bring up the matter first, as well as, possibly, a belief that 
this approach was the most likely to engage Moss’s sympathies and motivate him to 
action. 
 
A week later Moss informed Baxendale that the matter had been referred to Mark 
Huish, the company secretary. Baxendale wrote again to Moss a week later with a 
revised proposal - that the company should charge carriers the same costs for 
locomotives, waggons, and tolls as their internal cost to themselves as carriers; this 
arrangement would place carriers and the company on an equal footing, and allow 
them to compete fairly.26 A month later, on 18 November, apparently having received 
no reply from Moss, Baxendale wrote directly to Huish, offering yet a third proposal - 
that Pickfords pay the company's highest tonnage rate for packed parcels. He also 
requested information on the refund of excess carrying charges that the court had 
ordered the Grand Junction company to pay to Pickfords.27 
 
                                                 
25 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to John Moss, 10 September 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
26 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to John Moss, 27 September 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
27 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to John Moss, 18 November 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
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After several short and noncommittal replies from his correspondents, Baxendale 
finally received an angry response from John Moss on 22 November, stating that he'd 
seen Baxendale's letter to Huish and: 
I confess myself mortified that you have decided on what appears a 
continuance of hostilities…you cannot...seriously suppose that we can comply 
with your demand to abandon that traffic which is a large and legitimate source 
of Revenue I do not wish the Grand Junction Co. to enter upon further litigation 
if it can be avoided…I therefore take upon myself to postpone a reply until I 
have ascertained from you whether you really intend to insist upon having 
packed small parcels carried for you at the ordinary tonnage Rates I hope you 
do not The Grand Junction Co. are advised that you have not the right I am 
willing nay anxious to arrange all matters with you in a friendly spirit...and shall 
be glad to do so unless you have decided that it is better to continue the 
litigation.28 
 
Although in this excerpt Moss suggested that he was attempting to interact with 
Baxendale in a ‘friendly spirit’, and used personal emotional language such as 
‘mortified’, his framing of the issues shows evidence of a more transactional point of 
view. He referred exclusively to the company's own internal norms and requirements, 
describing a form of traffic that the court had just ruled the company was not entitled 
to as a 'large and legitimate source of revenue'. Despite Baxendale’s clear attempts 
to negotiate some kind of agreement based on the verdict, Moss referred to 
Baxendale’s position as a personal ‘demand’, and his request to engage in 
negotiations as ‘hostilities’; he framed Baxendale’s position and arguments as 
resulting from personal animus, rather than the principled position of another firm 
attempting to do business with his company. Although in this excerpt his own 
personality and agency were evident, he did use some bureaucratic language (the 
company ‘are advised') to conceal his agency and distance himself from the conflict.  
 
Baxendale replied to Moss two days later, pointing out that the question of Pickfords’ 
entitlement to send its goods on the Grand Junction’s line had already been decided 
in a court of law in Pickfords’ favour, and again requesting that the company propose 
or accept an agreement between the firms.29 Moss replied two days later, addressing 
what he seemed to perceive were two points of contention; first, that the law also 
required Pickfords as well as other railway companies to carry packed parcels (in a 
reply the following day Baxendale agreed that it did), and second, that the Grand 
                                                 
28 Letter from John Moss to Joseph Baxendale, 22 November 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
29 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to John Moss, 24 November 1842, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
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Junction had no interest in taking on Pickfords as agents (Baxendale had not 
proposed this). He also told Baxendale that, in contradiction to the suggestion he’d 
made in a previous letter, ‘I do not think any apprehension or even the certainty of 
injury to the parcel traffic would cause [the board] to alter their system of being 
Carriers on their own line that point is permanently settled’.30 
 
Baxendale wrote to Huish on 30 November, trying again to obtain an agreement, and 
Moss responded on 3 December, again stating that the Grand Junction had no 
interest in employing Pickfords as agents. Moss continued to interpret Pickfords’ 
request to carry their own goods on the line as an offer of service to the railway 
company; ‘there is too much competition with railroad and canals between Liverpool 
and Birmingham to allow us out of our Rates to pay a carrier’.31 On 6 December 
Baxendale wrote to Moss with what seems to have been an attempt to reassure Moss 
that Pickfords did not intend to compete with the Grand Junction company for the 
lucrative trade in small parcels: 
Pickford and company have not sought to become Carriers of small parcels If 
the Grand Junction pursues a course similar to the London and Birmingham 
they will find Pickford and Company are satisfied to leave the question as it 
now stands without prejudice to their rights.32  
 
This letter received a noncommittal response from Moss on 9 December.33 
 
This was Moss's last letter to Baxendale; at this point the company seems to have 
decided to ignore Baxendale’s requests. Baxendale wrote again to Huish on 14 
December reminding him of his previous unanswered correspondence and again 
asking for progress on the agreement, and Huish replied that he was awaiting 
instructions from the board.34 Baxendale wrote to Huish again on 16 and 22 December 
with detailed evidence demonstrating that despite the ruling against them the Grand 
Junction company was continuing to charge Pickfords more than they charged 
Southan & Son, another carrier, for the same services on the same routes, and 
                                                 
30 Letters from John Moss to Joseph Baxendale, 26 November and 3 December 1842, 
C14/134/P56, The National Archives, London. 
31 Letter from John Moss to Joseph Baxendale, 3 December 1842, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
32 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to John Moss, 6 December 1842, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
33 Letter from John Moss to Joseph Baxendale, 9 December 1842, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
34 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to Mark Huish, 14 December 1842; letter from Mark Huish to 
Joseph Baxendale, 16 December 1842, C14/134/P56, The National Archives, London. 
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reminding him that this was illegal.35 Huish replied on the 29th that ‘the board do not 
recognise your right to put the questions to them’, and on 7 January 1843 that despite 
the ruling against them they had no intention of changing their policies as that would 
‘give you an advantage over the public’.36  
 
At this point Baxendale had written at least two letters to Lawrence, five to Moss, and 
five to Huish, and had proposed at least three different agreements between Pickfords 
and the Grand Junction company, but none of his correspondents had either accepted 
one of these proposals or suggested one of his own. After unsuccessfully attempting 
to establish relationships with Moss and Huish, Baxendale now appeared to have 
gone back to attempting to correspond with Charles Lawrence, including what could 
be perceived as a threat to escalate the situation. His 20 January 1843 letter to 
Lawrence proposed again that Pickfords and the Grand Junction company enter into 
the same agreement as Pickfords had with the Manchester & Birmingham and 
Liverpool & Manchester companies, mentioning that he had ‘directed Pickford and Co 
to take no hostile measures until I had communicated with you’.37 Lawrence sent a 
short noncommittal reply on the 24th, and another letter on the 28th which appeared 
to have registered the potential escalation, but either deliberately or unintentionally 
misunderstood Baxendale’s concerns; he wrote that ‘[i]f our people are acting illegally 
in any thing and you will let me know in what respect I pledge myself that the Board 
will at once set it right’.38 
 
On 6 February Baxendale wrote to Huish, stating that Pickfords intended to begin 
sending packed parcels on the Grand Junction line starting 10 February. He offered 
to pay a 10 per cent surcharge on the usual rate, as a gesture of good will, in 
compensation for the additional liability the Grand Junction company had claimed to 
be incurring. On the 10th Huish wrote back stating that the company would charge 
Pickfords 80s per ton to carry goods between Birmingham and Liverpool, more than 
three times the standard rate. Baxendale wrote to Huish again on the 28th, stating 
that he expected Pickfords to be charged the same rate as Chaplin & Horne, another 
                                                 
35 Letters from Joseph Baxendale to Mark Huish, 16 and 22 December 1842, C14/134/P56, 
The National Archives, London. 
36 Letters from Mark Huish to Joseph Baxendale, 29 December 1842 and 7 January 1843, 
C14/134/P56, The National Archives, London. 
37 Letter from Joseph Baxendale to Charles Lawrence, 20 January 1843, C14/134/P56, The 
National Archives, London. 
38 Letters from Charles Lawrence to Joseph Baxendale, 24 January and 28 January 1843, 
C14/134/P56, The National Archives, London. 
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carrier, for the same services.39 Huish replied a week later stating that Chaplin & 
Horne were not actually acting as carriers: 
you cannot but know perfectly well that they are not the carriers...but simply 
and solely our agents...we and not they being the carrier...your offer therefore 
to do for us what they do is merely an offer to become our London Agents 
instead of them an offer which we should not have felt called upon to notice at 
all.40  
 
Baxendale tried one more time, on 22 March, to get Huish to agree to mutually 
beneficial terms. Huish wrote back on the 29th asking Pickfords once again to propose 
terms, and Baxendale replied a week later asking again for a similar agreement to the 
one they had with the London & Birmingham company, listing proposed rates for 
various categories of goods. On 15 April Huish wrote that he had been instructed to 
communicate ‘that we do not feel called upon in future either to admit or deny 
statements of facts similar to those alluded to in your letter’.41 These quotations ('the 
board do not recognise', 'we do not feel called upon...to admit or deny') showed Huish 
using bureaucratic language to distance himself from interaction with Baxendale and 
obscure his own agency in failing to negotiate with him. Huish’s ostensible deference 
to the board's decisions and use of the exclusive rather than inclusive 'we' indicated 
his focus solely on internal norms and requirements, and his lack of interest in his 
correspondent's objectives. 
 
The report of the 1842 appeal stated that ‘[t]he [initial] judgment was in favour of the 
plaintiff [Pickfords], but the defendants continuing the same kind of imposition in 
defiance of that judgment, a bill was filed for an injunction.’ Ironically, the length of 
time occupied in the correspondence I have described, in which Baxendale seemed 
to have been acting in good faith to come to an agreement with the Grand Junction 
company, was used as evidence, when Baxendale finally applied for an injunction in 
1843, that the damage to his business could not have been serious enough to merit 
legal intervention if he had waited so long to apply for it.42  
 
                                                 
39 'William Chaplin', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 14 September 2018, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.york.ac.uk/view/article/47556. 
40 Letter from Mark Huish to Joseph Baxendale, 8 March 1843, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
41 Letter from Mark Huish to Joseph Baxendale, 15 April 1843, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
42 Pickford v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 1843, C14/134/P56, The National 
Archives, London. 
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Because ‘although the unlawfulness of the practices and proceedings of the Grand 
Junction Railway Company had been established by the said action, and judgment 
recovered, the Company still persisted therein and in other unlawful practices’, the 
case was heard again before the Lord Chancellor in 1844.43 Joseph Baxendale was 
asked about the case and its aftermath in the Select Committee hearings that year:  
Upon that point the law has been declared against the company. - Yes. 
Has the company altered its practice in consequence? - No.  
Do you mean, that the practice of the Grand Junction Company at the present 
moment is in contravention of the principles laid down in the judgment of the 
Court of Exchequer? - I do.44 
 
Although Mark Huish directly denied these charges in his testimony to the Select 
Committee, Baxendale told the Committee that the Grand Junction company had not 
only not stopped interfering with the business of carriers sending packed parcels, 'they 
themselves send their parcels over the London and Birmingham under the plea that 
the judgment of the Court of Exchequer allows them so to do.'45  
 
I have analysed this correspondence in detail because it illustrates the difference in 
interaction style, expectations and norms between Joseph Baxendale, acting on 
behalf of Pickfords, and Charles Lawrence, Joseph Moss and Mark Huish, acting on 
behalf of the Grand Junction Railway Company. In this correspondence Baxendale 
attempted to negotiate directly with his three correspondents; he seemed not to 
appreciate that he was in conversation with a corporate entity, that the people he was 
corresponding with were communicating with each other, or that they were 
answerable to others. He offered concrete proposals, backed up with figures, 
comparisons and precedents, and suggested alternatives when these were ignored.46 
He seemed focused on developing a mutually beneficial personal agreement between 
himself and his correspondent. Baxendale’s approach appeared both reasonable and 
even-handed; he both asked for and offered concessions, including some that were 
over and above what would have been justified by the verdict in Pickfords’ favour (for 
example, the offer to pay a surcharge on the standard rate and the reassurance that 
Pickfords would not compete for the small parcels trade), and not only accepted the 
court’s verdict but acknowledged that the ruling applied to his own business as well. 
                                                 
43 John Monson Carrow and Lionel Oliver, Cases Relating to Railways and Canals, vol. 3 
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44 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
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Papers Online, 24 May 1844, 256, 537-538. 
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Lawrence, Moss and Huish took a different approach. Although each occasionally 
superficially used the polite language of traditional business communication, the intent 
behind their letters, and the decisions they made when corresponding with 
Baxendale, revealed that they were uninterested in conforming to the ‘sociable’ rules 
of negotiation that Baxendale seemed to expect. Rather than engaging with 
Baxendale directly, renegotiating or offering counterproposals, they repeated the 
company’s policies with no flexibility or acknowledgement of Baxendale’s arguments. 
They appeared to misunderstand Baxendale’s position and intent, framing 
Baxendale’s attempts at negotiation as a desire to act as ‘agents’ for the Grand 
Junction rather than recognising Baxendale as the representative of another business 
that it was appropriate to negotiate with on equal terms. They alternated among 
respondents, referring Baxendale to each other, allowing each to claim ignorance of 
what the others had written, to justify delays in committing to an agreement or 
proposing an alternative, and occasionally playing 'good cop and bad cop' (for 
example, Lawrence's conciliatory tone, when offering to 'set things right', compared 
with Moss's accusations and Huish's bureaucratically neutral statements). They 
employed bureaucratic language, such as ‘we do not feel called upon…to admit or 
deny’ and ‘the board do not recognise your right to put the questions to them’, to justify 
ignoring Baxendale’s proposals. In their correspondence they referred only to their 
own internal norms and promoted only their own interests. Despite some vague 
language about 'serving the public', neither the interests of their correspondent or 
other customers, the constraints of the verdict against them, nor any wider view of the 
business world appeared relevant to their decision-making process except insofar as 
it might promote their interest, as when Moss insisted that the court's ruling also 
applied to Pickfords.  
 
Their attitude toward the courts’ rulings also shows the dichotomy between their 
business models. Baxendale appeared to consider the courts’ rulings an extension of 
the informal dispute resolution methods that I described in chapter 2. As I mentioned, 
in the ‘sociable’ business model parties in conflict often asked a third party, whom 
both trusted, to mediate; should this not prove possible, or the result not prove 
satisfactory, the legal system played the same role in a more formal way. Both parties 
tacitly agreed, for the sake of avoiding disharmony and protecting their reputations 
and relationships, to abide by the decision of this third party, whether a colleague 
approved by both parties or a judge in court. Moss, Huish and Lawrence, however, 
183 
 
 
acknowledged no such constraints; in their business model, gaining advantage for the 
company was more important than protecting their reputations or relationships by 
conforming to social norms. It is worth mentioning, however, that while railway 
company officials may not have been explicitly concerned with protecting their own 
personal reputations or establishing relationships with other business owners, they 
did acknowledge the importance of character and reputation in hiring and managing 
staff.47 In other words, it is unlikely that the representatives interacting with Baxendale 
were ignorant of the nature and value of these social norms; they chose not to 
acknowledge them when it was not to their advantage to do so. 
 
A partial explanation for this contrast in language and negotiation style may be found 
in the backgrounds of the correspondents. As I mentioned above, while some railway 
company directors and managers had backgrounds in business, and in fact the Grand 
Junction company's goods manager, Braithwaite Poole, had been a carrier, the 
representatives of the Grand Junction Railway Company corresponding with 
Baxendale had professional backgrounds dissimilar to that of the owners of most 
small businesses. John Moss came from a merchant and ship owning family; he was 
a banker, investor in slave plantations in the West Indies, and director of the Liverpool 
& Manchester Railway Company as well as the company's banker.48 Charles 
Lawrence had served as mayor of Liverpool and had also been involved in the 
Liverpool & Manchester company; he also appears to have been connected to West 
Indies slave plantations, and is listed as a 'merchant' in family records.49  
 
These two men were directors and proprietors of the company; Huish, the third person 
corresponding with Baxendale, was a salaried manager. As the first railway 
companies were a new kind of business, their directors could not hire managers with 
previous similar experience, so they often recruited from the ranks of the armed 
forces, it being thought that officers, particularly naval ones, would excel in ‘the arts 
of controlling and disciplining large bodies of staff’, and could control costs better than 
                                                 
47 Mike Richardson and Peter Nicholls, A Business and Labour History of Britain (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 16-17; Philip Sidney Bagwell, The Railwaymen (London: Allen & 
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the engineers who had constructed the lines.50 Although Huish's father was a hosier 
and minor official in Nottinghamshire, Huish spent the first 14 years of his working life, 
before he obtained his first railway management position, as an officer in the East 
India Company army. Huish often seems to have viewed his work in military terms, 
using such language as '[the London & North Western is] in a position of vantage to 
contend with their natural opponents, the canals, as a strong phalanx, instead of as 
disjointed members of a jealous and weak because a disunited party.'51 Huish’s 
military background may have inclined him to view competitors as ‘enemies’, and to 
see monopoly railway carrying as a way to ‘defeat’ these enemies.  
 
It is possible that these men, with their background in 'high finance', international 
trade, and the armed forces, environments with different norms for interaction and 
relationships, may have been less familiar with traditional business behaviour than 
Baxendale was. As I mentioned in chapter 3, Sidney Pollard argues that the norms 
and structure of the armed forces helped to shape the norms and structure of joint-
stock companies, because in some ways their requirements and objectives were 
similar, and because men trained in the former environment were hired to work in the 
latter. Although Pearson and Richardson suggest that the Liverpool slave trade, 
backed by innovative financial instruments, had begun to develop a more impersonal 
and transparent way of doing business by the 1730s, the hypothesis that railway 
company managers from this business background were unfamiliar with and 
disinclined to adopt the social norms of the wider economic culture seems unlikely 
considering recent extensive research on how social networks developed and 
operated through international trade.52 In addition, as I described earlier in this 
chapter, Baxendale's correspondent George Hudson, who had originally come from 
the same business culture as Baxendale, felt free to disregard its norms as a 
representative of a railway company. Thus the difference in the background and 
training of individuals is not a satisfactory explanation for the difference in interaction 
styles. 
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While it might be tempting to ascribe the style of interaction demonstrated in these 
letters to specific personalities and institutions, a similar style of interaction appears 
in correspondence between officials of the Grand Junction company and the 
Manchester & Birmingham company between October 1838 and January 1839, 
concerning arrangements for a junction between the two lines.53 In these negotiations 
the latter explicitly attempted to find a mutually beneficial outcome, predicated on 
compromise and the exchange of concessions, while the former focused exclusively 
on what did and did not benefit the Grand Junction company. As Mark Huish did not 
become secretary of the Grand Junction company until 1841, I cannot ascribe the 
single-mindedness that appears in the Grand Junction company’s letters to the 
Manchester & Birmingham company solely to his personal influence, nor can I ascribe 
it to joint-stock companies in general, as the Manchester & Birmingham company was 
also a joint-stock company. 
 
I have used these exchanges between a carrier and representatives of railway 
companies to illustrate the responses that those who interacted with the first joint-
stock railway companies, like those confronting the London water supply companies 
twenty years earlier, initially deployed, the same responses they would have used 
when interacting with any other business - negotiation, compromise, and appeal to 
relationships. In his correspondence Baxendale did not suggest another response 
used in the context of the ‘sociable economy’, appeal to arbitration, because the two 
companies had already engaged in a series of lawsuits. However, at about the same 
time Alexander Saunders, the secretary of the Great Western Railway Company, 
explicitly rejected this option in his testimony before the Select Committee on 
Railways:  
To the proposition which you have made, of calling in some experienced 
carrier to meet an unprejudiced director...I am instructed to reply, that if it be 
suggested merely for the sake of acquainting the Committee with the views of 
the trade, they have already derived such information.... If your intention was 
that the company should leave it to some carrier to fix and determine the 
regulations of the trade, I am to acquaint you that the directors must decline 
delegating such authority to any person, however respectable and 
disinterested, inasmuch as they are acting for the proprietors, and are bound 
to exercise their own discretion in all which concerns the welfare of the 
company.54  
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In this statement Saunders explicitly disowned responsibility for his position, using the 
same passive phrases (‘I am instructed to reply’, ‘I am to acquaint you that’) as Moss, 
Lawrence and Huish in their correspondence with Baxendale. He also made it explicit 
that his only concern, and the only concern of the company’s proprietors, was the 
interest of the company. 
 
In the correspondence I have analysed Baxendale appears unusually, and apparently 
unwarrantedly, optimistic that he and the Grand Junction company would reach a 
mutually beneficial agreement through conversation, negotiation and compromise. In 
this situation his confidence appears particularly unwarranted as the correspondence 
took place in the context of the ruling in a lawsuit, an escalation people dealing with 
joint-stock companies resorted to when they failed to come to agreement in a less 
formal way. 
 
The carrying question in the courts 
When carriers found their business damaged by the actions or policies of railway 
companies, and were unable to reach agreements with the companies directly, some 
attempted to regularise the relationships between themselves and the companies 
through legal action. The correspondence between Joseph Baxendale and the Grand 
Junction Railway Company that I analysed in the previous section took place in the 
context of a series of lawsuits Pickfords brought against the Grand Junction company 
between 1840 and 1844. These were part of a set of high-profile court cases, 
beginning with Regina v. the London and Birmingham Railway Company in 1839, 
brought by carriers against railway companies. Carriers took railway companies to 
court on two general grounds, the requirement for the companies to treat all 
customers equally and the question of packed parcels, and invariably won these 
lawsuits. However, carriers’ victories in the courts did not translate into changes in 
either railway company or government policy. 
 
This set of cases between carriers and railway companies is mentioned by some 
transport and economic historians. Jackman described Pickfords v. Grand Junction 
Railway Company in an appendix to The Development of Transportation in Modern 
England, drawing on legal records and tracing the carrying question debate in the 
Railway Times.55 Kostal describes the ‘small freight wars’ in Law and English Railway 
Capitalism, using them as evidence that the legal profession was intimately involved 
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in what has been customarily considered the largely technological development of the 
railway network, and that English law was inadequate to manage and legislate issues 
brought up by the development of the railway network and forced to adapt to the new 
economic and technological environment piecemeal through litigation.56  
 
While Kostal is a valuable and insightful source with respect to legal issues, he relies 
on Jackman and Turnbull, and the claims of the railway companies themselves, for 
his information about carriers. For example, Kostal writes that once the railway 
network began to develop 'even the largest carrier firms began to abandon the long-
distance delivery trade'; his citation for this statement mentions that carriers had 
begun to apply for access to the Great Western Railway line in 1838, the opposite of 
'abandoning' the trade.57 Like the scholars I identified in my introduction, Kostal 
conflates passenger and goods transport, does not distinguish between goods 
carriage (the carrying trade) and small parcels carriage (the coaching trade), and 
seems unaware that the London & Birmingham and Grand Junction companies used 
different business models to manage goods carriage. He suggests that carriers' 
'dubious practice' of sending packed parcels was a response to railway companies 
raising small parcels rates, although as I pointed out in chapter 2 contemporary 
sources suggest that combining deliveries had been common practice before the 
development of the rail network.58 Kostal also categorically states that the legal right 
of others to operate equipment on a company’s lines was never used, which is 
contradicted both by contemporary evidence, some of which I have presented in 
chapter 4 above, and by the fact that railway companies made agreements to operate 
equipment on each other's lines.59 Finally, Kostal seems to see the carrying trade as 
the railway companies did, as unnecessary 'middlemen' extracting profit from 
superfluous services; he does not acknowledge the services carriers performed for 
their customers or, more significantly, the fact that carriers accepted liability for loss 
or damage when operating on railways. Thus, although the legal issues involved in 
the carrying question are within Kostal’s area of expertise, his interpretation of 
evidence is less certain with respect to the practices or policies of carriers or railway 
companies. In this section I attempt to understand how effective legal measures were 
in resolving conflicts between carriers and railway companies and in influencing 
railway company policy and behaviour. I have used Kostal's work on the three cases 
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that defined the carrying question - Pickfords, Parker and Crouch - as a starting point 
to review and analyse contemporary material (legal records and reports, and 
transcripts in newspapers) describing these and other cases. I identified additional 
carrying question cases through researching precedents cited in these three cases, 
as well as reviewing legal records from this period.  
 
Carrying question cases were a small subset of the legal battles railway companies, 
as large and complex entities with large and complex financial arrangements, were 
perpetually involved in throughout the nineteenth century, as plaintiffs or defendants 
against shareholders, property owners, contractors, suppliers, and passengers suing 
for anything from impolite treatment by railway staff to injury and death.60 Because 
each legal victory by a carrier plaintiff became a precedent for subsequent cases, 
because the thinking of both judges and the public changed over time as a result of 
each case, and because the arguments and verdicts in each case are related to its 
economic context, which changed as railway companies began to amalgamate, I have 
presented the cases in this section in chronological order. 
 
The first carrying question case, Regina v. the London and Birmingham Railway 
Company, was heard in the Court of Queen’s Bench in 1839.61 In September 1838, 
before its line was completed, the London & Birmingham Railway Company made a 
temporary access agreement with Pickfords, which had asked to use the open portion 
of the line as the Grand Junction Canal was unavailable due to low water. At that time 
another carrier, Golbys of Banbury, was also using the line.62 Shortly afterward the 
London & Birmingham company refused the request of carrier John Robins to convey 
goods between London and Birmingham for forwarding to Manchester, and Robins 
took the company to court for unequal treatment. The company claimed that they had 
refused Robins access because they were physically incapable of accommodating 
additional carriers at the time.63 The situation was complicated by the fact that Joseph 
Baxendale, a partner in Pickfords, was also at the time the general superintendent of 
the London & Birmingham company; although he claimed that the tenures did not 
                                                 
60 Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 55, 100. 
61 ‘RAILROAD MONOPOLY.’ The Manchester Times and Gazette, 30 March 1839. 
62 Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Committee on the London and Birmingham Railway 
Bill, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 2 May 1839, 47. 
63 First Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 26 April 1839, 6; Second Report from the Select Committee on Railways, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 9 August 1839, 58; Fifth Report from the 
Select Committee on Railway Communication, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
Online, 10 July 1840, 6. 
189 
 
 
overlap, it appears that months after Robins' case was first heard in a local court 
Baxendale was still acting in both capacities.64 Justice Patteson ruled, seemingly 
contrary to common carrier law, that ‘there was no clause in the act of Parliament 
incorporating the said railway company, which compelled the company to take in their 
carriages the goods of all persons who presented them for conveyance.’65 In his 
decision the judge seems to have relied on the 'Parliamentary contract', in which the 
rights, powers and obligations of railway companies were dictated exclusively by their 
enabling acts and not by common law applicable to carriers.66  
 
While this case was the first to consider carriers’ right to operate on railways, Pickfords 
v. the Grand Junction Railway Company drew far more public attention than Regina 
v. the London and Birmingham Railway Company and exerted more influence over 
public opinion and subsequent litigation. Pickfords brought its first suit against the 
Grand Junction company in November 1840, and took the company to court again in 
1841 and 1842. Along with alleging discrimination with respect to access to company 
facilities, as in the Robins case, Pickfords also accused the Grand Junction company 
of interfering with their sending of packed parcels, or consolidated parcels, an issue 
which would be argued in court and in Parliament for more than a decade. 
 
Although railway company enabling acts typically included maximum charges for 
conveying goods above a certain weight, they also often allowed companies to charge 
any ‘reasonable’ rate for the carriage of small parcels, which before the railways would 
have been sent by coach rather than by carrier. These parcels were charged by the 
piece rather than by weight, and the rates were high because small parcels tended to 
be more valuable, incurred risk and labour disproportionate to their weight, and were 
sent in higher-speed passenger trains. Some carriers, however, collected small 
parcels addressed to different people at a single destination, packed them in a larger 
box, and sent them as standard goods to their agent at that destination who distributed 
them to their final addresses. As I described in chapter 2, consolidation of packages 
was a common practice among senders. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 
however, unilaterally declared packed parcels 'fraudulent' and refused to carry them 
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for carriers (although it accepted them from other customers). Pickfords argued that 
this unequal treatment violated common carrier law. 
 
In the first Pickfords v. Grand Junction Railway Company case, in 1841, the company 
attempted to argue that they had not carried a Pickfords box between Birmingham 
and Manchester because Pickfords refused to pay in advance; this argument was 
rejected because carrying was typically paid for after the goods were delivered, and 
Pickfords won the case.67 The following year Pickfords again took the Grand Junction 
company to court, for continuing to refuse to carry their consolidated parcels and for 
denying them the same rebates and access to facilities that they provided to Chaplin 
& Horne, the company's preferred carrier.68 Lawyers for the Grand Junction company 
argued that the company's enabling act gave it the right to know the contents of any 
package they carried; the judge agreed, but pointed out that knowing the contents of 
a container was not the same as knowing to whom they were addressed.69 The Grand 
Junction company also argued that in accepting a consolidated parcel it was 
accepting liability for goods sent to everyone to whom the packages contained in it 
were addressed, but the judge ruled that the company’s contract for carriage was with 
the carrier alone, and the carrier assumed any liability to the addressees of goods in 
their box.70 Finally, the company argued that '[i]f such men as the plaintiff were 
permitted to collect these small parcels...and put them in the bulk, the company must 
increase their rates on small parcels four or five-fold, by which the public would 
suffer.'71 John Swift, lawyer for the Grand Junction Railway Company, made this same 
argument to the Select Committee in 1844 - 'if the company are deprived of a large 
portion of revenue in this collusive manner, they charge more upon something else to 
the public’; however, shortly after making this statement he stated in response to a 
committee member's suggestion that revenue loss from a government-imposed cap 
on fares might be made up by higher parcels charges that the company's revenue 
from parcels is 'so small in amount, that it is not worth discussing'.72 
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The company’s arguments were unsuccessful, and Pickfords again won its lawsuit, 
as I mentioned in the previous section, but the Grand Junction company was slow to 
amend its policies. In 1844 the Grand Junction company appealed to the Court of 
Chancery, where the Lord Chancellor perhaps overoptimistically began by expressing 
‘a hope that [the hearing] would not occupy so much time as it had taken in the court 
below’.73 Although the Lord Chancellor expressed doubts that the Grand Junction 
company was acting honestly and in good faith, he ruled that the plaintiff, Pickfords, 
had not made a convincing enough case to justify further action by the courts.74 
 
In another high-profile case heard at the Court of Exchequer in 1844 Richard Parker, 
a London carrier, sued the Great Western Railway Company for the same two 
practices, discriminatory treatment and charging small parcel rates for his packed 
parcels while allowing the packed parcels of other senders to be sent at standard 
goods rates. The same year Parker had testified to the Select Committee on Railways 
that he had no objection to the ten per cent discount railway companies offered 
carriers for providing their own collection, distribution, packing and other customer-
facing services as well as accepting liability for goods, and believed it was a 
reasonable allowance to cover his costs; his case against the Great Western company 
had to do with the fact that they offered this discount to other carriers but not to him. 
He told the committee that the company had never given him a satisfactory 
explanation for this decision; he assumed it was because 'I was not sufficiently 
courteous or obsequious to Mr. Seymour Clark', the Great Western company’s Chief 
Traffic Superintendent.75  
 
Like the Grand Junction company, the Great Western Railway Company 
unsuccessfully argued that consolidating packages increased the liability of the 
railway company, and that Parker had voluntarily paid the increased amount for 
carriage of his goods; neither of these arguments was accepted and Parker was 
awarded his settlement.76 Despite this and subsequent victories in the courts, Parker 
was forced to continue his legal battle with the Great Western and other railway 
companies at least until the mid-1850s, winning suits for more than 15,000 incidents 
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of discriminatory pricing.77 These constant legal battles, however successful, seem to 
have taken a toll on Parker’s business; by 1849 the plaintiff had become ‘Edwards 
and others’, the assignees of Parker, as Parker, still awaiting more than £6,000 in 
damages from the Great Western company alone, had gone bankrupt.78  
  
In 1849 the Warwick Assize Court awarded George Crouch, a London carrier, the 
value of overcharges and parcels lost when the London & North Western Railway 
Company opened his packed parcels and shipped the contents on themselves, 
charging the receivers for the service. In the appeal in the Court of Exchequer in 1850 
the company’s attorney admitted that '[o]f course it was illegal for the defendants to 
open parcels; but it was unfair to the defendants and to the public to act as the plaintiff 
did.'79 Like the Grand Junction Railway Company, the London & North Western 
company argued that if they could not gain their expected profits from small parcels 
they would be forced to raise their rates on other goods, 'by which the public would 
suffer'.80 The plaintiff’s attorney described the absurdity of a railway company 
demanding additional charges to carry a box that contained articles destined for more 
than one person: 'if any of the jury had two children at school, and it was wished to 
send each of them a plum-cake, the Company insisted that each must be put into a 
distinct parcel, or they would be charged at the rate of 6d per pound.'81 In his testimony 
before the Select Committee in 1844 Edward Cardwell, a director of the South Eastern 
Railway Company, brought up the same point:  
One of the Judges said when the matter was put before him in argument, ‘I 
have eight children, and I suppose I am to pay for my portmanteau eight times 
over if it happens to have an article belonging to each child in it.... If I choose 
to take a box and pack it with all kinds of articles, and send it to any particular 
carrier to be carried, I may do so; he cannot refuse to carry it...[railway 
companies] have no more right to know from [the carrier] how many small 
parcels there are in it than he has to know from me’82  
 
In his summing-up statement Chief Justice Wilde pointed out that the company's 
refusal to accept packed parcels was not justified by the company's enabling act; if 
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the company 'want further powers they must go to Parliament; and if it is thought right 
that they should have such a power, Parliament will give it to them.'83 This ruling was 
the first of several legal victories for Crouch against the London & North Western, the 
Midland & London, the South Western, and the Brighton & South Coast companies.84 
Crouch subsequently also sued the publishers of the Railway Times for libel over an 
article describing his ‘illicit trade in small parcels, in defiance of the rules of companies 
over whose lines he desires free way’, and a jury awarded him £5 damages.85  
 
However, like Baxendale and Parker, Crouch did not see an improvement in his 
treatment by railway companies after his legal victory. In response to the ruling against 
the London & North Western company, for example, Mark Huish issued a statement 
that the company would no longer accept packed parcels, justifying the decision by 
claiming that it was possible that 'Lucifer Matches, Chemical Combustibles, and other 
dangerous substances' might be found in them.86 In 1852 the company issued another 
notice, dictating the conditions under which it would accept packed parcels. Huish 
stated that due to the 'extra risk and responsibility' the company took on, it would 
charge carriers double for packed parcels and would refuse to send carriers' 
packages further than the extents of their own line, although they forwarded other 
packages where required. In addition, the carrier needed to guarantee that none of 
the parcels were themselves packed parcels, which was impossible given carriers’ 
refusal to open and inspect the parcels they transported in the same way the railway 
companies did to carriers' parcels.87 In his book about the carrying question Crouch 
described the measures he was forced to take in response to the actions of the railway 
companies, including compensating his customers for the loss of or damage to 
property that the railway companies refused to compensate him for, and sending his 
own staff as passengers with shipments in order to ensure their safe arrival.88 
Although Crouch won settlements from several railway companies, he stated that they 
did not compensate for this inconvenience and expense and that he was thus forced 
to operate his business at a loss.89 He stated that the railway companies were 
equipped with 'the sword of oppression, the helmet of combination, the shield of 
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corruption, and habited in massive golden armour'. Crouch noted that railway 
companies had admitted to spending at least £20,000 fighting legal cases against 
carriers.90 Business representatives meeting with officials of the Board of Trade in 
1849 pointed out that while Crouch had won his case against the London & North 
Western Railway Company he had in the process lost ‘upwards of £85’ and ‘in fact, 
the railway companies openly assert that they do not care for such actions.’91 
 
Over time the carrying question cases built up a legal precedent, making each 
subsequent case a surer victory for the carrier plaintiff. In a case against the Great 
Northern Railway Company in 1852 a judge ruled that the company was entitled to 
charge a carrier a higher price than other customers for the same service, but a higher 
court, citing Pickfords v. Grand Junction and Parker v. Great Western, overruled the 
verdict.92 Pickfords, Parker, and Crouch sued railway companies for their right to use 
rail lines and vehicles on the same terms as railway companies or their preferred 
carriers, in accordance with common law requiring carriers to serve all customers 
equally, and to operate their business, in the case of sending packed parcels, 
according to the traditional practice of the carrying trade. Each of these carriers, as 
well as others bringing similar cases to court, won his lawsuit, and every railway 
company defendant was instructed to pay the carrier damages and rectify its practices 
to permit carriers to conduct their business on the railways. Yet although, as Kostal 
notes, the opinions of the judges in this succession of carrier plaintiff victories 
'reflected a consistency and unity of opinion rare in Victorian common law', the 
practices the courts had unequivocally declared illegal continued, and carriers 
continued to bring railway companies to court until 1873, when new legislation 
referred such disputes to a panel of commissioners rather than the legal system.93  
 
Public response to railway company policy 
The members of the House of Commons Select Committee on Railways, the origins 
and actions of which I will discuss in the following section, believed that irregularities 
or illegalities in railway company practices were best dealt with in court. However, the 
witnesses testifying before the committee explained to the members that this method 
of regulation was not viable. Joseph Baxendale stated that '[the law] is inoperative 
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unless a man has not only determination, but a very heavy purse. Very few people 
would be found who would contend with a public company.'94 Edward Cardwell, 
director of the South Eastern Railway Company, pointed out that railway companies 
were so wealthy that 'the expenses of litigation form so light a burden upon them that 
it is not a sufficient security to those who may have dealings with them that they should 
have the means of recourse to the ordinary remedies at law’.'95 Richard Parker pointed 
out that 'though I have gone into court, and obtained all I asked for, it all takes up a 
great deal of my time, and I get nothing for it; my lawyer gets well paid, but I do not 
get a farthing', and noted that '[w]hen I see that Pickford's, a much mightier company 
than I am, are kept at bay month after month, and year after year, I do not like to go 
into a conflict.'96 Carriers pointed out that taking railway companies to court put their 
livelihoods in jeopardy; 'the carriers generally are small men...and they actually stand 
as much in fear of the railway companies as a pupil does of his schoolmaster.'97 Fear 
of retaliation from railway companies proved to be reasonable; in 1853 Thomas 
Kimpton won a case against the London & North Western Railway Company for 
overcharging him for sending packed parcels, and the company retaliated by refusing 
to accept any parcel from Kimpton at less than twice the usual rate, and by losing or 
misdirecting his property so frequently that he believed 'it must have been done by 
the orders of some one in authority.' The committee asked Kimpton if he had taken 
his case to Chancery, and Kimpton admitted he had not, because 'the expense is too 
great'.98 
 
As the carriers' escalation of their grievances to the legal system proved ineffective in 
changing railway company business practices, some carriers, as well as other 
dissatisfied customers of the railway companies, sought redress by publicising the 
conflict. Partly as a result of newspaper coverage of these cases, partly due to 
newspaper reporting on Parliamentary Select Committee hearings addressing the 
issue, and partly due to direct experience with railway companies, the carrying 
question became a public issue in the 1840s, debated in pamphlets and in the press.  
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As I described in my introduction, most transport historians writing about the 
development of the rail network in Britain during this period have not suggested that 
there was any question about the transition from the carrying trade to railway company 
carrying. Only Freeman and Aldcroft mention that railway company carrying may have 
been problematic: ‘road, water and waggonway transport appear to have been 
servicing the needs of the industrialising economy without undue difficulty. The 
relatively show growth of railway freight traffic relative to that carried by inland water 
and by coasters testifies to this.’99 The evidence I provide in this section - from 
pamphlets, newspaper reports, petitions and memorials, and testimony before Select 
Committees - indicates that many customers of the carrying trade did not consider 
railway company goods carriage an improvement, and often resisted using it. 
 
Carriers and their supporters wrote letters and pamphlets describing their experiences 
with railway companies, although many, mentioned in Kostal and referred to in the 
pamphlets that still exist, no longer survive.100 In contrast to the set of pamphlets I 
analysed in chapter 4, which were nominally addressed to those responsible for 
making railway company policy, and which illustrated a debate among 
decisionmakers about companies’ policy on carrying, the pamphlets written by 
carriers and railway company supporters that I analyse in this section were addressed 
to the general public, and were intended to affect public opinion on the carrying 
question in favour of or against the railway companies. Pamphlets in favour of the 
carrying trade cast the carrying question in terms of ‘David and Goliath’, with carriers 
representing the English tradition of private enterprise and free competition against 
publicly-supported monopolists. J. T. Norris, whose 1841 pamphlet supporting the 
carrying trade I mentioned in chapter 4, framed the carrying question as a general 
question of freedom; 'competition amongst many parties, open to the whole public' 
was 'essential to the very existence of this freedom' that citizens of Britain were justly 
proud of.101 He portrayed the plaintiff in Pickfords v. Grand Junction Railway Company 
as seeking fairness and openness to facilitate healthy competition; Joseph 
Baxendale, in his attempts to negotiate with the Grand Junction company which I 
analysed earlier in this chapter, sought 'a clear stage and no favour’.102 The Grand 
Junction company, however, '[d]espite the general asseverations that their own 
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interests are, and ever will be, identical with those of the public', narrowly focused on 
its own interest which, at least in this situation, was antithetical to that of the public.103 
Norris demonstrated this by quoting letters from the company's directors to its 
proprietors, showing how deliberately they protected that interest by manipulating 
public opinion: 
An attempt was made by parties engaged in the carrying trade to create an 
impression unfavourable to the system on which the merchandise business of 
this railway is conducted. The attempt however, the Directors believe, has 
been entirely defeated by the evidence offered on behalf of the Company…. 
The Bill for the regulation of railways…was attentively watched by the 
Directors, and their efforts…have been directed to procure a modification of 
the proposed enactments which were calculated to prejudice the interests of 
the Company, and to interfere widely with the internal management of their 
property.104 
 
Norris also highlighted the Grand Junction company's disingenuousness by pointing 
out the 'ambidexterity' of its public statements, which described the railway as both a 
public and private road, and claimed that the company made profits both on tolls only 
and on its carrying business. John Moss, chairman of the company, had stated in 
1837 that the company preferred not to carry and had no intention of going into the 
carrying business; by 1840 he had declared that the company were required to act as 
carriers and had intended to set up a carrying business since before its enabling act 
had been approved.105 Norris did not consider it likely that railway companies’ 
monopoly over goods carriage could be controlled by competition from canals or other 
railway lines; so much money had been invested in railway companies that it was 
unlikely that canals could provide meaningful competition, and the boards of directors 
of railway companies tended to overlap, and they made informal non-competition 
agreements.106 Thus there was no external check on ‘the Company…in fact carrying 
out resolutely into practice, the monopoly which they so candidly avow in words.’107  
 
In addition to his political and ideological arguments, Norris described the financial 
bind carriers found themselves in. The Memorandum of Understanding the Grand 
Junction company required carriers who used their line to accept did not permit them 
to charge less than the company for equivalent services; carriers were reimbursed for 
providing their own liability and customer-facing services, ‘that which constitutes the 
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real difficulty, and to the public the main value of the carrier’s trade', with a percentage 
of the company’s carriage rates.108 Because the carrier's reimbursement was a 
percentage of the railway company's own charges, whenever the Grand Junction 
company lowered its rates the carrier’s reimbursement was reduced even though the 
carrier continued to provide the same services at the same cost to themselves.109  
 
The first of carrier George Crouch’s books supporting the carrying trade, Railway 
Parcels and Rates, was published in 1849. It outlined the arguments in Crouch v. The 
London and North Western Railway Company, and included some transcripts of 
witness testimony as well as the spoken verdict of the jury, which is not included in 
other records of the case. Crouch claimed that railway company policy was intended 
to: 
injure Traders and Competitors, by designedly opening, delaying, and 
missending Packed Parcels, and delivering the contents to the Customers, - 
to destroy Carriers - who compete with them on their own Line, and carry for 
less than the Company - and to ruin them by enormous and illegal overcharges 
and misconduct.110  
 
Crouch's other surviving publication is a longer book entitled The Case Stated: Crouch 
and the Railways' Monopoly, in which he asked the 'merchants, manufacturers and 
traders of Great Britain and Ireland' to support him in his conflict with several railway 
companies.111 He also asked for, and expressed, support for railway companies and 
their shareholders. Like John Whitehead and ‘A Sufferer’, whose arguments I 
analysed in chapter 4, Crouch argued that railway companies would benefit financially 
from supporting carriers, and pointed out that railway company shareholders would 
be dismayed to discover how much money that could have gone into dividends had 
been wasted on legal battles.112  
 
Both carriers and their supporters and railway companies considered it important to 
have public opinion on their side. Railway company officials were well aware that they 
would somehow have to overcome the public’s general suspicion of monopoly. They 
therefore argued that while it seemed likely that railway companies exercised, or 
would soon exercise, a monopoly over rail passenger and goods transport it would be 
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impossible for them to exploit their position due to negative public opinion. In 1840, 
for example, Edward Cardwell, director of the South Eastern Railway Company, 
testified to the Select Committee on Railway Communication, 'I believe that if the 
public are once led to be very suspicious…they will take care that we shall be sufferers 
in the long run.'113 John Swift, lawyer for the Grand Junction Railway Company, 
claimed that  
the railway company is amenable to public opinion in a far more immediate 
and active mode than the middleman, who...is not talked about and watched 
as the companies are.... [The influence of public opinion on railway 
companies] is more powerful than the action of public opinion upon individual 
carriers, upon whom it never acts at all.'114  
 
These officials asserted that railway companies would never exploit their monopoly 
position due to ‘fear of public opinion, and also of Parliamentary action' to authorise a 
competing rail line; if a company tried to increase its rates 'the public feeling would be 
aroused, and...[the companies’] interest would suffer materially'.115  
 
In 1847, in response to one of the several petitions to government created by 
businessmen in support of the carrying trade, some ‘remarks’ were published in an 
anonymous pamphlet. It is likely that the author was connected to a railway company 
- the pamphlet described railway operations using company jargon (for example, 
‘Northern Division’) and stated that railway company officials were the 'most clever 
and intelligent in the world'.116 Although the pamphlet’s publisher, Bradshaw and 
Blacklock, does not appear in the Nineteenth-Century Short Title Catalogue, 
Bradshaw was a publisher of railway timetables, and thus had some connection with 
the railway sector.117 The anonymous author argued that 'the trade of Birmingham 
have erred in principle, and been misled, much to their own disadvantage, and are 
lending their support to a party, whose only object is self-interest'.118 The author 
restated the arguments against the carrying trade first laid out by Henry Booth in 1841, 
and described in chapter 4 - that carriers were self-interested and unnecessary 
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‘intermediaries’, that it was inefficient for many carriers to use a single rail line, and 
that 'the Carriers desire to maintain a monopoly of their trade at the expense of the 
Railway Companies.'119 The author adopted Booth’s framing of the issue, with railway 
companies and carriers equally matched in the conflict.120 The pamphlet stated, 
inaccurately, that customers need not be concerned that railway companies would 
exercise their monopoly privilege by raising rates, as ‘any person of common 
discernment, must know that such could not be done, because their maximum rates 
are fixed by Parliament’ (maximum tolls on goods carriage were fixed by companies’ 
enabling acts, but goods carriage rates were not).121  
 
The proprietors of businesses that used railway companies to transport goods 
expressed dissatisfaction with railway company service and policies through letters 
published in newspapers, public meetings, and petitions to government. As with the 
responses to the practices of the London water monopolies I described in chapter 3, 
these speakers and writers expressed concerns about both the quality and expense 
of railway company service and the lack of competition. Customers complained ‘of 
the irregularity and dearness of the conveyance of…goods on the railways, since the 
companies superseded the old carriers and took the trade into their own hands’.122 
When in 1846 the London & North Western Railway Company announced that it 
would exclude carriers from part of its line, a speaker at a meeting in Birmingham to 
protest this decision stated that ‘[t]he moment they had driven the carriers off the 
line…by carrying at a loss themselves…they would raise the freights to a much higher 
rate than at present.’123 Another stated that 
he had been told that unless he signed an agreement to send all his corn by 
railway, the company would not afford him the same accommodation which 
they did to others; he was forced to send his goods in his clerk’s name since 
not only had he been barred from the line, but the railway company had also 
notified all of their other customers that they would not ship to him…. Not long 
ago he had given an order to a manufacturer in Yorkshire, who sent the goods 
by railway, and paid the carriage. When they were delivered in Birmingham, 
the carriage was again demanded; but he…refused to pay, and sent the man 
back, with a letter asking for an explanation. A month elapsed before he got 
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any answer at all, and it was then presented to him in an envelope, and the 
sum of 5s. demanded before he could open it to see what it contained.124  
 
Several other speakers described how railway service was inferior to carrier service; 
for example, carriers contracted to railway companies only delivered to destinations 
within a specified boundary, and were known to leave consignments by the side of 
the road once they reached that boundary.125 They stated that railway companies and 
their contracted carriers did not adapt their business practices to that of their 
customers, as the carrying trade did and as customers of the carrying trade had come 
to expect. 
 
Government response to the carrying question 
In addition to addressing railway companies and their peers through published letters, 
pamphlets, and public meetings, businessmen concerned about the carrying question 
appealed directly to the government to regulate railway company business practices. 
In 1839, in response to railway companies’ refusal to abide by the verdict in Regina 
v. the London and Birmingham Railway Company, 3,500 of ‘the most respectable 
merchants and manufacturers’ of London, Manchester, Chester and other cities, 
some of whom had also been refused railway carriage of their goods, sent a memorial 
to the House of Commons requesting them to intervene on behalf of carriers and 
restrain the railway companies' monopoly. The memorial pointed out that the 
government had already involved itself in railway operations, by compelling the Grand 
Junction and London & Birmingham Railway Companies to carry the mail, and that 
the law respecting railway goods carriage must be clarified or ‘there will be created, 
in place of the existing roads and canals, which by law are open to all, conveyance 
monopolies of the most mischievous nature’.126 Another memorial collected 1,700 
signatures from businessmen and carriers in London, Manchester, Birmingham, 
Worcester, Nottingham, Leicester, Sheffield, Wolverhampton, Oxford, Northampton, 
Walsall, Huddersfield and Staffordshire (a witness stated that they had also obtained 
signatures from Derby but they had not arrived in time to be submitted).127 These 
public expressions of concern motivated the House of Commons to appoint a Select 
Committee to investigate railway company business practices. 
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In 1846 railway company officials proposed a clause for inclusion in the Bristol & 
Birmingham and Midland Consolidation Bill stating that ‘it shall not be lawful to include 
in one packet several parcels of various sorts, and intended for various individuals, 
but that it shall be lawful for the Midland Railway Company to charge a separate sum 
for each such parcel, although many are included in one packet.’128 London 
booksellers petitioned the House of Commons in opposition to the clause:  
[railway companies] got large powers…but these privileges were granted to 
them under the idea that the railway would be of great public convenience, not 
only a source of profit to themselves…. [B]efore the introduction of railways 
the carrying trade were subject to heavy loss…if they detained [parcels] they 
were liable to fines. Were railways to be exempt from this, and to have nothing 
to force them to attend to the public?129 
 
The booksellers pointed out the danger to privacy of such a clause, which permitted 
railway companies to open and search any parcel.130  
 
After the formation of the London & North Western Railway Company in 1847, 
Birmingham merchants met to oppose the exclusion of carriers from what had 
formerly been the London & Birmingham line.131 The resulting memorial to the Board 
of Trade requested that railway company goods carrying rates be regulated, that 
railway companies be required to transport carriers’ goods, that the rate companies 
charged carriers be the proportion of their standard rates that did not include the work 
undertaken by carriers, that the company’s goods not be given a higher priority than 
carriers’ goods, and that disputes be settled according to carrier law.  
 
In 1849 a deputation of merchants and carriers presented the Board of Trade with 
petitions from merchants in Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Edinburgh, Sheffield, 
Coventry, Newcastle, Belfast, Bristol, Glasgow, and other cities, protesting 
‘oppressive conduct and charges of railway companies toward traders and carriers’ 
and claiming that railway companies had ‘resorted to illegal and improper charges in 
order to defeat fair competition’. The Board of Trade acknowledged that ‘no person 
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can doubt that some remedy must be had’ and agreed to consider the deputation’s 
requests.132  
 
On 4 March 1850 a public meeting, chaired by Baron Lionel Rothschild, MP for the 
City of London, and attended by 65 of the 'most influential gentlemen' in London, 
'merchants, bankers, wholesale warehousemen, manufacturers, and traders', was 
held to ‘take into consideration the charges on railways and the alleged monopoly of 
the great railway companies in taking the carrying of goods into their own hands 
instead of leaving it under the management of private carriers.’ Crouch described this 
meeting in detail, stating that the room was packed to overflowing and many were 
turned away due to lack of space.133 The attendees, including several MPs, at least 
one of whom who was also a railway director, overwhelmingly supported railway 
companies and desired them to be profitable, but affirmed that it was necessary that 
government, by ensuring that railway companies did not exercise a monopoly over 
goods carrying, must save the railway companies from themselves.134 The railway 
company director who spoke at the meeting pointed out that companies could not act 
unilaterally, but must be regulated.135 The attendees appointed 28 gentlemen to 
express their concerns to the House of Commons Select Committee.136 According to 
Crouch, 'the report so made by the Committee of the said public meeting, never was 
acted on, or further progress made thereon; why, we cannot say'.137  
 
In British Politics on the Eve of Reform Peter Jupp divides Parliamentary petitions into 
two types, those arising from local meetings and those facilitated by national pressure 
groups or single-issue organisations.138 Petitions addressing the carrying question 
were atypical, as they were the result of local meetings held all over the country rather 
than the work of national single-issue groups. Unlike, for example, petitions 
supporting abolition, no national membership organisation gathered signatures for 
petitions supporting the carrying trade; nevertheless, the memorials protesting railway 
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monopoly of goods carriage contained thousands of signatures from all over the 
country.  
 
Parliament responded to these expressions of concern over the carrying question, as 
well as other concerns about railway company finances, management and business 
practices, by convening Select Committees which held a series of hearings between 
1839 and 1844 and published hundreds of pages of witness testimony. While the first 
Select Committee hearings on railways, held in April 1839, heard only eight witnesses, 
all associated with railway companies, the second and third sets of hearings, from 
April to August 1839 and February to June 1840, heard about 50 witnesses each, 
representing railway companies, government agencies, and railway companies’ 
customers, including carriers. The hearings held between February and May 1844 
heard 26 witnesses. Although the committees produced five reports including 
recommendations about several aspects of railway company practice, they did not 
make any concrete recommendations with respect to the carrying question, and the 
government ultimately declined to take any substantive action to address it. 
 
In 1839, before the carrying question became a significant public issue, Charles 
Poulett Thomson, the president of the Board of Trade, convened the first House of 
Commons Select Committee on Railways. Many of the 15 MPs on the committee had 
already distinguished themselves in Parliament, most notably Robert Peel, who had 
served as Prime Minister four years before, and Charles Shaw Lefevre, Speaker of 
the House of Commons. The committee also included at least one member with 
relevant expertise; Sir John Guest was familiar with railways from managing his 
family's ironworks in Wales and had other similar business interests.139 The committee 
did not hear testimony from carriers during this session, but the opinion of the railway 
compay representatives who testified about the appropriate relationship between 
railway companies and carriers was divided and uncertain. Witnesses’ responses to 
questions relating to carrying were inconclusive, as most companies had not fully 
developed their goods carrying policies or started carrying goods on their lines. The 
Great Western company had not started carrying, the London & Birmingham company 
had been transporting goods for less than a month, and the Southampton Railway 
Company witnesses stated that they did not as yet carry many goods.140 One railway 
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company representative pointed out that carrying 'is so completely a new trade to us, 
that we have not been able to frame regulations'.141 Only one company had developed 
a regular carrying service by that time; John Moss, chairman of the Grand Junction 
Railway Company, stated that three or four carriers operated on their line alongside 
the company's own carrying business, and that the company allowed these carriers 
'a per-centage out of the toll we charge, for their trouble as carriers; we are not anxious 
to be carriers.'142  
 
At about the same time, the committee overseeing the reauthorisation of the London 
& Birmingham Railway Company's enabling act were also exploring issues of control 
of and access to rail lines. They were particularly interested in the extent to which the 
original intent of enabling acts - for the company to construct the line and allow others 
to use it on payment of a toll - could realistically be expected to be realised. They 
asked Captain Moorsom, an engineer for the company, how it could be possible for 
an individual to operate a locomotive on the line; he explained that while it was 
possible, and permitted, the company was not compelled to provide a third party’s 
locomotive with fuel or water, or a place to pick up and deliver goods or passengers.143  
 
Joseph Baxendale, general manager of Pickfords, testified before the committee in 
his role as deputy chairman of the South Eastern Railway Company and former goods 
manager of the London & Birmingham Railway Company. He explained that the 
London & Birmingham Railway Company had considered setting up a carrying 
business but had no interest in becoming carriers themselves as 'they are upon a 
much sounder principle.'144 '[I]t is quite out of the question,' he argued, 'that a railroad 
company can be carriers, and admit other carriers upon the line, without doing serious 
injury to those carriers.' He believed railway companies should confine themselves to 
managing the infrastructure, as 'they act upon the same principle as the canals, only 
finding a larger capital for the benefit of the traders'.145 Theodore Rathbone, deputy 
chairman of the North Union Railway Company, also expressed support for carriers, 
                                                 
141 First Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 26 April 1839, 6. 
142 First Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 26 April 1839, 27.  
143 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee on the London and Birmingham Railway 
Bill, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 2 May 1839, 8. 
144 Second Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 9 August 1839, 55. 
145 Second Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers Online, 9 August 1839, 55. 
206 
 
 
as they allowed railway companies to focus on operating, maintaining and improving 
the rail infrastructure. Allowing carriers to manage goods transport provided railway 
companies with 'the benefit of the established connexions, experience and system of 
the carriers, instead of having them as rivals and enemies.'146 Edward Bury, who 
supplied locomotives for the London & Birmingham Railway Company, also supported 
carriers - ‘[a] private carrier would convey…and...handle the goods at less expense 
than the company could; he would adopt those plans which would seem to him to be 
the best; and as regards his general connexion with the country, the public would be 
very much benefited' - and stated baldly, ‘I do not think that railway companies ought 
to have anything to do with carrying.'147  
 
The committee's second report, published in August 1839, reflected this state of 
uncertainty about the role of carriers on railways. The committee accepted that railway 
companies were not required, like canals and turnpikes, to provide public access, and 
reiterated the defendants’ argument in Pickfords v. Grand Junction Railway Company 
that stations and water supplies were not included as part of railway companies’ 
transport infrastructure. In order to protect passenger safety, the committee 
concluded, ‘it is necessary that the Company should possess a complete control over 
their line of road, although they should thereby acquire an entire monopoly of the 
means of communication.’148 This point settled, the committee considered the carrying 
question directly. As ‘[w]itnesses, whose opinions on this question are deserving of 
careful consideration, will be found to differ entirely upon the comparative advantage 
of Companies themselves becoming carriers’, the committee stated that it did not yet 
feel competent to make recommendations regarding railway goods carriage.149 
 
The committee, now referred to as the Select Committee on Railway Communication, 
met again between February and June 1840, after the Board of Trade had received 
several more petitions from businessmen and carriers objecting to railway company 
carrying. In this session the committee heard testimony from nine carriers. Thomas 
Tibbets of Pickfords explained that railway companies charged a toll for using their 
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line, fixed by a company’s enabling act and varying by type of goods, and an additional 
rate per ton for use of the company’s locomotives and waggons, which did not vary 
by type of goods and was not fixed by law. The committee asked Tibbetts to explain 
the rationale behind the company’s charges, but he was unable to; 'they issued their 
terms, and we paid for the use of the railroad on those terms.'150 Joseph Derham, also 
of Pickfords, pointed out that carriers could not determine railway carrying charges in 
advance, as the companies billed them weekly for locomotive power based on the 
direction in which they carried the greatest weight; for example, if in one week they 
carried 50 tons in one direction and 40 tons in the other, they would be charged for 
locomotive power for 50 tons each way. This uncertainty frustrated the committee: 
The question is, whether it is or not an advantage to the public that the 
company should be carriers, or individuals; how can the Committee form an 
opinion upon that until they know how the carriers calculate their profit; if you 
cannot tell the Committee how much of the 45s you charge for goods, you 
expect to come into your own pocket, how can they form an idea whether the 
company could carry them cheaper? - From the manner in which they make 
the charges we are precluded from making that calculation at the time.151 
 
All of the carrier witnesses expressed frustration with dealing with railway companies. 
Railway carrying cost more than other transport modes, and carriers had to absorb 
this increase without passing it on to their own customers.152 Companies expected 
immediate payment while carriers were paid 'whenever you can get it'.153 Carriers 
mentioned that ‘there is not the punctuality which existed in former times’; goods were 
often delayed on the railway, either due to accident or error or, in the case of the 
Grand Junction, because the company sent its own goods before carriers’ goods. 
Such delays could result in significant additional cost and delay if the goods were 
intended to be shipped overseas; a delay of a day in the arrival of goods to be loaded 
onto an international vessel could result in a delay of weeks and loss of customs 
house fees if the ship had already sailed by the time the goods arrived at the dock.154 
Finally, companies refused to compensate carriers for loss or damage; John Robins, 
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for example, stated that ‘I have never received a farthing for all the pilferages and 
damages which have occurred on [the Grand Junction Railway].'155 The London & 
Birmingham company admitted that it had lost a package of his, but had refused to 
pay compensation for it.156 The committee asked carrier William Harnett why, in that 
case, he continued to use the railway: ‘If it does not pay you, why do you continue to 
send by railway? - In hopes of an improvement.’157  
 
The issues carriers raised to the committee were different from those they presented 
as plaintiffs in court. In court carriers argued points of common law, while before the 
committee they described situations where companies had behaved unethically or 
illegally. Carriers did not take railway companies to court over increased costs, delays, 
or even loss of or damage to goods, but rather sought redress for systemic 
discrimination in rates or service. In their testimony to the Select Committees the 
carrier witnesses expressed more general concerns about railway company policies 
and business practices, concerns which highlighted the difference between the 
economic behaviour of carriers and their customers and that of railway companies. 
 
The committee also heard testimony from 14 customers of the carrying trade - 
merchants, warehousemen, salesmen, and manufacturers from Birmingham, 
Liverpool, London and Manchester, some of whom had signed the memorials in 
support of the carrying trade. All except the Birmingham witnesses used the railways 
to send and receive goods but employed carriers rather than the railway companies, 
and all but the Birmingham witnesses expressed dissatisfaction with railway company 
service, stating that it was less reliable than the carrying trade and less responsive to 
their needs. Some witnesses stated that railway company carrying was no less 
expensive than carrying by other transport modes, and could cost up to 25 per cent 
more, and goods could be 'as long coming as if they came by the canal'.158 Reiterating 
the carriers’ testimony, witnesses explained that reliability was more important than 
speed. Witnesses also said that the timing of goods trains was not convenient for 
them; for example, since perishable goods often arrived in London by rail in the 
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evening to be sold the following morning, it was just as convenient for them to be 
delivered by waggon, which was slower but arrived in time for the opening of the 
market.159 These witnesses also pointed out that carriers offered services railway 
companies did not, such as notifying customers when shipments were due.160 Carriers 
could be trusted to deliver goods to market and then return with the revenue from their 
sale.161 Through long relationships carriers understood the business and needs of 
their customers, and had developed their own business practices in collaboration with 
them. Finally, witnesses stated that railway companies were not as amenable as 
carriers to settling disputes or paying for loss or damage. Railway companies 'would 
insist on strict right, and set you at defiance' while carriers 'would stretch a point to 
oblige you'.162 The committee asked some witnesses why they thought anyone used 
the railways, if they offered no advantage over the carrying trade; some replied that 
they did it because others did, and they felt they could not afford to be left behind.163 
The four witnesses from Birmingham employed the Grand Junction Railway Company 
as carriers for some or all of their goods, and all expressed satisfaction with the 
company's service; all agreed, however, that neither the Grand Junction nor any other 
railway company should have the right or ability to exclude carriers from their lines.164 
 
Some witnesses specifically attributed their dissatisfaction with railway companies to 
the fact that they were joint-stock companies. Andrew Caldecott, a Manchester 
warehouseman, stated that 'with respect to public companies, it is almost useless; we 
are turned about from pillar to post, and do not know where to get redress.'165 
Witnesses felt that while they and the carriers they employed were on an equal footing 
there was no point in attempting to get railway companies to compensate for poor 
service, as 'one house could not contend against a company' and 'public bodies 
generally do not consider themselves responsible.'166 At least one railway company 
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official concurred; Edward Bury, the superintendent of locomotives on the London & 
Birmingham Railway, stated that 'I never knew a joint-stock company who would do a 
thing more economically than private individuals', and 'there would be much more 
satisfaction in the public dealing with individuals than with the company.'167  
 
As in the previous year, not all of the railway company officials testifying before the 
committee in 1840 were convinced that railway companies should act as carriers, and 
many seemed to recognise the strengths and limitations of joint-stock companies. 
Edward Bury argued that not engaging in the carrying trade meant that the company's 
'earnings would be greater with less inconvenience, and less trouble to ourselves.'168 
Captain Laws, manager of the Manchester & Leeds Railway Company, was 
convinced that railway company carrying would soon be phased out, and 'the Grand 
Junction, if it pursues its own plan [to act as carrier], will very soon stand alone.’169 He 
noted that the new Birmingham & Gloucester and North Midland companies did not 
intend to carry, and believed that the Great North of England and York & North 
Midland companies would make the same choice. He also believed the Liverpool & 
Manchester company would soon cease carrying; '[w]hen I consider the enormous 
expense that company carry at, I cannot think they will continue carriers'.170 He 
believed that the Grand Junction company’s choice to subsidise its carrying 
operations with passenger revenue was financially unsustainable; '[i]t appears to be 
very bad policy, if they cannot carry goods at a profit, to do it at all.'171 
 
In its third report, issued in May 1840, the committee revisited the issue of railway 
company monopolies of goods carriage, concluding that although their investigation  
demonstrates beyond all doubt that Parliament was anxious to prevent 
Railway Companies from obtaining an exclusive control over the conveyance 
of Passengers and Goods along their respective lines…[a]t the time…the 
subject was very imperfectly understood; powers were consequently 
conceded to these Companies, which counteracted…the evident purposes of 
the Legislature.... The original error consisted in a total misapprehension of 
the best means of providing locomotive power on Railways: Parliament at first 
considered that this might be safely…supplied by public competition; and its 
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measures were accordingly framed with the view of affording a free scope to 
all persons who might be willing to engage in such an undertaking…. The 
general impression of Parliament appears to have been, that there existed a 
close analogy between the principles which govern the means of conveyance 
by Railway and by Canal, and this indeed appears to have been the opinion 
of the Railway Proprietors themselves [who] frequently declared that…they 
considered themselves to be merely toll proprietors, and that it was neither 
their desire nor for their interest to undertake the conveyance of passengers 
and goods over the lines of road which they proposed to construct.172 
 
The committee realised, however, that Parliamentary restrictions on tolls ‘were 
useless, except under the supposition that there should be a free competition among 
the parties supplying the locomotive power’, and suggested that such competition was 
unlikely because carriers were reluctant to invest in the expensive equipment required 
to use the railways. Given this obstacle to competition, as well as issues of passenger 
safety and service coordination, ‘[i]t was eventually acknowledged that these 
lines...must be placed under one undivided control and authority’. The committee 
concluded that ‘it is indispensable…to prohibit, as far as locomotive power is 
concerned, the rivalry of competing parties on the same line of railway, although such 
prohibition involves the continuance of the monopoly.’173 Thus the committee not only 
confirmed that the railway companies did exercise a monopoly on their lines but that 
that monopoly was acceptable to the government.  
 
The report described the three business models for railway company carrying that 
had been explained to the committee - those of the London & Birmingham company, 
which did not carry, the Grand Junction company, whose own carrying service 
competed with carriers, and the Liverpool & Manchester company, which they 
erroneously stated was the only railway in the country ‘required by their Act to 
undertake the carriage of all goods…whereby private carriers are virtually excluded 
from participation in this business.’174 It concluded that the operations of the Liverpool 
& Manchester company were ‘carried on very much to the satisfaction of the public’, 
but acknowledged that it competed with multiple inland waterway carriers on the same 
corridor. The Grand Junction company’s policies had ‘created much ill-feeling 
between the parties concerned’, partly because carriers could charge no less than the 
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railway company acting as a carrier.175 Of the three business models, that of the 
London & Birmingham company seemed to the committee the least unsatisfactory, 
because although it did not provide any cost advantage to the public, as carriers were 
still beholden to the railway company for carrying arrangements, ‘[t]he profits of each 
carrier will depend on the amount of his business, and this can only be maintained 
and increased by an incessant attention to the wishes of his employers, and by his 
civility, punctuality, and care in the collection and delivery of goods.’ In addition, the 
committee recognised that ‘the details of the carrying trade will be more attended to 
by those who earn their livelihood from it, than if [it] were left to the management of 
railway directors, necessarily less acquainted with the details of such a trade, and less 
interested in its success.’ Although they acknowledged that a railway company goods 
carriage monopoly might harm the public, and although they seemed to favour the 
London & Birmingham company carrying model, the committee did not make any 
substantive recommendations about carrying; they only recommended ‘the 
appointment of an authority to watch the different systems practiced upon the different 
lines of railway’ and that railway companies provide statistical information about the 
volume and revenue of goods carriage separated into revenue from rates charged by 
the company acting as carrier and tolls collected from carriers.176 
 
Four years later, the committee reconvened to consider the advisability of government 
intervention in railways. Five members of the 1844 committee - Mr Greene, Lord 
Seymour, Viscount Sandon, Lord Grenville Somerset, and Mr Thornely - had served 
on the first committee; among the new members was Henry Labouchere, former 
President of the Board of Trade, and William Gladstone, then President of the Board 
of Trade.177 Between 1839 and 1844 the physical and financial landscape of the 
railway sector had changed dramatically; the railways that had opened before the 
1839 hearings had now been operating for more than five years, and many of the 
lines still under construction in 1839 had become operational.178 Some companies 
were already acquiring other lines as well as canal companies, and there was a fierce 
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competition for traffic.179 Although railway operations had become more standardised, 
particularly with respect to passengers, three major railway companies, the London & 
Birmingham, the Grand Junction, and the Great Western, still used different business 
models for carrying. 
 
The committee had been asked to consider a set of 'Clauses submitted with a View 
to amend the Law relative to the Carriage of Goods by Railway', designed to 
systematise and equalise the rights and responsibilities of railway companies with 
respect to carrying and to outline fair and consistent practices for railway company 
treatment of carriers.180 It is unclear who developed these clauses, or in what manner 
they were submitted for review by the committee; the committee itself, however, 
appeared to have considered them ‘a view of the arrangements which the carriers 
desire, but which…would be most unpalatable to the Railway Companies.’181 These 
clauses would require railway companies acting as carriers to separate their goods 
carriage rates into tolls and charges for pickup and delivery, locomotive power and 
waggons, and carrying, and that these charges should be 'fixed, equal, and 
reasonable'. The clauses would empower the Board of Trade to investigate and 
adjudicate complaints of unfair or preferential treatment in rates or in operations (for 
example, prioritising loading and unloading, sending goods on faster or earlier trains).  
 
The language of some of the witnesses in these hearings is similar to that used in the 
municipal water supply company hearings I analysed in chapter 3, demonstrating a 
conflict between a business model based on relationships and the model employed 
by joint-stock companies. For example, witnesses before both committees suggested 
that their credibility could be demonstrated by the strength of their connections with 
their communities. One witness observed that a witness in Parker v. The Great 
Western Railway Company 'has lived in Oxford and its neighbourhood from his youth, 
and his testimony would be relied on by the magistrates of that place' and that of he 
himself 'no man has just cause to doubt my word.'182 These kinds of statements show 
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that these witnesses, like many others, still valued and relied on a carefully maintained 
social reputation to support their economic interests.  
 
Three railway company official witnesses used the same language and frames to 
delegitimise the carrying trade as in the pamphlets I analysed in chapter 4. John Swift, 
lawyer for the Grand Junction Railway Company, asserted that the company were 
'carriers' and carriers on the line were not; asked about the Pickfords case, he stated 
that 'the only question is, whether he or I should have the money; we being, in fact, 
the carriers and he only the collector or deliverer’.183 He later used the phrase 'what 
are called the carriers on the railway’, stating that as 'the railway company are the 
carriers, I cannot see how you can deal with any other person under the name of 
carrier.'184 Using similar language to that in Braithwaite Poole’s pamphlets, Swift 
explained that carriers were really only 'customers of the carrier, that is to say, of the 
railway company' and frequently used the expressions 'so-called carriers' and 
'middlemen'.185 During his testimony the committee members questioning him began 
to adopt his terminology. Swift refused to allow the word 'monopoly' to be applied to 
railway company operations; 'I do not call it by that name, because it is not an 
agreeable name.'186 In his testimony Mark Huish, secretary and general manager of 
the Grand Junction company and author of one of the pamphlets I analysed in chapter 
4, used similar language to refer to carriers:  
I cannot admit that there is any competition between the Grand Junction 
Railway Company and the middlemen…. The company being the sole 
carriers, they receive all goods…in their capacity as carriers, and…receive 
and transmit them from the so-called carriers or middlemen.187  
 
John Moss, chairman of the Grand Junction company, engaged in similar semantic 
manipulation, referring to carriers using the line as the railway company's agents.188  
 
Despite having heard witness testimony related to the carrying question, the 
committee did not recommend any action to control railway companies' growing 
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monopoly over regional and national goods transport. Their report stated that 
'interference of such an extensive and unusual nature...ought not, in their opinion, to 
be attempted, unless after mature deliberation, upon a very strong case of 
necessity...and with a full view of the actual position of the different interests affected'. 
Given 'the magnitude of the other questions, of a more pressing nature, into which the 
Committee have had to inquire', including financing, safety, and through service for 
passengers, they opted not to make any recommendations on the carrying question 
until after the Pickfords case had been decided in court.189  
 
Nearly a decade later, in 1853, a Select Committee on Railway and Canal Bills was 
convened to reconsider government involvement in the management of railway 
companies, which by this time constituted a national transport network. By this time it 
was generally acknowledged that these companies collectively constituted 'an entire 
monopoly, sanctioned by Parliament', although the extent to which canals and 
alternative rail routes offered meaningful competition, and the extent to which these 
potential competitors should be permitted to combine, were still open questions.190 
Although the carrying question appeared to have been settled by default by this time, 
the committee did hear some testimony from the Board of Trade, carriers, and carriers' 
customers relating to railway company carrying. Representatives of the traders of 
Birmingham described several instances of railway companies either directly refusing 
service to specific individuals or indirectly damaging businesses by charging them 
higher rates, delaying packages, requiring pay in advance, or placing arbitrary 
restrictions on the conditions of carriage. The witnesses pointed out that while these 
actions might be illegal, taking railway companies to court had proved ineffective in 
stopping them; even when the carrier plaintiff won his case the damage had already 
been done. In short, 'the ordinary remedy of an action at law is not available as a 
sufficient protection for the individual trader.'191 A few witnesses called directly on 
Parliament to take action to protect the carrying trade and the public from railway 
company monopoly. George Loch, barrister for the Bridgewater Trustees, stated that 
if the government were concerned about monopoly 'you must reduce the railways 
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throughout the country to be highways, and not monopolists of carriage also.'192 
George Mellish, director of the Grand Junction Canal Company, agreed, stating that 
the only way to ensure competition was '[i]f Parliament were to oblige the railways to 
admit the carriers'. His argument, however, was not very convincing as he went on to 
say that  
if [the canal company, currently acting as carriers on their line] were compelled 
necessarily to let all carriers come in, that it would be very difficult for us to 
continue our carrying establishment at all, for it cannot be carried on efficiently 
except we practically have a monopoly to a certain extent.193  
 
The committee heard hundreds of pages of testimony from railway company officials, 
canal company officials, and other parties, much of which was contradictory, and 
some of which the committee criticised for focusing on the witness's self-interest 
rather than seeking to develop and apply general principles to promote public 
benefit.194 As a result, although it made several recommendations in its report, the 
committee did not directly address the carrying question. 
 
Over a period of 14 years, in response to expressions of public concern over railway 
company goods carriage, Select Committees considered the carrying question in their 
deliberations over the extent and role of government involvement in railway 
companies. Although they did recommend legislation concerning other issues 
regarding regulating railway companies, the committees ultimately made no 
recommendations for legislation to keep railway companies from monopolising goods 
carriage, or to mitigate the effects of these monopolies. Ultimately all of those who 
expressed concern about railway company monopoly of goods carriage and the 
elimination of the carrying trade were forced to rely on government, in some form - 
the courts or Parliament - to mitigate the situation when their attempts to negotiate as 
peers with railway companies proved unsuccessful. While the courts directly, and 
Parliament implicitly, acknowledged the justice of the complaints of those using 
railway companies to transport goods, and the courts explicitly attempted to address 
them, the government did not have the power, or the will, to request or enforce 
changes.  
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In Forging Industrial Policy, Frank Dobbin suggests that the British government during 
this period supported an economic climate in which ‘rationality ensued when scores 
of small entrepreneurs competed freely without interference from politics or from 
larger, dominant firms’.195 With respect to railway companies, government attention 
was directed toward three issues - balancing public benefit against the rights of 
landowners in the compulsory purchase of land, protecting the safety of passengers, 
and preventing the predatory acquisition of small companies by larger ones.196 The 
government in principle supported the carrying trade, as it conformed to its model of 
competing small entrepreneurs on a level playing field, but proved unable to enforce 
that support in any meaningful way, due to ‘lack of basic mechanisms for 
administrative or judicial oversight of private activity’, relying on the idea that ‘the law 
would enforce itself’ through the courts.197 As we have seen, however, the unanimity 
and vigour of judicial verdicts supporting the carrying trade and censuring railway 
company policies and practices with regards to goods carriage had virtually no effect 
in changing those policies and practices, or stopping the entire railway network from 
excluding carriers. 
 
Attempts to boycott railway companies 
By the late 1840s it was becoming clear to many of those objecting to railway 
company policies and practices that the strategies they had employed - negotiation 
and mediation, legal action, publicity, and appeals to government - had not been 
successful. Describing public wariness toward joint-stock companies and the threat 
of monopoly that they posed, James Taylor notes that ‘supporters of limited liability 
argued that the public did not have to deal with limited liability companies if they did 
not want to’, although it is difficult to imagine how most people could have 
substantively exercised this choice, particularly when the joint-stock company in 
question was a monopoly.198 Although a relatively insignificant and ultimately 
unsuccessful response, some businessmen, having experienced the poor quality and 
high cost of railway company carrying and not having succeeded in eliciting desired 
changes, explicitly attempted to avoid carrying by railway. An 1844 complaint against 
the Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company, primarily focusing on passenger 
service, included the following statement about goods carriage: 
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The other evening…I called at a warehouse to see a friend of mine, who was 
delivering a number of bales to a lorry for the New Quay [canal] Company. 
‘Why do you not forward them by rail?’ inquired I, ‘the charges being about the 
same?’ ‘Oh, curse the rail,’ said he, ‘the company don’t study our comforts, 
and, of course, we…don’t study their interest; we always send by a carrier, 
unless a vessel be waiting at Liverpool, and then we rail ‘em; and so we thank 
them for nothing, as Paddy says.199  
 
In 1845 it was reported that due to increasing costs of railway company carriage 
former customers of the South Western Railway were returning to inland waterway 
carrying.200 In 1846 it was reported that goods carriage between Leicester and London 
was both faster and less expensive by fly waggon than by railway.201 In 1847 a group 
of Birmingham merchants declared that due to ‘[t]hat great disappointment, both as 
regards punctuality...and damage of goods carried on railways’, they would ‘employ 
themselves, and encourage and recommend to others not present, the employment 
of water in preference to railway carriage’ for their goods.202 One frustrated bookseller, 
determined to send packages by rail from Edinburgh to London as he expected it to 
be faster than by water, and discovering otherwise, stated that ‘as I could obtain no 
assurance from [the railway company] that celerity could be depended on, I must give 
up the railway.’203 A letter to the Hull Packet noted that due to high railway carriage 
costs and poor service ‘[a] waggon goes daily between Beverley and Hull and is well 
loaded every day.’204 The York Herald and General Advertiser reported in 1849 that  
[o]n the opening of the lines between Hull and Scarbro’, all the carriers and 
coaches were expected to be annihilated, but when it was found that the 
company charged so enormously for small parcels, carriers commenced again 
between Scarbro’ and Driffield, and Burlington and Driffield, and have 
continued to be well encouraged.205  
 
In 1851 it was reported that  
[t]he charges for small parcels from Exeter to this town, by the South Devon 
Railway, is most exorbitant. A parcel only one pound and-a-half in weight is 
charged eleven-pence, when it will be taken by the Ashburton carrier for two-
pence…. The public should notice this.206  
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An 1851 letter to the editor of the Daily News expressed the writer’s opinion in strong 
terms: 
The irregular and careless conduct of the goods traffic on most railways is 
notorious…[i]n answer to [a customer’s] application for redress, he has 
doubtless been bandied about from one end of the line to the other; and...the 
only satisfaction he obtains is a curt reply from every clerk on the railway…. 
The effect of these evils is, that freighters never send goods by railway...if they 
can send any other way. 
 
The writer went on to state that he preferred to send goods by carrier, and was happy 
to pay more to do so.207 Even as late as the 1850s, by which time the carrying question 
had been settled by default in favour of the railway companies, some continued to 
attempt to avoid using railway companies for goods carriage. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Many individuals and businesses that employed the carrying trade began to use 
railway company carrying as it became available, or as it became the only option to 
transport their goods, and many who did so, for various reasons - high cost, slow 
service, insufficient protection of goods, poor response to complaints and requests for 
compensation - found railway company carrying unsatisfactory. Part of this 
dissatisfaction derived from the fact that railway companies' business structure was 
oriented toward passenger transport; railway companies were accustomed to 
interacting with individuals rather than with other businesses expecting their own 
requirements and objectives to be acknowledged, understood and catered to. Despite 
the fact that carriers, customers and the government made their dissatisfaction with 
the policies and actions of railway companies clear, these companies continued to 
adopt and strengthen their monopoly goods carriage business model.  
 
In this chapter I described the strategies carriers, carriers' customers, the general 
public and the government adopted to respond to the development of railway 
company goods carrying during the 1840s. These strategies, similar to those of 
customers of the joint-stock companies supplying water to London in the 1820s, 
ranged from attempts to negotiate with companies, to attempts to gain compensation 
or policy changes through the courts, to publicising problematic company behaviour 
through pamphlets and public meetings, petitioning the government, and making 
alternative carriage arrangements.  
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This chapter also indicates that while these strategies were somewhat successful 
against London’s water supply companies, they met with little or no success against 
railway companies. Unlike the water companies, railway companies did not engage 
at all with attempts to negotiate, either informally with individuals or formally through 
the legal system. Parliament responded to public expressions of dissatisfaction by 
convening Select Committees to investigate railway company practices and 
recommend legislation to address problems; although these committees 
recommended legislation addressing other areas of railway service, they ultimately 
took no significant action with respect to the carrying question, and railway companies 
continued to operate monopoly goods carrying services on their lines. 
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Chapter 6: Carrying after the railways 
Introduction 
As I described in chapters 4 and 5, although in the 1840s and early 1850s the carrying 
trade seemed to have the support of the business community and the government, 
and to have had both prevailing ideology (in favour of competition and against 
monopoly) and practical considerations (in that at least some believed railway 
companies were more profitable facilitating the carrying trade than acting as carriers 
themselves) in their favour, railway companies ultimately achieved their aim to 
become exclusive carriers on their lines. Railway companies’ displacement and co-
optation of carriers had several effects on both the economy and on the way business 
was done. I begin this chapter by offering some speculations about how railway 
companies were able to dominate domestic goods carrying in the face of strong and 
principled opposition. I then review some of the changes brought about by this change 
in goods carriage - railway companies’ consolidation of goods carriage through 
acquiring canals and incorporating local carriers, the contestation of the legal meaning 
of the word ‘carrier’, and the eventual state regulation of railway companies. I 
conclude this chapter by considering the effect of the change in goods carriage on the 
wider economy. 
 
Why did the railway companies succeed? 
As I have documented in this study, once railway companies determined to take over 
regional carrying they succeeded despite opposition from carriers, government, the 
business community and the general public, and despite the apparent incongruity 
between their policies and government views of how the economy should be 
structured. This success has up to now not required analysis; historians have 
assumed that it was a natural result of railway companies’ superior service and lower 
prices. As this study has shown, however, railway company goods carrying was often 
considered inferior to the carrying trade except in terms of speed; in situations where 
speed was a factor senders used railways where they would formerly have used 
coaches, but otherwise many preferred to continue to employ the carrying trade. This 
study has also suggested that the cost of carrying, while not trivial, was not of 
overwhelming significance to those who employed the carrying trade. While later 
observers have suggested that the most significant improvement of railway company 
carrying over the carrying trade was increased capacity, carriers using railways could 
have achieved the same increase that railway companies eventually did; in fact, the 
former might have been greater as carriers had more experience in organising goods 
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transport, and would have been better able to integrate existing transport and storage 
resources into a high-capacity multimodal service.  
 
This study suggests three advantages the railway companies had over the carrying 
trade. First, mirroring the collective action of joint-stock companies in other business 
sectors and industries, railway companies exercised collective influence through such 
organisations as the Railway Clearing House.1 As early as 1839 George Carr Glyn, 
then chairman of the London & Birmingham Railway, set up a ‘railway society’ to 
oppose government regulation of railways; this society was disbanded in 1840 when 
the threat proved to be illusory.2 However, in response to logistical pressures and 
government regulation railway companies created collective organisations throughout 
the 1840s and 1850s and as the dividends of individual lines dropped between 1845 
and 1855 cooperation rather than competition for limited traffic was seen as the most 
sensible and profitable course.3 
 
By contrast, although Everitt suggests that ‘[a]mongst the carriers themselves, oral 
evidence suggests that there was often a strong sense of community, fostered 
occasionally by relationship, but much more by their meeting one another week after 
week in the inns’, carriers had no equivalent collective organisations.4 Small family 
firms interacted with each other at the ends of their routes or indirectly through inns 
and agents, but there was no overall organisation or sharing of intelligence. Some 
evidence suggests that the personalised business model of the companies 
comprising the carrying trade worked against collective action.5 The nonhierarchical 
structure of the carrying trade left it without any ability to speak collectively or exert 
collective influence; the closest they came during the carrying question was the 
perceived leadership of Pickfords, the largest of the carrying firms, in its battle against 
the railway companies.  
 
Second, due to their extraordinarily profitable passenger business railway companies 
came to control a substantial amount of capital that carriers, individually and 
collectively, were unable to match. The sheer economic mass of the railway 
companies, particularly when it began to be exercised collectively, allowed them to 
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invest more in goods transport than carriers could afford to, to wear down and outwait 
carriers through endless lawsuits in the only area carriers could directly confront 
railway companies, the courts, and to influence government through personal and 
financial connections with MPs. 
 
Finally, from their inception railway companies developed strong ties with the state. 
The relationships railway company directors formed with members of Parliament 
when obtaining their companies’ enabling acts allowed them to exert political 
influence in places to which carriers had no access. In his testimony to the Select 
Committee in 1844 Richard Parker mentioned that he had intended to petition for a 
change in the Great Western company's enabling act, but 'not being accustomed to 
such proceedings, never having given evidence before, never having petitioned 
except a public petition, never having petitioned on a Private Bill, or knowing anything 
about Parliamentary proceedings, [he] feared the expenses', and was unable to act 
in time. 'I came down to the Private Bill-office, and I found that I could not petition 
against those clauses; that I must give three days' clear notice, and that I could not 
do, and I lost the opportunity.'6 Parker told the committee he had been unaware that 
he could approach the Board of Trade to investigate complaints against railway 
companies as 'I really was ignorant upon the subject'.7  
 
By contrast, while carriers found it difficult to get representation in Parliament through 
formal means that railway companies obtained through personal connections, the 
number of railway company directors in the House of Commons increased from 18 
per cent in the 1840s to nearly 90 per cent in 1853.8 These personal and financial 
connections between railway companies and the government, later referred to as the 
‘railway interest’, helped to overcome both public opposition to railway company 
business practices and the government’s own preference for supporting many small 
competing businesses.9 MPs and railway company directors may have had differing 
views on the way the economy should function, but they shared social and cultural 
backgrounds and participated in the same social networks. These personal 
                                                 
6 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Railways, House of Commons Parliamentary 
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connections may have played a pivotal role in helping an impersonal business model 
emerge victorious in a conflict with a social business model. 
 
Railway companies eliminate or integrate competitors  
Once railway companies succeeded in monopolising regional goods carriage on 
railways, they set about eliminating competition from inland waterway carriers by 
acquiring and then operating or filling in canals.10 Pollins suggests that railway 
companies began to purchase canal companies as early as the 1840s.11 'A Sufferer' 
mentioned in 1848 that the London & North Western Railway Company drove carriers 
off the Grand Junction Canal, as well as its own line.12 By 1863 railway companies 
controlled one third of the country's canal mileage; as Sir Alexander Cockburn told 
the House of Lords, 
There cannot be a doubt that…the introduction of railways has destroyed the 
competition which formerly existed…. [T]he absence of other means of 
conveyance…compels the owner of goods…to resort to railway conveyance. 
He is thus at the mercy of the [railway company], and has no alternative but to 
submit to any terms, however unjust and oppressive, which the latter may think 
fit to impose.13 
 
As I have indicated, the carrying trade did not disappear completely; in fact, in some 
areas the number of local carriers increased after the introduction of railway service.14 
These carriers, however, served a different economic purpose than the carrying trade 
of two generations before. W. H. Hudson identified two roles for carriers at the turn of 
the twentieth century, as 'country buses' bringing villagers to and from town for 
errands, shopping, and market days and as an informal postal service picking up and 
delivering packages for village residents; Everitt identifies a third purpose, bringing 
fresh produce from nearby farms into town.15 Although carriers still established 
relationships with customers, and continued to serve as 'shopping agents' as well as 
transporters of goods, this new incarnation of the carrying trade no longer served 
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other businesses, as production of goods had largely relocated into cities with rail 
links.16 
 
The change in the legal meaning of ‘carrier’ 
As railway companies began to control the goods carrying business and carriers 
became increasingly marginalised, the legal definition of ‘carrier’, after a period of 
ambiguity, underwent a change. As I mentioned in chapter 5, some railway company 
officials testifying before Select Committees between 1839 and 1844 referred to 
themselves as carriers; they objected to the use of the word ‘carrier’ to describe the 
carrying trade, describing carriers as ‘middlemen’ or ‘collectors’ or ‘deliverers’, or even 
‘so-called carriers’.17 As I described in chapter 1, however, the term ‘carrier’ had a 
legal meaning, and carriers had specific and substantial responsibilities under statute 
and common law to protect and insure goods in their care, and to compensate 
customers for lost or damaged property. While railway companies were eager to 
exclude carriers from the goods carrying business, they were less eager to take on 
these responsibilities, and the issue of whether a railway company was a ‘carrier’ in 
law took some time to settle.  
 
As early as 1833 the issue of whether railway companies were legally carriers, and 
thus subject to the law regarding carrying, or only companies responsible for 
constructing, maintaining and operating transport assets, began to generate legal 
questions, particularly in relation to tax assessment and liability for goods. R. W. 
Kostal covers the former topic in detail in Law and English Railway Capitalism, but as 
he approaches it with a different set of questions I have not relied on his interpretation 
of the story, instead drawing evidence from contemporary sources.18 The legal issues 
involved in settling these questions, and the arguments presented in the hearings that 
decided them, can be found not only in the law books and case records I cite below, 
but also in the extensive contemporary newspaper reporting of these cases, which 
were clearly assumed to be of interest to the general public as both investors in 
railway companies and as users of railways. 
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Among the many taxes and revenues authorised by Parliament was a land tax, 
introduced in the 1690s to fund poor relief.19 Although this tax, collected by local 
authorities, was inconsistently assessed, the general principle was to tax a 
percentage of the value of the land itself, and its agricultural and industrial 
improvements, based on how much rent a property owner could derive from it.20 
Assessable improvements were distinct from the profits of a business, or ‘stock in 
trade’, which in theory could be performed or located anywhere.21 In the eighteenth 
century a local authority’s assessment of infrastructure within its boundaries, 
particularly canals, was generally agreed to be the proportion of the asset’s value 
corresponding to the proportion of the asset within its boundaries, based on 
determination of a ‘value per mile’ of the total profits of the asset owner.  
 
In 1833 the Liverpool & Manchester Railway Company appealed the assessment of 
the township of West Derby based on the company’s 1832 profits. The company 
asserted that because 'from the untried nature of their undertaking...[it] ha[d] been 
obliged to be themselves the carriers on their own line', its stated profits were 
generated not only by the value of the land the railway occupied, but also the 'profits 
on trade', which should not have been included in the township's calculations. West 
Derby argued that if another party had been using the company's property the 
company would have generated the same assessed profit from tolls. The company 
responded that the revenue it could have generated from the tolls for the goods they 
carried was much higher than the company’s actual revenue because the company 
did not collect tolls on goods they carried themselves, and therefore the infrastructure 
company did not profit from them. In effect, as the company was arguing that it would 
have made substantially more profit on goods transported in 1832 from tolls alone 
than from carrying them, it admitted that it had been operating its carrying business 
at a loss. In a 'monstrous' and 'extraordinary' decision, however, the court disagreed 
with the company’s arguments, and the township's tax rate was upheld.22  
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Nine years later the defining case for railway company land tax assessment, Queen 
v. The South-Western Railway Company, was heard in the Court of Queen's Bench. 
The parish of Micheldever in Hampshire had assessed the South Western Railway 
Company for the proportion of its published profits assigned to the 4.5 miles of the 
77-mile line that fell within the parish’s boundaries.23 The company had lost its 
challenge to this rate in a lower court, but appealed the decision. The local newspaper 
reported that ‘the case was full of confusion in every part of it’.24  
 
In a five hour argument, the company expressed its willingness to accept an 
assessment based on toll revenue but argued that it should not include the profits of 
their carrying business. They referred to the precedent of King v. The Trustees of the 
Duke of Bridgewater, which found that the Bridgewater Canal Trustees would be 
assessed on the value of their asset, including toll income, but not on the value of 
their carrying business. In the Bridgewater case, however, the trustees’ ‘characters of 
occupiers of the land and of carriers were quite distinct’, and it was found that their 
carrying business was ‘unconnected with the land, did not add to its value, and 
therefore [was] properly excluded from the rate’.25 The railway company argued that 
as other parties had the right to carry on the line their carrying revenue should be 
considered separately - ‘it was a mere personal profit arising from a personal privilege 
and advantage, and was therefore not liable to any rate’.26  
 
The court, however, confirmed the lower court’s ruling in favour of the parish, stating 
that 
[i]t seemed to have been originally expected that railroads would be generally 
demised…to third parties…. It had, however…been considered by the 
companies to be more profitable to become carriers themselves, and although 
any person was entitled in law to use any company’s railroad…yet…the 
traffic…upon these lines is at present a virtual monopoly…. As the 
defendants…were in actual, exclusive, and beneficial occupation of the 
railroad, there seemed to be no reason…for pursuing any different course.27 
 
A contemporary legal analysis of this case pointed out that the London & South 
Western Railway Company’s 1835 enabling act included clauses both permitting the 
company to act as a carrier on its line and requiring it to allow other carriers to use 
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the line.28 If the company had opened its line to carriers, the company as infrastructure 
provider and the company acting as carrier ‘would…stand much in the same relation 
to each other as the trustees of a turnpike road, and the coach and post-masters 
conveying passengers upon it.’29 This analysis also mentioned the logistical issues 
involved in making the theoretical distinction between tolls and rates in this case, 
pointing out that although the company’s enabling act required it to keep separate 
records of profits from tolls and from carriage the company did not appear to have 
done this, nor did it have a mechanism to collect tolls separately from carriage rates.30  
 
Although the Micheldever verdict set a clear standard for the land tax assessment of 
railway companies, the issue was topical enough two years later to be a subject of 
questions in the hearings of the Select Committee on Railways. An overall 
Parliamentary review of taxation in 1846 also addressed the subject, but by this time 
it was generally agreed that it was reasonable for railway companies to be assessed 
on the value of ‘the net rent a company of carriers would give for the occupation of 
the same’.31 By the time the Eastern Counties Railway Company took the parish of 
South Weald to court in 1847 to contest its assessed rate, the principle that a railway 
company was itself a carrier had been settled, and the question argued in court was 
over the amount of the company’s profits and the appropriate rate of deduction for 
tenants’ profits.32 An 1854 analysis of a railway company assessment rate case took 
it for granted that companies were assessed on ‘the net profits, as derived from the 
traffic’.33  
 
In contrast, consensus on whether the legal definition of ‘carrier’ with respect to liability 
for customers’ lost or damaged property applied to a railway company took 
substantially longer. An article in the Leeds Intelligencer and Yorkshire General 
Advertiser in 1842 noted that while some railway companies' enabling acts specifically 
exempted them from common carrier law, the law still required that any common 
carrier should be held responsible for loss or damage to property in their custody. The 
article’s author recommended, however, that anyone seeking compensation from a 
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railway company should consult a lawyer first, as 'public companies are far too ready 
to take advantage'.34 As railway companies took on the role of carriers during the 
1840s, direct conflicts between companies and their customers became more 
frequent as customers, not having either the personal relationships or precedents in 
custom and common law to negotiate with railway companies as they had with 
carriers, resorted to lawsuits. Newspapers in the late 1840s were filled with reports of 
customers suing railway companies ‘as common carriers’ for recompense for loss or 
damage of goods.35 
 
Railway company defendants initially attempted to avoid being subject to common 
carrier law, though it was generally considered that unless their enabling acts 
specifically exempted them they were required to comply with the Carriers’ Act.36 In 
the 1849 case Shaw v. York & North Midland Railway Company, for example, the 
defendant attempted to argue that the company had not contracted to transport the 
plaintiff’s horses safely and were thus not required to compensate the plaintiff for one 
that had been killed in transit. Aside from arguing that ‘they did not receive the horse 
on the understanding that he was to be safely carried’, the defendant claimed that 
they ‘were not common carriers, and…the law applicable to common carriers did not 
apply to them.’ The jury awarded £315 to the plaintiff, but the verdict was overturned 
by the judge, who determined that due to the nature of the specific agreement 
between the company and the plaintiff the company was not liable for the death of the 
plaintiff’s horse.37 While this was an unusual case, in that the carrying trade did not 
typically transport live animals and thus there was little or no pre-railway precedent 
for deciding it, it is notable in that the defendant argued that railway companies were 
not common carriers and thus not subject to the laws applicable to carriers.  
 
It was clear, however, by the late 1840s that the legal system had accepted that 
railway companies carrying goods on their lines had the legal responsibilities of 
carriers. Although Richards v. The Brighton Railway Company, heard in the Court of 
Common Pleas in 1849, related to a piece of luggage belonging to a passenger rather 
than goods being carried by the company, the judge, in his finding in favour of the 
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plaintiff, argued that the circumstances ‘were quite sufficient to cast upon [the railway 
company] the common law responsibility of carriers’.38 In Phillips v. the Great Western 
Railway Company, heard in Bristol County Court in 1850, the plaintiff argued that the 
railway company was responsible under the Carriers’ Act to compensate him for lost 
property, irrespective of any clauses to the contrary in the company’s enabling act, 
and the judge agreed, citing earlier similar cases as precedents.39 
 
In addition to being required to take responsibility as carriers for their own actions, 
case law began to hold railway companies that had contracted with carriers as agents 
responsible for the actions of these carriers as well. An 1847 article reported the 
verdict in Machin v. the London and South-Western Railway Company, in which the 
plaintiff had engaged the defendant ‘in their capacity as carriers’ to send a bale of silk 
worth more than £100 from Andover to London, and subsequently took the company 
to court for compensation when the bale was lost. While a common carrier would 
ordinarily not be liable for goods worth more than £10, the plaintiff stated that he was 
suing the railway company for the ‘felonious act of the company's servant’, Chaplin & 
Horne, described as 'the defendants' agents'. The jury awarded the cost of the bale 
to the plaintiff, indicating that the actions of Chaplin & Horne were considered the 
responsibility of the railway company.40 In another case heard that year at the 
Guildhall in London, the plaintiff had given his goods to Pickfords to be sent to 
Aylesbury, and Pickfords had transferred them to Chaplin & Horne, acting as railway 
company carriers, who had subsequently misplaced them. The plaintiff’s solicitor 
advised the plaintiff that Pickfords was not liable for the goods, as responsibility had 
been transferred, and ‘[r]ailway companies, when they undertook to carry goods, 
were, in the eye of the law, subject to all the responsibilities of common carriers.’ The 
legal question in this case was whether or not it could be heard in City court; as the 
answer appeared to be ‘no’, no further legal action was reported.41 Shortly afterward, 
in Moore v. Horn & Co. (sic), the Westminster County Court confirmed that the London 
and Brighton Railway Company could be sued for compensation for broken glass in 
a package they were responsible for; in this case the carriers Horne & Co., which had 
received the package, were considered to have acted as agents for the railway 
company.42 
                                                 
38 The Bradford Observer, 17 May 1849. 
39 ‘BRISTOL COUNTY COURT’, The Standard, 17 September 1850. 
40 The Morning Post, 24 December 1847. 
41 The Morning Chronicle, 28 September 1847. 
42 Daily News, 24 November 1847. 
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Even in cases where a railway company acting as a carrier could legitimately have 
expected protection under common carrier law, such as those involving the loss of 
items worth more than £10, juries awarded plaintiffs substantial sums for damages. 
In an 1851 case against the London & North Western Railway Company the 
defendant presented several arguments for why they should not be liable for the cost 
of a lost box of silk, including that 'if the company were made liable under such 
circumstances it would be a great hardship’; despite the fact that under carrier law the 
company should not have been liable for more than £10, the jury awarded the plaintiff 
£17.43  
 
On the other hand, railway companies highlighted their status as common carriers 
when it was in their interest to do so. In 1849, for example, a coal merchant sued the 
Midland Railway Company for ‘breach of their duty, as common carriers’ by not 
accepting a shipment of coal; the company successfully argued that common carriers 
had discretion over what type of goods they carried and to where they delivered, and 
were therefore not required to carry a specific type of goods to a specific place if they 
did not offer equivalent service to anyone.44 The same year a plaintiff suing a railway 
carrier for a lost package received only £10 compensation, the limit of carriers’ liability 
if the value of a package had not been declared.45 Railway companies successfully 
used the Carriers’ Act to gain the same exemption from liability as carriers; in an 1856 
case involving damage to a pier glass the railway company defendant argued with 
partial success that ‘the Company was exempt, under the Carriers Act, from liability 
on account of damage.’46  
 
One result of the legal definition of ‘carrier’ evolving to include railway companies was 
a change in the way carrier law protected individual carriers. In Sheffield Sheriff’s 
Court in 1835, for example, Smith v. Wilkinson confirmed that a carrier was only liable 
for the property in his possession over the part of the route for which he was 
responsible. The plaintiff sued a carrier between Rotherham and Sheffield for the loss 
of property sent to him in Shepley; the defendant, however, confirmed that he had 
                                                 
43 Liverpool Mercury, 11 February 1851.  
44 ‘Law Proceedings,’ The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, 30 June 1849; The Hull Packet 
and East Riding Times, 29 June 1849. 
45 ‘Law Intelligence,’ Daily News, 11 December 1849; The Sheffield & Rotherham 
Independent, 22 December 1849.  
46 Wrexham and Denbighshire Weekly Advertiser and Cheshire, Shropshire, Flintshire, and 
North Wales Register, 1 November 1856.  
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delivered it safely to Sheffield and was thus no longer responsible for it.47 By 1841, 
however, common law with respect to carrying had begun to change due to railway 
company practice. In that year Muschamp v. Lancaster and Preston Railway 
Company was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Muschamp, a carrier, had delivered a 
package to the railway company to be sent to someone in Derbyshire, beyond the line 
of the company to which the package was given. In this case the Lancaster & Preston 
Railway Company was found responsible for the package through to its delivery to 
Derbyshire. This case set the precedent that once a package was delivered to any 
railway station, the railway company that received it was responsible for it until it 
arrived at its destination railway station, whether the company itself carried it the 
whole way or not.48  
 
Regulation of railway companies in the nineteenth century 
As I mentioned in my introduction, the relationship between railways and government, 
and government regulation of railways, are topics of interest to historians of transport, 
and a great deal has been written on the subject in the railway company histories I 
mentioned in my introduction. It was acknowledged after the findings of the first Select 
Committee on Railways in 1839 that some government oversight of railway 
companies would be required, as the initial intent of Parliament for carriers to compete 
on a separately-owned infrastructure asset did not reflect the reality of railway 
company policy and operation. In 1854, the Railway and Canal Traffic Act codified 
railway companies’ de facto change from infrastructure asset builders and 
maintainers to carriers of goods. The act declared railway companies carriers, subject 
to the same laws as other carriers. In addition to requiring railway companies to 
provide equal service to all customers at the same rate, and to accept liability for loss 
of or damage to property in their care, companies were also required to forward goods 
expeditiously and not ‘obstruct’ passengers or goods.49 Enforcement of this act was 
ineffective, however, and continuing abuses and further lawsuits resulted in additional 
legislation in 1868 and 1873.50 
 
This very brief outline of the development of railway regulation demonstrates two 
points relevant to this study. First, although as I described in chapter 5 government 
was unable to influence the outcome of the carrying question, it did ultimately develop 
                                                 
47 The Sheffield Independent, and Yorkshire and Derbyshire Advertiser, 3 January 1835. 
48 ‘Nisi Prius.--Monday.’ Preston Chronicle, 27 March 1841. 
49 Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 206; Gibbs, ‘”Of Pious Memory”’, 18, 80-81. 
50 Gibbs, ‘”Of Pious Memory”', 101-103; Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 267. 
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the ability and motivation to regulate the economic behaviour of railway companies. 
Second, although railway companies were initially unwilling to negotiate or 
compromise on anything they perceived as adversely affecting their interests, they 
became subject to increasingly complex and detailed government regulation through 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, eventually resulting in 
nationalisation of the railway network in 1948. 
 
Effects of the change in goods transport on the wider economy 
The change in England’s goods carrying system, from a dense network of small 
carriers collaborating with each other and with supporting businesses to relatively few 
high-capacity corridors managed by railway companies, had significant, though 
largely unacknowledged, effects on the English economy. The edge rail technology 
developed in the northeast in the eighteenth century and disseminated throughout the 
country in the early nineteenth century was a component of a larger mechanism to 
convey a bulk commodity (coal) from a single origin (a pit head) to a single destination 
(a dock or staith). This technology was less suited to the transport requirements of 
dispersed multistage domestic production than that provided by the carrying trade. It 
has been suggested that the railway network caused ‘small rural operations 
previously insulated from the competition of large urban businesses [to be] no longer 
viable’; in fact, the carrying trade facilitated the ability of small rural producers, located 
in low-wage regions outside of guild and corporate control, to compete successfully 
with each other, and with urban businesses.51 As a multitude of connections 
‘hardened’ into fewer high-capacity rail corridors, manufacturers shifted production 
from homes and villages to centralised factories, and consumers began to acquire 
goods from fixed locations in urban centres rather than travelling peddlers and 
temporary markets. Roger Scola outlines the debate among historians over the 
changing relative importance of shops and markets; while his own evidence from 
Manchester and Salford business directories indicates that shops did exist in the area 
in the eighteenth century, his tables show a significant increase in the number of 
shops after the introduction of railway service to Manchester, with no corresponding 
increase in the number of market stalls.52 Christina Fowler notes this change from 
mobile to fixed points of purchase beginning in the eighteenth century, and suggests 
that it related to demographic changes; some of her figures, however, suggest that 
                                                 
51 David Turnock, An Historical Geography of Railways in Great Britain and Ireland (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, c1998), 202. 
52 Roger Scola, ‘Food markets and shops in Manchester 1770-1870’, Journal of Historical 
Geography 1, no. 2 (1975): 156-159, 162. 
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increased use of railways to transport goods may have played a role in accelerating 
this change.53  
 
Summary and conclusions 
As I described in chapter 5, during the 1840s and 1850s the carrying question, 
whether railway companies had the exclusive right to carry goods on their lines, was 
contested between carriers and their supporters and railway companies in the courts, 
in Parliament and in print. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the 
carrying interest had more public backing and more legal support, and was more 
consistent with prevailing business and government ideology; additionally, railway 
companies’ collective decision to exclude the carrying trade from rail goods transport 
may have, at best, been less profitable than operating passenger and small parcels 
service only and collaborating with the carrying trade, and at worst reduced company 
profits. However, by the mid-1850s the carrying question had been largely settled in 
favour of the railway companies.  
 
Although it is impossible to determine with any certainty, I began this chapter by 
offering some speculations on why the railway companies were victorious in the 
conflict over goods carriage. I then described some of the changes in goods transport 
and the wider economy resulting from this outcome of the carrying question. In 
addition to putting carriers out of business or integrating them into railway company 
operations, railway companies began to monopolise not only rail carrying but canal 
carrying as well, purchasing and either operating or removing canals. The word 
‘carrier’, and its associated legal definition, became over the course of several years 
and legal decisions a word applied to railway companies, although railway companies 
initially attempted to evade the responsibilities and obligations that went along with 
being legally defined as carriers. Although railway companies resisted any 
government oversight, either by legislation or by the courts, a series of laws passed 
in the second half of the nineteenth century brought them under increased 
government control. The technical constraints of railway goods carriage began to 
affect where and how goods were produced and acquired. 
  
                                                 
53 Christina Fowler, 'Changes in Provincial Retail Practice during the Eighteenth Century, 
with Particular Reference to Central-Southern England', Business History 40, no. 4 (1998): 
41, 47. 
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Summary and conclusions 
Introduction 
I begin the final chapter of this study with a brief summary and review of the arguments 
presented in previous chapters. I consider the relationship between the structure of 
goods distribution and the structures of production and consumption before and after 
railway company carrying became the predominant model for goods carriage. I 
conclude this chapter with some thoughts on the relevance of this research to related 
fields of study. 
 
Summary of arguments 
I began this study by arguing that our understanding of the change in domestic goods 
transport in England between about 1830 and about 1850, from carriers operating on 
roads, inland waterways and coastal ships to railway companies operating on rail 
lines, is incomplete without a better understanding of the multimodal carrying trade 
and its role in the economy of the long eighteenth century. I argued that although 
some transport and economic historians have identified and described some aspects 
of the carrying trade, their focus on specific modes of transport, geographical areas 
or types of business, or on regional development and industrialisation, as well as a 
common conflation of passenger travel and goods transport, has meant that we do 
not yet have an account of the carrying trade that allows us to assess its role in the 
economy of eighteenth-century England. I have attempted to provide this account in 
the first two chapters of this study. In chapter 1 I developed a more detailed analysis 
of how carriers worked in collaboration with each other, and with the businesses that 
supported them, than has yet been written, and in chapter 2 I showed how carrying 
operated within the economic context of eighteenth-century England using 
contemporary business correspondence. 
 
In chapter 2, drawing on evidence from business correspondence, which showed how 
people interacted with each other to accomplish economic transactions, I argued that 
the carrying trade facilitated and was part of the ‘sociable economy’ identified and 
described by several social historians, particularly E. P. Thompson and Craig 
Muldrew.1 In chapter 3 I began to compare this sociable style of business to the 
transactional and managerial style of joint-stock companies, described and analysed 
by James Taylor and others.2 I argued that the first mainline railway companies can 
                                                 
1 Thompson, Customs in Common; Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation. 
2 Taylor, Creating Capitalism. 
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be viewed as part of the ‘modern management revolution’, and their policies and 
actions can be understood as the economic behaviour of joint-stock companies. 
People accustomed to the sociable style of business, confronted with the 
transactional style of business adopted by joint-stock companies, developed 
strategies to adapt to this change; I used the conflict over London’s water supply in 
the 1820s to illustrate these strategies, how they were deployed, and how 
representatives of joint-stock companies responded. 
 
In chapter 4 I introduced the carrying question of the 1840s - whether railway 
companies had the right to act as exclusive carriers of goods on their lines - and in 
chapter 5 I presented the debate and its outcome. The fact that this question provoked 
public debate shows that the change from the carrying trade to railway company 
carrying was, rather than the technological issue it is usually presented as, in fact a 
political conflict between opposing interests, and between incompatible business 
models. Those supporting the carrying trade used strategies confronting the railway 
companies similar to those of the customers of London’s water supply companies. 
These strategies proved ineffective against the railway companies, however; despite 
opposition from the government and the general public, they eventually achieved 
monopoly goods carriage on their lines. 
 
Finally, in chapters 4 and 6 I analysed the economic and social changes that resulted 
from this change in domestic goods carriage, and some of the effects of that change 
on transport infrastructure and business practice. 
 
This study and the wider research agenda 
Although this study was undertaken to fill a gap in transport and economic history, it 
is relevant to, and draws from, wider historical research. Increased understanding of 
the carrying trade can inform the work of historians of several topics relating to 
eighteenth-century England, including transport infrastructure; industrialisation and 
regionalisation; consumer culture, consumption and fashion; distribution and retailing; 
literacy, letter writing and the postal service; and women's work and family firms. 
 
For more than a century historians have devoted a great deal of consideration to the 
development of England's domestic transport infrastructure - railways, roads and 
turnpikes, inland waterways, and to a lesser extent coastal shipping.3 As I noted in 
                                                 
3 I identified this literature in my introduction. 
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my introduction, with few exceptions most of this work is internally focused, 
addressing the financing, construction and management of this infrastructure rather 
than its use. Better understanding of the carrying trade can provide insight into how 
the businesses that used the infrastructure engaged with it and how their use of the 
infrastructure was shaped both by external factors and by the configuration of the 
infrastructure itself, the change over time in the use of different transport modes and 
assets, and the ways in which these transport modes and assets were functionally 
connected through the carrying trade. 
 
The extensive body of literature on industrialisation during this period, and its relation 
to regionalisation, can also benefit from an understanding of the carrying trade. 
Scholars writing about the causes of the Industrial Revolution have long focused on 
technological, economic and to some extent political factors; more recent work 
considers social and institutional effects on economic development and differentiation 
in the type and extent of industrialisation in regions and sectors.4 Historians of the 
Industrial Revolution have analysed the change in production methods from 
decentralised homes and workshops to factories, and the change in consumption 
patterns from peddlers and temporary markets to fixed and centralised urban retailing. 
This literature generally focuses on the development of production processes and the 
organisation of work, but neglects the role of the distribution network (as distinct from 
transport infrastructure) in facilitating regionalisation and the development of 
geographically separated production processes outside London and provincial cities.5 
Research on distribution is still relatively rare, and researchers seem to take it for 
granted that if transport infrastructure was constructed or improved between two 
locations that trade between them would automatically develop. Although some 
historians recognise that changes in transport technology affected changes in 
production and consumption, few if any have addressed distribution as an economic 
activity in itself, or considered how changes in distribution influenced changes in 
production and consumption. Discussion of the putting-out system of domestic 
manufacture, for example, does not typically consider the transport arrangements that 
                                                 
4 Maxine Berg, Pat Hudson and Michael Sonenscher, 'Manufacture in town and country before 
the factory', in Maxine Berg, Pat Hudson and Michael Sonenscher, eds., Manufacture in Town 
and Country before the Factory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, c1983). 
5 Court, The Rise of the Midland Industries; Maxine Berg, The Age of Manufactures, 1700-
1820: Industry, Innovation, and Work in Britain (London: Routledge, 1994); Stobart, The First 
Industrial Region. 
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must have been in place to move goods between production centres during multi-
stage manufacturing and wholesale and retail sale.6  
 
When transport is mentioned, it is often in a way that suggests little understanding of 
the contemporary transport system. The only mention of transport in Mary B. Rose’s 
analysis of the industrialisation of cotton manufacturing in Lancashire, for example, is 
a description of '[i]mperfect often slow communications over poor roads, or by sea' 
which 'imped[ed] information flows and increas[ed] the danger of loss or damage to 
goods'.7 This phrasing describes infrastructure, not transport, and seems to suggest 
that a different, or previous, system did not ‘impede’ information flows, and 
transported goods with less risk; as I have suggested, the contemporary transport 
system could, possibly with more justification, have been equally described as 
facilitating information exchange and supporting the multi-stage putting out system by 
transporting raw materials, components and finished products. Although it mentions 
Szostak’s argument that improvements in transport infrastructure lowered the costs 
of factory production by increasing efficiency, S. R. H. Jones’s 1994 overview of the 
historical arguments explaining the rise of the factory system in England in the early 
nineteenth century is almost entirely internally focused, and does not consider the 
changing nature of goods carriage, from the carrying trade to the railway network, as 
a possible factor in explaining the shift from ‘outworkers’ to centralised factory 
production.8 The carrying trade was dense, decentralised, responsive to change and 
capable of connecting a web of small manufacturers; railway company goods 
transport was centralised, fixed and unresponsive, which made it more difficult to 
connect small manufacturers and provided communication and distribution 
advantages to places well served by railway links. Understanding the nature of goods 
transport with respect to multi-stage production might also help to explain such 
phenomena as the apparent ‘delay’ in the centralisation of the components of cotton 
cloth manufacture after the technology for mechanising these components became 
available.9 
 
The carrying trade was integral to the development of consumer culture and fashion 
in the eighteenth century. As I discussed in my introduction, although this 
                                                 
6 Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values, 24-27. 
7 Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values, 60. 
8 S. R. H. Jones, ‘Origins of the factory system in Great Britain’, in Business Enterprise in 
Modern Britain, eds. Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (London: Routledge, 1994), 31-60. 
9 Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values, 30-31. 
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development, occurring in parallel with the rise in demand for luxury goods beginning 
with imported 'hot liquors', has attracted scholarly attention since the 1990s, and 
historians have investigated changes in both production and consumption during this 
period, to date little attention has been paid to distribution. The capacity and flexibility 
of the carrying trade helped producers and suppliers of fashionable goods 
accommodate rapid changes in taste. The existence and configuration of the carrying 
network permitted sellers of fashionable goods to exhibit examples in showrooms in 
London while the goods themselves were produced in and shipped from other parts 
of the country. Gillows furniture and Sheffield silver, both shown and sold in London 
showrooms, were manufactured in Lancaster and Sheffield respectively; components 
for the products manufactured in these locations, such as upholstery fabric and 
horsehair, or specialised silver plating and finishing processes, were often produced 
or performed in still other provincial locations or in London. The carrying trade 
facilitated manufacturers’ access to a global market of raw materials from which to 
produce fashionable objects, and distributed these objects throughout the country, 
leading to the formation of a national market and national taste led by London elites.  
 
In conjunction with this distributed method of selling goods, historians have not yet 
recognised the existence, and in some sectors prevalence, of what we would now call 
'mail order' purchasing during the eighteenth-century consumption boom. A recent 
history of mail-order retail begins in the mid-nineteenth century after '[the] advent of a 
cheap, reliable and universal postal service', despite the fact that the carrying trade 
had been providing similar services to elite and middle class consumers for at least a 
century by that time.10 As described in the correspondence I reviewed in chapter 2, 
customers could purchase furniture, fabrics or other household or luxury goods by 
either selecting a product in a firm's showroom or describing it in correspondence with 
the firm’s owners; the firm then manufactured the desired product at its factory, or 
through a distributed network of workshops, and delivered it directly to the buyer via 
carrier. Such a purchasing pattern fits into neither the 'traditional' method of 
purchasing at markets or through travelling peddlers, nor the 'modern' method of 
purchasing directly from an urban retail shop to which goods are delivered.11  
 
                                                 
10 Richard Coopey, Sean O'Connell, and Dilwyn Porter, Mail Order Retailing in Britain: A 
Business and Social History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14. 
11 Stobart, Sugar and Spice, 146. 
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The configuration of the carrying trade both influenced and was influenced by the way 
objects were bought and sold. Carriers often acted as sellers for their customers, 
scheduling their routes to coincide with market days, bringing goods to market, and 
returning with the proceeds. Such markets were replaced by fixed urban retailing as 
the flexible and adaptable carrying trade was replaced by the fixed lines of the 
railways. An understanding of the carrying trade can supplement existing research on 
both the network of peddlers and markets and the fixed retailing system that came to 
replace it.12 
 
Changes in the distribution network also affected interactions between sellers and 
buyers. For example, as Clifford notes, ‘[t]he relationship between a customer and 
retailer often involved more than just the simple exchange of currency for goods’; 
sellers relied on customers to bring in business through customers' social networks 
and to provide intelligence on fashion trends to allow sellers to shape their products 
to appeal to a constantly changing market.13 The shift from selling directly between 
persons to selling from shops required shopkeepers to assess potential buyers and 
make decisions about credit and payment on the spot, rather than using their social 
networks to ascertain a potential buyer's trustworthiness. Economic interaction began 
to rely less on personal relationships and more on formal rules of economic 
engagement used for single-exchange transactions, although participants, with 
varying degrees of success, continued to attempt to apply the rules of personal 
relationships to single-exchange transactions.14 
 
The operation of the carrying trade depended on widespread literacy, as carriers and 
their customers documented the conveyance of goods, coordinated goods transfers, 
and communicated collection and delivery information. Carriers kept detailed written 
records, and carriers' customers provided information on when, where, how and with 
whom goods were being conveyed. Research on the carrying trade can thus 
contribute to recent work on literacy and letter writing in the eighteenth century, and 
the development of a 'culture of correspondence' during this period, by tracking the 
use of these written communications and the development of this documentation over 
time. 
                                                 
12 Fowler, 'Changes in provincial retail practice’.  
13 Helen Clifford, Silver in London: The Parker and Wakelin Partnership 1760-1776 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 138-149. 
14 Hannah Barker, 'Trusting the Money of Strangers in Eighteenth-Century London' (talk, 
University of Liverpool, 14 November 2018). 
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Finally, research on the carrying trade can contribute to our understanding of social 
networks, family businesses and women's work during this and later periods. 
Research into carrying and the transport network could supplement such works as 
Andrew Popp’s Entrepreneurial Families, providing a fuller picture of the social and 
physical networks within which business activity took place in early nineteenth-century 
England.15 The structure of the carrying trade, and changes in carrying service (as 
distinct from changes in transport infrastructure) may have played some part in the 
development and configuration of the regions, networks and clusters Popp identifies 
and describes. 
 
As was, and is, true of many small businesses, entire families participated in the work 
of carrying, and women as well as men owned and managed carrying firms. As early 
as 1630 records mention that the widow of a carrier sought approval to carry between 
Salisbury and London, and a woman is recorded as a carrier for the Eastern 
Association army in the 1640s.16 As I mentioned in chapter 1, women carriers 
appeared in business directories, newspaper articles, and wills, although the 
proportion and actual number of women in the carrying trade, and how these may 
have changed over time, cannot be determined from the demographic information I 
analysed in chapter 4.  
 
By comparison, Davidoff and Hall have noted that  
[r]ailway building and management were closely associated with engineering, 
organized on a large scale as private companies and often staffed on military 
lines, all characteristics uncongenial to women. The heavily male ambience of 
the railway system has not often been commented on but was a significant 
factor in the economy of the second quarter of the nineteenth century.17  
 
The difference between the carrying trade, where the presence of women was 
unremarkable, and railway companies, where women seem to have been all but 
completely excluded, is striking. The 1841 and 1851 census occupation tables for 
England, for example, provide the following figures: 
 
 
                                                 
15 Popp, Entrepreneurial Families. 
16 Susan Bullock, Women and Work (London: Zed Books c1994),109; Anne Laurence, Women 
in England, 1500-1760: A Social History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 127. 
17 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English 
Middle Class, 1780-1850 (London: Routledge 2002), 301.  
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Table 4: Number and percentage of women working in the carrying trade and railways, 
1841 and 1851 
 1841 census 1851 census 
Occupation Number 
of 
men 
listed 
Number 
of 
women 
listed 
% of 
women 
workers 
Number 
of 
men 
listed 
Number 
of 
women 
listed 
% of 
women 
workers 
Carrying trade 58,750 788 1.3 76,327 3,142 4 
Railways 243 2 0.8 54,161 55 0.1 
Source: ‘1841 Census of Great Britain, Occupations’, A Vision of Britain Through 
Time, accessed 14 September 2018, http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/census/table/ 
GB1841OCC_M[1]; Great Britain, Census Office, Census of Great Britain, 1851, ccxli-
ccxlvii. 
 
As I mentioned in my analysis of demographic information in chapter 4, there is a 
clear distinction between the number of women working in the carrying trade and on 
the railways. There is, however, some evidence that women railway workers may 
have been undercounted; an early railway company history mentions that the wives 
of platelayers were often employed as crossing gate keepers, and identifies one 
woman as a signal manager and station manager in the 1830s.18 It is unclear from 
this anecdotal evidence whether a significant enough number of women worked on 
the railways to require a reconsideration of the ‘male ambience’ of the sector.  
 
The apparent absence of women from railway administration, management, and even 
such tasks as cleaning and ticket taking as well as technical work may be partly due 
to the early influence of the armed forces on railway company organisation; in 
addition, however, the nature of joint-stock company management in general may 
have contributed to the lack of women’s involvement in railway companies. Although 
Amanda Vickery’s comprehensive 1993 review of the concept of ‘separate spheres’ 
in the historical literature, and some of the work that has expanded on the topic since 
then, does not seem to consider it, there may be a connection between the growth in 
the dominance of joint-stock companies in the domestic economy, the change from 
relational to transactional business practice, and the increasing dominance of 
business sectors less congenial to women (such as railways) and the decline of 
women’s participation in business management (as compared to the participation of 
women in the labour force generally).19 In her essay Vickery mentions the work of 
                                                 
18 Stretton, The History of the Midland Railway, 31. 
19 Amanda Vickery, ‘Golden Age to Separate Spheres? A Review of the Categories and 
Chronology of English Women’s History’, The Historical Journal 36, no. 2 (June 1993): 409. 
243 
 
 
women in letter-writing, part of the labour involved in in establishing social networks; 
it is possible that some of the work women contributed to the management of family 
firms in developing and maintaining vital social networks and personal connections 
became less significant with the growth of the joint-stock company.  
 
Issues and questions relevant to all of these topics can help to shape the direction of 
further research on the carrying trade. An understanding of the transport infrastructure 
allows us to appreciate the physical and logistical constraints within which carriers 
operated. Understanding the nature and evolution of production and consumption 
during the long eighteenth century, and the sites of interaction between the two, can 
more clearly define the role of the carrier in the chain of activities from extraction of 
raw materials through production to purchasing and consuming. Understanding the 
waves of fashion as well as slower and more general changes in lifestyle and 
consumption patterns during this period can help to explain the changes in volume, 
types, and origins and destinations of goods transported by carriers, and the shifts in 
transport mode choice that resulted from these changes. The way the carrying trade 
operated, using extensive written documentation, only makes sense when coupled 
with our understanding of literacy and the use of the written word by most people of 
the 'middling sort' during this period. Finally, understanding the carrying trade as an 
interconnected network of small family firms, and the comparison of this type of 
business organisation to the large, complex, specialised and hierarchical organisation 
of the joint-stock companies that soon dominated the economic landscape, can be 
informed by research on family firms and women's work during this period. 
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Appendix: Companies cited in chapter 2 
Firm name Firm 
location 
Archive 
location 
Type of goods 
produced/sold 
Type of 
source 
Years 
reviewed 
Locke, Blackett & 
Co. 
Newcastle Tyne and 
Wear 
Archives, 
Newcastle 
Lead and lead 
shot 
out letter 
book 
1741-
1750 
William Lupton & 
Co. 
Leeds Brotherton 
Library, 
Leeds 
Cloth in and 
out letter 
books 
1760-
1851 
Gillows Lancaster Westminster 
City 
Archives, 
London 
Furniture  out letter 
book  
1769-
1841 
Jonathan Michie London Westminster 
City 
Archives, 
London 
Wine out letter 
book  
1770-
1776 
Boulton and 
Fothergill/Matthew 
Boulton/Boulton and 
Fishwick/Boulton 
and Watt 
Soho Birmingham 
Archives and 
Heritage, 
Birmingham 
Central 
Library, 
Birmingham 
Metalwork, 
machinery 
in and 
out letter 
books 
1773-
1845 
Walkers, Fishwick & 
Co. 
Newcastle Tyne and 
Wear 
Archives, 
Newcastle 
Painters’ colours, 
lead and lead 
shot 
in letter 
book 
1786-
1789 
Watson & 
Co./Fenton, Watson 
& Co./ 
Thomas Bradbury & 
Sons 
Sheffield Sheffield 
City Council 
Archives, 
Sheffield 
Silverware 
 
out letter 
book  
1787-
1814 
Wormald, Fountaine 
and Gott/Wormald, 
Gott & 
Wormalds/Benjamin 
Gott & Sons 
Leeds Brotherton 
Library, 
Leeds 
Wool and woollen 
cloth 
in and 
out letter 
books 
1792-
1832 
Thomas Courtney 
Devenish 
London Westminster 
City 
Archives, 
London 
Furniture 
 
out letter 
book  
1796-
1804 
Joseph Trollope & 
Sons 
London London 
Metropolitan 
Archives, 
London 
Wallpaper  in letter 
book  
1797-
1808 
Edward & James 
Richardson 
Newcastle Tyne and 
Wear 
Archives, 
Newcastle 
Leather  out letter 
book 
1806-
1807 
245 
 
 
Joseph Jackson Wakefield John 
Goodchild 
Collection, 
Wakefield 
Wool and woollen 
cloth 
In and 
out 
letters 
1807-
1823 
Dixon & Smith Sheffield Sheffield 
City Council 
Archives, 
Sheffield 
Silver  out letter 
book  
1809-
1820 
Fielden Brothers Todmorden University of 
Manchester 
Archives, 
Manchester 
Cotton textiles  out letter 
book 
1811-
1838 
Skelton & Wells Leeds Brotherton 
Library, 
Leeds 
Wine  out letter 
book 
1814-
1832 
Harrison’s Nursery 
Garden 
London London 
Metropolitan 
Archives, 
London 
Seeds, bulbs and 
plants 
out letter 
book 
1818-
1827 
Thomas Nowill & 
Sons 
Sheffield  Sheffield 
City Council 
Archives, 
Sheffield 
Silverware  in letter 
book 
1819-
1821 
George Hattersley & 
Sons, R. Hattersley 
& Sons 
Keighley West 
Yorkshire 
Archives, 
Bradford 
Machine parts in letters 1824-
1866 
H. Singers & Co. Gateshead Tyne and 
Wear 
Archives, 
Newcastle 
Wine, spirits, 
vinegar 
in letters 1826-
1832 
Hindley & Sons London Westminster 
City 
Archives, 
London 
Furniture  out letter 
book  
1835-
1844 
 
Locke, Blackett & Co. 
John Locke, a London lead merchant, and Christopher Blackett, a Newcastle coal and 
lead manufacturer, founded a company in Newcastle in 1797 to produce red and white 
lead and lead shot. They appear to have sent their goods primarily by coastal ship. 
 
William Lupton & Co. 
William Lupton Sr. began the family’s cloth-dressing business in the mid-eighteenth 
century; the business was formally established in 1773. His son and grandson, also 
named William, and his grandson’s widow, Ann, continued the business. 
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Gillows 
Robert Gillow began manufacturing furniture in Lancaster in 1729, eventually 
developing a large business with a showroom in London and global connections to 
suppliers and customers. The firm made and sold bespoke furniture for fashionable 
customers and off the shelf, sometimes self-assembly furniture for middle-class 
buyers. On Robert Gillow’s death, his sons Richard and Robert assumed 
management of the firm, Robert based in the London showroom and Richard at the 
Lancaster workshop. Gillows sent furniture from Lancaster by waggon (their own or a 
carrier’s), by canal from Liverpool, and by coastal ship from Liverpool. 
 
Jonathan Michie 
Jonathan Michie of London, wine merchant, was a client of solicitor Frederick Booth, 
amongst whose papers his letter book was found. Michie did a substantial business 
with the East India Company and with customers in North America, as well as buyers 
in England. Orders were sent by coach, waggon, canal and coastal ship. 
 
Boulton and Fothergill/Matthew Boulton/Boulton and Fishwick/Boulton and Watt 
Matthew Boulton developed a wide variety of businesses over the course of his 
lifetime. Before going into business with James Watt to produce steam engines, he 
and his partners manufactured small metalwork such as toys, buttons and buckles. 
The extensive Archives of Soho (the factory near Birmingham) are now held at the 
Birmingham Central Library.  
 
Walkers, Fishwick & Co. 
Walkers, Fishwick and Co. were founded in 1785 as a merger of firms producing 
painters’ colours, red and white lead, and later lead shot. Aside from their factory in 
Newcastle, the firm had premises in London, Chester, Derby, Liverpool and 
elsewhere. They primarily sent their goods by coastal ship from Newcastle to other 
parts of Britain. 
 
Watson & Co./Fenton, Watson & Co./Thomas Bradbury & Sons Ltd. 
The silversmithing firm eventually known as Thomas Bradbury & Sons Ltd. began as 
a partnership of three silversmiths active in Sheffield at least since 1769. In the late 
eighteenth century they produced silver and silver plated goods in Sheffield which 
they sold through a showroom in London. Goods were sent by several modes, and 
often travelled on more than one mode; goods were also sent overseas through 
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agents in London and Liverpool. Their correspondence mentions several carriers by 
name, including Hibberson, Hunt & Sons, Andertons Waggon, Clarkes Waggon and 
Lyes Waggon. 
 
Wormald, Fountaine and Gott/Wormald, Gott & Wormalds/Benjamin Gott & Sons 
Benjamin Gott began his career in woollen textile manufacturing in 1780 as an 
apprentice at Wormald and Fountaine. Five years later, at the end of his 
apprenticeship, he became a junior partner in the firm with the help of an investment 
from his father, John Gott. 1791 Gott became the senior partner after the death of 
Joseph Fountaine and retirement of John Wormald. In 1805 he opened Armley Mills, 
the largest wool factory in the world at that time. Gott introduced technical innovations 
to the cloth manufacturing process, including the use of steam power and power 
looms. In 1825 he transferred the business to his sons John and William. 
 
Thomas Courtney Devenish 
Thomas Courtney Devenish, a London cabinet maker and upholsterer, was a client 
of solicitor Frederick Booth, amongst whose papers his letter book was found. 
Devenish's letter book mentions shipments by both land and water. 
 
Joseph Trollope & Sons 
This London firm was founded by Joseph Trollope, a wallpaper hanger, in 1778. They 
often sent samples and wallpapers by coach, though they were occasionally directed 
to send purchases by waggon. 
 
Edward & James Richardson 
The Richardson family had been tanners since the seventeenth century, originally in 
Great Ayton and later in Whitby and Newcastle. They sent and received goods mostly 
by water, and were active in organising coastal voyages from Newcastle to ports in 
Wales and southwest England. 
 
Joseph Jackson 
Little information is available about Joseph Jackson, wool-stapler, except that the 
warehouse on King Street in Wakefield was built for his firm in 1811, and that Titus 
Salt, who later built Salts Mill and Saltaire in Yorkshire, was his apprentice there. 
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Dixon & Smith/James Dixon & Son 
James Dixon and Thomas Smith began producing silver, silver plated, and Britannia 
metal goods in Sheffield around 1806. The firm continued to expand throughout the 
early nineteenth century; Thomas Smith left the firm, and William and James Dixon, 
James Dixon’s sons, joined it. They sent goods by several modes within Britain as 
well as overseas via their agent in Liverpool. They preferred to send their merchandise 
by Hunts Waggon, but letters also mention Johnsons Waggon and Lister & Co. 
 
Fielden Brothers 
Joshua Fielden of Todmorden founded a cotton spinning factory in 1783; his sons 
took over on his retirement in 1803. The firm expanded during the early nineteenth 
century, developing overseas markets and upgrading its machinery. Raw cotton was 
sent to them via packhorse and canal boat; they preferred to send finished goods via 
inland waterway. 
 
Skelton & Wells 
The Leeds Directory for 1817 contains an entry for Skelton & Wells, wine merchants, 
at premises in Albion Street in Leeds. In 1860 Thomas Casson bought the business 
from Frank Richardson & Co, and Skelton & Wells are named as their predecessors. 
 
Harrisons Nursery 
Henry Hewitt had opened a nursery in Kensington by 1775, which sold vegetable and 
flower seeds, bulbs from Holland, and seedlings for shrubs and both ornamental and 
agricultural trees. Some were grown at the nursery but most were grown by country 
farmers. Harrisons shipped to buyers all over England, largely by coach and waggon; 
water transport is mentioned infrequently. Buyers occasionally arranged to meet 
Harrisons' own waggon at designated locations.  
 
Thomas Nowill & Sons 
Thomas Nowill founded a silverware and cutlery manufacturing firm in Sheffield in 
1700, which passed through various generations of Nowills until 1949. The firm seems 
to have sent urgent orders, often for shipment overseas, by coach, though some are 
noted as sent by waggon. 
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R. Hattersley & Sons/George Hattersley & Sons 
After serving as an apprentice at Kirkstall Forge near Leeds, Richard Hattersley 
started his own business in 1789 in Airworth, and later Keighley, manufacturing nuts, 
bolts, screws and other small parts for textile machines. He eventually shared the 
business with his sons. The firm employed both road and water carriers and 
occasionally sent small items by coach. 
 
H. Singers & Co. 
Hugh Singers, born in Edinburgh in 1787, went into business in Gateshead as a 
vinegar manufacturer, later adding wines and spirits to his merchandise. His son 
Archibald travelled around the north of England collecting orders. They sent their 
goods by coach, waggon, and water.  
 
Charles A. Hindley 
Charles A. Hindley established an upholstery and furniture shop in London in 1773. 
Most of Hindley's goods appear to have been sent by waggon; the only water 
shipment mentioned in this correspondence is of pattern blocks for fabric 
manufacture.  
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